University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1988

Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment
1941-1946: The force of tradition
Anita Louise Coryell
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Coryell, Anita Louise, "Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment 1941-1946: The force of
tradition" (1988). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5179.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5179

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Th is
s u b s is t s

A PP RO VED

is

.

an

Any
BY

THE

u n p u b l is h e d
further

m a n u s c r ip t

r e p r in t in g

of

in

it s

w h ic h

c o p y r ig h t

contents

must

AUTHOR.
Ma n s f i e l d

L ib r a r y

Un i v e r s i t y
Da t e :

,

1 ,

of

Mo n t a n a

be

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT,
1941-1946:

THE FORCE OF TRADITION

By
Anita Louise Coryell
B.A., Rutgers, The State University, 1974
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1988

Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

lusrt/J
Date

UMI Number: EP40643

All rights reserved
IN FO R M A TIO N TO ALL USER S
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
Bjwsrtalkm

UMI E P 40643
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

nest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1 3 4 6

4•1'

Coryell, Anita Louise, M.A., June 1988

History

Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of Containment,
1941-1946: The Force of Tradition (185 pp.)
Director:

•

'

Frederick W. Skinner '/

'

•

U—
■

The role which ideology has played in the formation of
Russian and American foreign policy was the impetus for this
project. Soviet-American diplomacy during the period 1941 to
1946 became the focus of the study after several projects
pointed to the role that ideology played in the relationship
between Russia and America during the years 1945 to 1947. After
discovering the role which ideology played, it became necessary
to find the origins of such a role, as well as the felt necessity
by each nation to implement ideology into the formation of its
policy. The origins of each nation1s ideology led to the
discovery of traditions in the way each nation conducted its
foreign relationships. These traditions go beyond ideology,
although ideology is often a part of the tradition. After a
close evaluation of each nation's history in the formation of
foreign relationships, the tradition was identified. It was
found that Russia, and later the Soviet Union, had a tradition of
conventional European power politics; its policy during the war
years was based on its own national interests and maintaining the
global status quo in its favor. The American tradition was more
complicated; although interested in preserving the global status
quo in its favor, the American tradition also involved spreading
justice and democracy throughout the world, thereby changing the
status quo. The American tradition also involved convincing the
American public to accept Washington's foreign policy decisions,
doing whatever was necessary to gain approval.
The American and
Russian traditions proved to be incompatible during the years of
the Grand Alliance. Roosevelt tried to bridge the gap between
the two traditions, but he did not succeed. His successors were
left with the problem of balancing the power of Europe and
containing the Soviet Union in a way that was compatible with the
American tradition. The origins of containment can be found in
these two traditions and Roosevelt's attempt to bridge the gap
between Soviet power politics and America's quest to assure its
national interests through the establishment of democratic
capitalism.
ii
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The tradition of all past generations weighs like an Alp upon the
brain of the living.
—

Karl Marx
18th Brumaire (1852)

Tradition is a great retarding force, the vis inertiae of history,
—

Friedrich Engels
Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (1891)

The effigies and splendors of tradition are not meant to cramp the
energies or the development of a vigorous and various nation. They
are not meant to hold in mortmain the proper territory of human
intelligence and righteous aspiration.
They live and teach their
lessons in our annals, they have their own worshippers and shrines,
but the earth is not theirs nor the fulness thereof.
—

Lord Roseberry
Address at Aberdeen
5 November 1880
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PREFACE

Other

than the

causes

of

World

War

I,

there

has

been more

literature written about the origins of the Cold War than any other
period in history.

The reasons why are as numerous as the writings

themselves, but three acme readily to my mind.

First, the Soviet Union

and the United States managed to remain allies in fairly good standing
throughout the war, proving that the two nations had the capacity to
cooperate when necessary.

What broke up the coalition is one source of

fascination for historians.

Secondly, all nations must live with the

Cold War and its aftermath— the arms race.

An understanding of the

causes of such a precarious situation is instrumental in rectifying or
neutralizing the conflict.

Lastly, the nature of the conflict is often

thought of as ideological, and Americans have been led to believe that
the democratic integrity of the United States, indeed the entire globe,
is at
goals.

stake if the Soviet Union succeeds in achieving any of its
For this

reason,

historians

have

felt

compelled to either

criticize or condone the foreign policy of America, placing the blame
on either the United States for being too idealistic, or the Soviet
Union for allowing its oonmunistic doctrine to justify any means used
to gain the end— ultimate control of the world, for the good of all
mankind of course.
The part which ideology has played in the

formation

of

both

nations' foreign policy has held a fascination for me during my course
of study.

The Soviet Union admits it upholds a certain ideology— the

doctrine

of Marxism-Leninism,

and

claims

to

proudly

base

all

its

policies, both foreign and domestic, on the determination to remain
true

to

its

classless,

professed

ccnmunistic

creed

and

society.

ambition— the
What

part

establishment
has

of

a

Marxism-Leninism

actually played in Russia's foreign policy decisions, however, and to
what extent does the Kremlin simply use the doctrine to mask its true
motives?
Determining the role

ideology has played in the formation of

America's foreign policy is a bit more difficult.

One man did not take

a distinct philosophy and forge a new nation on its premises, as did
Lenin. However, America is still a mythological nation to a certain
extent, the hone of the brave and the land of the free.

United States

policy makers have had to contend with the fable that every action
America takes is for the sake of justice and liberty; to what extent
did this idea affect the formation of America's foreign policy goals
and to what extent has Washington been able to discard such ideals?
The search for the origins of the containment policy as it was
finally penned in 1947 by Harry S. Truman's Doctrine and George F.
Kerman's
America

famous
and

"X Article"

Russia.

By

did not begin with the

first

exploring

the

part

ideologies

which

of

America's

ideology played in the Cold War, and then coming to an understanding of
Stalin's war aims and the reasons behind his goals, it became obvious
that each nation had a

distinct

"tradition"

in foreign policy,

a

tradition so integral to its decision-making process that it could not
be avoided or ignored even if the policy makers were aware of its
existence.

Roosevelt was painfully aware of the tradition in American

foreign policy; Truman did not appear to be.

Stalin, because he had to

answer to no one, did not bother to concern himself with anything but
his goals; indeed, that reality is a part of the Soviet tradition in
foreign policy.
The paper took several turn-abouts as research proceeded.

At

first, it was thought the period examined would have to extend to 1949.
It then became obvious that the origins of the policy

lay somewhere

between

It was still

the eighteenthcentury and Roosevelt's

death.

f

important to examine the years between Roosevelt's death and the Truman
Doctrine, for the origins of containment could be seen in the actions
and heard in the words

of the men who succeeded FDR. The Russian

tradition began as far back as the ninth century, but the age of
Russian

expansion and the Russian Revolutionwas

examined.

the

most

closely

Consequently, the paper begins with a careful examination of

how the tradition in each nation's foreign policy evolved, and then
closely examines the period which planted the seeds of containment.
The thesis is not about the policy of containment itself, and makes no
attempt to discuss the actual policy, its consequences or attributes.
The writer felt certain, at first, that George Kennan's role would
be indispensable.
also.
achieve

Research found a stumbling block in this premise,

Kennan may have penned the word,
the

kind

of

policy he

tradition in foreign policy.

wanted.

but his writings did not
The reason:

the

American

With or without Kennan's contribution,

Russia would have to be contained.

Stalin's goals had much to do with

the Russian tradition, as did the clarity with which he stated them.
His clarity could not be dealt with in the terms ordained by America's
vii±

tradition in foreign relations.
In the end the author was pleased with the research, for it did
not prove the ideas first held regarding the matter.

Sources relied

upon were the memoirs of the characters involved, their conversations
with and about each other.

Secondary sources were relied upon to

establish the traditions in each nation's foreign policy, but chapters
two and three attempted to dispense with secondary sources and turn to
the memoirs of the foreign policy makers in each nation.

Chapter One— The Traditions

The Policies

Since the Soviet Union's stormy inception in 1917, the concept of
a bi-polar world has existed in the foreign policies of America and
Russia.

Each

respective

country

political

has

wished

system,

each

harbinger of world peace and

to

see

the

claiming

security.

world

its

molded

system

to

The Carmunists

in

its

be

the

boasted

of

socialism as their economic base, maintaining its uniqueness in a world
exploited by high-finance.

America's Republic, however, was certain

capitalism was the true expression of individualism and freedom.
There is more to the chasm, however, than two opposing political
systems.

Ivo J. Lederer made the observation that Russian relations

with the outside world have always been notably unstable,

and past

generations have faced their cwn particular problems with Russia.1 As
Cyril E. Black pointed out in one of his essays on Russian foreign
policy

objectives,

Russia

has

always

been

a

Europe's balance of power by sheer size alone.

potential
2

threat

to

Such a massive area

could easily achieve world hegemony if it had the necessary strength
and will.

Alexis de Toqueville visited the United States in 1830.

His

observations led him to the conclusion that America and Russia held the
fate of the globe in their hands, and this was years before oarmunism
had

become

a

part

of

the

Russian

system.

Toqueville

obviously

recognized the dormant power latent in both Russia and the United

2
States, nations occupying two of the globe's largest continents, both
rich in natural and economic resources.
There are at present two great nations in the world
which seem to tend tcwards the same end, although they
start frcm different points. I allude to the Russians and
the Americans....Their starting point is different and
their courses are not the same, yet each of them appears to
be marked by t^e will of heaven to sway the destinies of
half the globe.

Throughout the despairing relationship between the Soviet Union and the
United

States, neither has

trusted

the

other

to

share

the

vital

resources and raw materials necessary to maintain power and hegemony in
a world which places the utmost importance upon the two.
there

appears

relations,

and

to

be

it

is

two

diverse

usually

aspects

difficult

of

to

Soviet

tell

Therefore

and

which

American

one

takes

precedence when the policies are being made— ideology or the quest for
economic and political power.
This

is why the account of hew the two foremost industrially

powerful nations on earth came to be adversaries is one of convolusion,
of economic and national security interests shrouded in ideology and
masked by noble and lofty ideals.

A truly objective eye would soon

tire of trying to discern the truth of the story, of exactly what
happened in the years following the Bolshevik Revolution to produce a
world engaged in Russia's and America's Cold War. The foreign policies
of these two nations have often been directed against each other and
there

has

been

little

rocm

in

the

past

for

compromise

in

their

dichotcmous systems.
The officially stated foreign policy of the Soviet Union is to
stop aggressors and ensure the peace and independence of the world,

3
which

is

constantly

being

threatened

by

high-finance

capitalists

seeking to exploit weaker nations and hence thwart their liberation
fran the yoke of low wages and poverty.
exploiter,

"who

new plays

the

role

America is the world's biggest
of

world

policeman

aiming

to
4

strangle

any

liberation

movement

in

any

part

of

the

globe."

Interestingly, there are several American historians who would agree
with the Soviet assessment of America's foreign policy goals.

5

It is more difficult to discern a succinct and definitive foreign
policy for the United States. Unlike the Soviet Union, which touts an
officially
rhetoric,

stated

foreign

American

policy

policy
has

commensurate

developed

according to historical dictates.

with

gradually

Ccmmunist

Party

over

years

the

Since World War II it has been not

only to contain ocmmunism, which threatens the world with censorship,
totalitarianism,

and

the

curtailment

of

basic

civil

and

political

liberties integral to free societies, but also to "change the nature of
the Soviet System itself."^ America's foreign policy goals have been
explicitly based on the principle of self-determination for all nations
ever since 1941 when the Atlantic Charter was penned.

American foreign

policy makers have always felt the political system of the Soviet Union
7
to be the antithesis of this principle. In 1985, George Schultz told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
driven

by

positive

goals— peace,

"American foreign policy is

democracy,

liberty,

and

human

O

rights...These are not Soviet goals."
Because America's foreign policy is to contain ccmnunism, it is
essential to understand the development and aims of Russia's foreign
9
policy

from

1917

to

1941.

It

was

during

these

years

that

4
Marxist-Leninist ideology was forced to succumb to the global realities
of the 1920's and

'30's. Expediency supplanted ideology during this

time, but it did not become a substitute for it.
never

understand

the

obstinancy

of

the

United

Furthermore, one can
States

to

contain

communism unless America's perceptions of Soviet foreign policy are
understood.

Perhaps this is why Donald Bishop, author of a two-volume

study on Soviet foreign policy, wrote that "the decisions of Soviet
leaders affect us more than the decisions of our cwn people.
The reality of Soviet foreign policy, however, if it can be found,
may be quite different frcm America's perception of it, or what America
claims its perception to be.

Moscow officially claims to adhere to the

Marxist dialectic, and believes capitalism's demise is inherent within
the system itself.

Therefore, war or territorial aggrandizement is not

necessary to bring down capitalistic nations: they will simply fall.11
In the years directly following Wbrld war II, several American foreign
policy makers discounted the official party-line and instead chose to
believe

ccmnunist

expansion

to

be

a

goal

of

the

Soviet

Union.

12

Stalin's stated purpose for wanting to extend his western frontier, to
protect his badgered nation against future invasion, was not accepted
either.

A crucial question asked by Moscow at the time, is whether the

United States truly believed Russia was aggressively planning to expand
its communist ideology to encircle the globe, or if it simply claimed
to

believe

that

in

order

to

protect

its

cwn

national

whatever they were, at the cost of Soviet friendship.
when the Truman Doctrine was issued:

interests,

As Stalin said

"The cry of saving Greece and

Turkey from the expansion of the so-called 'totalitarian states' is not

5
new.

Hitler used to refer to the Bolsheviks when he wanted to open the

road for his own conquests."
And

what

of

13

Moscow's

perception

of

American

foreign

policy?

Capitalistic encirclement of the globe is scmething to fear if a nation
is not capitalistic, but is that actually America's intention?

The

Soviet Union does not view containment as a defensive policy; it is
instead a mask to cover up an offensive policy designed to export
capitalistic exploitation to all parts of the world in order to achieve
the optimum amount of economic power possible for the United States."^
If the United States foreign policy of containment was determined
by imperialistic self-interests as the Soviets claimed, how does one go
about proving that, especially if American foreign policy makers state
otherwise?

By the same token, if Washington chose to believe Soviet

foreign policy goals were not what Moscow purported them to be, where
is the basis for mutual cooperation?

There comes a time when truth and

reality merge with ideology and perception.

In fact, it may not be

possible at all to derive the true motives which formulated the foreign
policies of the two, newly endowed superpowers in the crucial years,
1941-1946.

All that can be seen are the results.

The key point to remember about each nation's foreign policy is
that both claimed to be striving for world peace, true democracy and
egalitarian values.

How is it possible both powers could profess to

offer the only viable political system for attaining these goals when
the systems were so dichotcmous?

The question,

like the answer, is

ambivalent because the truth in this story is not objective, nor can it
be.

It

is opaque,

obscure,

subject

to

years,

even

centuries,

of

6
historical

traditions,

circumstances

and

attitudes.

The

studies

undertaken to explore these historical traditions are voluminous, and
they have their place and importance in assessing what happened to
produce two foreign policies so much at odds with each other that they
threaten

the

peace

of

the

world.

More

than

anything

else,

an

understanding of the traditions and circumstances that helped to shape
these nations' ideologies and ultimately their

foreign policies is

imperative in establishing a rapport and empathy between the two.

The Russian Tradition: "We shall turn to you our alien
Asiatic snout."

In 1961 Theodore Von Laue wrote an article for a Yale Conference
convened to explore the problems of a century of Russian/Soviet foreign
policy.

According to Von Laue, Russia has always felt a compulsion to

compare itself with the West; and the deepest motivation for forming
foreign

policy has

come

from this

"evaluation,"

internal conditions of the state itself.

15

and not

from the

To understand this contest

between Russia and the West, one needs to go back in tin®.
back is a matter of interpretation and thoroughness.

Hew far

Louis J. Halle's

The Cold War As History goes as far back as the ninth century.

Seeing

an abundance of continuity and little change over the centuries, Halle
simplistically states:
Fear, rather than ambition, is the principal reason
for the organization and expansion of the Russian society.
If all my ancestors for ten centuries had died violent
deaths at the hands of their neighbors, it is quite likely
that I would have been brought up frotv^^childhood to be
suspicious and hostile tcward my neigbors.

7
This is quite a generalization, and one must be careful not to put too
much credence in pat generalizations that span centuries, for they can
too easily become explanations for complex situations.

It is true,

though, that Russia's history has brought about a peculiar xenophobia,
especially of the West.
The single, most pervasive reason for Russia's history to have
developed as it did was its geography.

17

Over the years historians have

debated Russia's geographical status— was it part of Europe or Asia?
According to historian Robert Byrnes, geographically Russia has always
been in the West, but she has never been a part of it.

18

To understand

the logic of his reasoning, it is necessary to go back to the ninth
century; and although it may seem extreme to traverse ten centuries to
understand a situation in 1944, Russian history developed differently
than the West's and the nation became locked into an alien political
system feared and abhored by the "free" world.
The vast European plain to where the Slavic peoples migrated in
the eighth century was void of natural, protective boundaries.

Tibor

Szamuely, author of The Russian Tradition, writes that the area was
"worlds

apart

fran

that

of

western

and

unbroken, unchanging and unending plain."

19

central

Europe,

a

vast,

This plain, or the southern

steppe, is the one region where arable soil can be found on the huge
Russian landmass.

The steppe stretches frcm Kiev south to the Black

Sea, then moves eastwardly, declining in width as it expands toward
Siberia. This area of a quarter billion acres is new the center of
Soviet agriculture.
The Slavs, though, were not to knew the bounty of the steppe until

8
the end of the sixteenth century.
mountains,

the

population

Lacking the protection of seas and

residing

on

the

steppe

was

constantly

subjected to invasion and pillaging by ncmadic tribes seeking to gain
control of the fertile area.

Szamuely wrote of the invasions,

"of

which the length, intensity and ferocity has no parallel in the annals
of any other nation."

20

Each invasion sent the Slavs fleeing in fear

frcm the steppe into the formidable forest of northeastern Europe, near
the region where a small, insignificant ostrog named Moscow was located
on the Moskva River. Moscow, well inside the forest's interior, offered
wonderful protection to an already xenophobic population, conditioned
by centuries of incursion.

It was here that Russia grew 15)— in a bleak

forest situated on the same latitude as Canada, in a climate barely
able to support life, far away frcm the thriving cosmopolitan centers
to the south and west.
The most definitive blew to the steppe would cane frcm the Mongol
invasion

of

1237-1240.

Any

Slavs

remaining

on

the

plain

fled

northward, leaving the rich Ukraine area to the Tartar control of the
Golden Horde. Their conquest would last 250 years, depriving the Russ,
as

the

Slavs

were

sometimes

called,

of

the

light

of

Western

advancements as they were being made.
The cultural contributions the Mongols made to the population they
dominated were, on the other hand,

nominal.

The Mongols interfered

little with everyday Russian life.

They disliked the confinement of

the forest and stayed out of it.
How much

influence

the Mongols

controversial issue among historians.

had

upon the Russ

remains

a

Although they interfered little

9
in everyday life, Szamuely writes that "The infiltration of Russian
society by Mongol concepts and practices was a gradual and insidious
process that covered a long period of time."
however,
Mongolian

stresses
impact

that
on

extracting tribute,

caution

Russia.

must

Their

"and they were

Russians to their cwn ways."

22

be

21

Nicholas Riasanovsky,

used

primary

when

assessing

interest

was

perfectly willing to

the

only

in

leave the

It is possible over the years that the

Mongols taught the Russ, through example, what was eventually utilized
to

threw off the

yoke

of

the Golden Horde:

absolute,

autocratic rule and unqualified submission to the state.
Szamuely,

the

Tartars

had

provided

Russians, and they learned it well.

23

this

kind

of

centralized
According to

paradigm

to

the

One thing is certain: a highly

centralized state and autocratic ruler finally consolidated Russia,
ending the appanage period and throwing off the Mongol rule.
Whatever

its

source,

the

Russian

people

24

experienced

state

domination and subjugation while the rest of Europe became immersed in
the

concepts

of

the

Magna

Carta,

the

contractual

partnership

characteristic of the medieval feudal system, and the Reformation of
the sixteenth century.

Russian historian Kliuchevsky wrote:

If one thinks of the amount of time and the material
and spiritual forces consumed in this wearying, painful
pursuit of the cunning steppe predator, one can hardly ask
what the people of Eastern Europe were doing while Western
Europe was achieving its triumphs in industry, commerce, in
social life, in the arts and the sciences.

Instead of learning of the liberal political systems much of Western
Europe would adopt

in the centuries to ccme,

Russia

learned of a

peculiar state social system, where all classes were utilized to serve

10
the state for the purposes of defense against the alien invader.
The Tartar Khans continued to penetrate the northern regions for
centuries, to capture and enslave the population.

"Year after year, an

unending procession of young Russians disappeared into the Crimea."
Securing the northern region frcm Tartar

incursion and

26

closing the

southern steppe to invaders became a priority of the Russian state well
into

the

unrelenting

eighteenth

century.

invasions,

had

Muscovy,

to

become,

in

out

order
of

to

cranbat

necessity,

centralized state, well-organized and controlled frcm above.
resources,

what

little

were

left

after

the

Mongol

a

the

highly

Economic

Khanates

had

extracted their purse, had to be collected and utilized for the purpose
of defeating the Golden Horde. This objective was the only priority,
turning Russia into a military state.

Halle compares this aspect of

Russia's development with America's:
The United States, expanding over a rich and empty
continent, could afford the luxury of democratic self-rule,
of individualism, of free enterprise.
The whole Russian
society, by contrast, had to be organized for continuous
military defense. Its government had to be in a position
of total control, so that it could maneuver freely, and so
that it could ccmmand the forces necessary |^r the vital
defense of the besieged and embattled society.

Kliuchevsky had this to say: "The Muscovite state, in the name of the
cannon welfare,

took

into

its

full

control

all

the

energies

and

resources of society, leaving no scope for the private interests of
individuals or of classes."

28

In 1550, Ivan the Terrible destroyed the large Khanates of Kazan
and Astrakhan and annexed their territory into Muscovy. This cleared
the way for Russia to begin expanding into the more fertile lands to

11
the south.

Beyond Kazan lay Siberia. Russia began its expansion, but

according to Halle it was a "peculiar" kind of expansion, done out of
fear.

Without natural boundaries, the only protection was to spread

out as far as possible, to use space as a defense.
The danger of invasion, however, came not only frcm the south and
east,

but frcm the west as well.

In the thirteenth century major

incursions came frcm Europe. The Holy Crusades brought the Germanic
Teutonic Knights, a formidable foe who swept eastward into the Baltic
area.

In 1239 the Germans advanced with the Finns as their allies, and

in 1240 the Swedes invaded.

These penetrations were only the beginning

of a continuous and ominous onslaught frcm the west and northwest.

In

the early part of the seventeenth century Poland invaded, and for two
years occupied Moscow. The Swedes became involved in this dispute as
well,

and would

century.

attack

again

in

the

beginning

of

the

eighteenth

Peter the Great finally subdued them in 1709. The invasions

frcm the west and northwest left a more indelible fear in the Russians
than had the Mongol occupation.
single event or circumstance,

These assaults, more than any other
influenced the development of Russian

foreign policy in subsequent years.
Cyril Black maintains the Baltic frontier has been the scene of
Russia's longest and most significant political turmoil.
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Unprotected

by natural boundaries, the quest to secure this borderland has spanned
two

centuries

and

resulted

in

the

bitter

circumstances

that

precipitated America's containment policy and the Cold war. In 1709
Peter the Great mounted a successful campaign to annex the Ukraine into
the empire.

By 1795 the western frontier had been conquered.

In 1815

with the defeat of Napoleon Russia moved farther into Poland, and in
spite of several rebellions the eastern portion of Poland remained a
part of the Russian empire until World War I. At that time Lenin's
separate peace with Germany resulted in several heavy losses for the
young

Soviet

region.

state,

including

the

entire

Ukraine

and

the

Baltic

Although the Treaty of Versailles restored most of the Ukraine

to the Bolsheviks, it contained many anti-Bolshevik points as well,
weakening
Finland

Russia

was

even

made

a

further and
separate

liberating

state,

as

was

the

Baltic

Estonia,

frontier.

Latvia,

and

Lithuania. New states were created, carved mostly frcm the destroyed
Austro-Hungarian
Yugoslavia.

and

Turkish

empires— Hungary,

Bulgaria and Rumania were enlarged.

Czechoslovakia

and

Poland was made a

sovereign nation, the first time in over 100 years.

This created a

barrier, a series of buffer states, preventing Russia frcm expanding
and shutting her off frcm the West. The destruction of this

'cordon

sanitaire' would become the driving principle behind Stalin's diplomacy
during the Second World War; never again, he vowed, would Germany be
able to march through those hostile buffer states.

Stalin succeeded in

securing his war aims, and the Russian empire onoe more came to include
the frontier which borders Western Europe.
Louis Halle is tempted to discuss Russia's expansion in terms of
geopolitics and a xenophobic fear of the West. This approach is far too
simple, for imperialistic Russia also extended eastward, into Siberia
and

eventually

Japan

and

Manchuria,

using

the

same

imperialistic

methods practiced by Britain, France and America in the nineteenth
century.Historian Hugh Seton-Watson writes:
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The Russian record is neither better nor worse than
the others. Russian expansion in the Volga valley has its
parallels in the Spanish reconquista, the absorption of the
Ukraine in the French absorption of Burgandy and Lorriane,
and the colonisation of Siberia in the colonisation of
North America... .Indeed the Russo-Japanese war share with
the Anglo-Boer war the distinction of more nearly
approaching the Marxist model of an imperialistic war
undertake for economic motives than any other example in
history.

Lenin denounced imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism.
Yet the notion of

national

self-determination,

so

integral

to

the

abolition of imperialistic colonies, became something which the young
Bolsheviks expounded in theory only, not practice.

Lenin seemed to

tread the Marxist path with practical feet, and he succumbed to a more
traditional foreign policy which had Russia's best national interests
at heart.

He made Joseph Stalin Commissar of Nationalities, and in

1918 Stalin told the Third All-Russian Congress that the principle of
self-determination must be an instrument in the struggle for socialism
and must be subordinated to the principle of socialism.
republic could be expected to secede frcm the union.
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NO national
Stalin never

wavered from this approach to Marxist-Leninist foreign policy, creating
a blatant paradox within the Soviet tradition of foreign policy.

It

was one thing to condemn the West's imperialistic policies and call
them

exploitative;

it

would

be

yet

another

to

allow

national

self-determination in the Soviet empire if such a practice threatened
the power base of the newly-formed U.S.S.R.
This paradox is evident throughout the study of Russian history.
Denouncement

of

Western

culture

and

political

systems

essential to the survival of this backward nation,

has

been

so obviously an

anomaly when compared to Western Europe and the U.S. Yet emulation of
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the West has also been necessary in order for Russia to compete with
the

industrially

superior

nations

of

the

world.

Nowhere

is

this

paradox, the 'leitmotif' of Russia, more evident than in the history of
the Russian revolutionary movement.

To modernize in the tradition of

the West would be a painful and embarrassing admission of the stagnant
conditions of the culture and society.

There were those able to admit

to such faults, able to rebuke every Russian institution and tradition
as damnable and not worth saving.

Others, though, became adaitant in

their defense of Russia's uniqueness, seeing it as separate from and
desirable

over the decadent West. In the end this attitude prevailed;

Russia would not become a liberal, Westernized nation, joining in the
democracies of Europe; instead it would remain different and apart, as
it had throughout its history.
The

Russian

reform movement

had

a

difficult

time

with

this

dilemma, caught as it was between the best way to change a battered,
backward nation: imitate those in the West who had already progressed,
or build on a tradition which already existed.

For those who opted for

the latter, industrialization and the rising new proletariat class were
quickly changing the character of the mir,
which

had

been an

the pseudo-ccmnunal farm

integral part of medieval

Russia.

Many

in the

revolutionary movement looked upon the mir as virtuous, a phenomenon
that made socialism natural in Russia, setting it off frcm the corrupt
West.

These revolutionaries wanted to deny the

industrialization of

their

country, which prophesied ofthe death of

the commune.

Others

knew industrialization had acme to Russia to stay.
Among

these

were

the

Marxists,

who

accepted

modernity

and

15
technology

as

positive

forces.

Although

Marx

accepted

the

industrialization process the West had undergone, he did not accept the
way it had all turned out— in favor of the capitalists who exploited
the working class in their quest for profit.

He advocated socialism, a

society where the working class controlled the means of production and
hence the profits of industrialization.
the

spoils of manufacturing, class

supplanted by ccmnunism.

With all sharing equally in

rivalry would

disappear,

to be

What could be more natural for a nation which

already had the tradition of the socialistic mir?

Furthermore,

the

Marxist theory pegged the West as corrupt and greedy, and this greatly
appealed to the small band of revolutionaries who extolled their nation
and resented living in the West's shadow.
Marx provided a way out of the Russian revolutionary dilemma, a
way to catapult a backward and inferior nation into the m o d e m world
without adopting the political institutions and culture of the West.
The class struggle of Marx gave the young revolutionaries a chance to
embody their fears of the outside world into an ideology which would
eventually exclude all other political systems from the face of the
earth; all threats would disappear, utopia would abound— and Russia's
uniqueness would be preserved.
But the utopia Marx envisioned was subject to historical processes
which he

called

the

dialectic.

Before

a

classless

society

could

prevail, capitalism, industrialization and the proletariat had to be
firmly established.

The working class had to be the largest segment of

the population, well versed in hew to run a modem, technical society.
Hew else could the workers wrest control of the means of production and
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overcone the bourgeois capitalists with socialism?
not evolved to this point; even as
agrarian.

Clearly, Russia had

late as 1917, it was still 85%

The truly orthodox Marxists like George Plekhanov and Rosa

Luxemburg adamantly felt that Russia needed to wait,

to allow the

dialectic to take its course.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, however, did not want to wait.

His desire

for revolution was obsessive, his loathing of the bourgeois capitalists
unprecedented.

The struggle between the worker and the capitalists was

viewed scientifically by Marx, a

logical and necessary development.

But Lenin attacked the capitalistic elements of the world ferociously.
One need only read Lenin's cwn words to gain an insight into the fierce
dedication

of

the

Soviet

Union

toward

an

anti-capitalistic-imperialistic ideology and an ever-present xenophobia
which pits

capitalism against socialism.

Written shortly after the

Bolshevik Revolution, the attitude present in these words, more than
any other, has been Lenin's legacy to Soviet foreign policy:
The hangers-on and spongers on the bourgeoisie
described socialism as a uniform routine, monotonous and
drab barrack system.
The lackeys of the moneybags, the
lickspittles of the exploiters— Messieurs, the bourgeois
intellectuals— used socialism as a bogey to "frighten the
people, who, precisely under capitalism, were doomed to
penal servitude and the barracks, to arduous, moi^tonous
toil, to a life of dire poverty and semi-stravation.

In 1901-1902, Lenin put forth his doctrine of revolution in "What
is to be Done?" Feeling as he did that the working class was inadequate
and too spontaneous, Lenin feared they would fall prey to the influence
of the bourgeoisie, content with achieving better working conditions
and materialistic goods.

Because the workers could not be trusted to
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turn to socialism on their cwn, an elite party would have to nurse the
workers along, educating thorn to

social

consciousness.

This elite

group was an updating of Marx's "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," and
its concept split the Social Democratic Party into the Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks,
vanguard

the former being the orthodox Marxists.

of

the

proletariat,

made it

possible

to

The party,

the

'leapfrog'

the

bourgeois revolution which the West had undergone.
Lenin's "What is to be Done" was quite in keeping with the Russian
spirit.

It allowed Russia to modernize and revolutionize,

yet the

process advocated was far removed fron the route the West had taken.
Lenin's elite

vanguard,

the party, or,

more

precisely its Central

Cornu.ttee, produced the same kind of absolutism which had prevailed in
Russia for centuries.

As Rosa Luxumburg argued,

there was nothing

revolutionary about it:
In Lenin's
over-anxious desire to establish the
guardianship of an omniscient and omnipotent Central
Committee...we
recognize
the
symptom
of
the
same
subjectivism that has already played more than one trick on
socialist thinking in Russia... .Knocked to the ground,
almost reduced to dust by Russian absolutism, the 'ego'
takes revenge by turning to revolutionary activity. In the
shape of a ccnmittee of conspirators, in the name of a
non-existent Will of the People, it seats itself on a kind
of throne and proclaims it is all-powerful.
But the
'object' proves
to be the stronger.
The knout is
triumphant, for tsaris^might seems to be the 'legitimate'
expression of history.

"What is to -be Done" was written in 1902, when the possibility of
revolution was an unrealistic dream in the hearts of a very few.
1917,

however,

World

War

I

had

drastically

altered

the

By

internal

situation within Russia. Lenin recognized the war as an opportunity— a
chance to bring revolution to the world, with Russia the vanguard.
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Calling World War I an imperialistic, capitalistic war, Lenin's premise
of peace to a weary, hungry population gained the Bolsheviks the votes
they needed in the
government.

Soviet to wrest power from a dying provisional

These war cries were anti-Western, and Von Laue writes how

the war was the turning point in Russian foreign relations: it would be
the last humiliation suffered at the hands of the West for the backward
Russian nation.
deepest

35

The Bolshevik Revolution was a "breakthrough

amibitions

Luxumburg

would

of

have

the

Russian

agreed.

ego,"

According

Von
to

Laue
Von

wrote.

Laue,

of the
36

with

Rosa
the

Bolshevik's publication of the secret treaties connected with the war,
the repudiation of the Tsar's war debts, and the decision to conclude a
separate peace with Germany,
conclusive.
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the break with the West was final and

It was done with hostility and no regrets, as Lenin's cwn

words demonstrate in the following excerpt, taken frcm "Imperialism,
the Highest Stage of

Capitalism," written in 1917:

The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the
war— a war to decide whether the British or German group of
financial plunderers is to receive the most booty— and
those "peace treaties," are with unprecedented rapidity
opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of
people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped
by the bourgeoisie. Thus out of the universal ruin caused
by war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which,
hcwever prolonged and arduous its stages ma^ be, cannot end
otherwise than in a proletarian revolution.

Lenin planted the seeds for a bipolar world in these words.

Writing in

answer to an indignant West that was angered over Lenin's decision to
make

a

separate peace with Germany,

poet Aleksandr Blok told the

Europeans: "We shall turn to you our Asiatic snout!"
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Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," is the

19
first official treatise written on Soviet foreign policy.

It pits the

socialist system against capitalism, branding the latter inferior and
bound to ruin in time.

Written in early 1917, the theoretical work

damned the capitalistic states as warmongers.

Colonialism was at its

peak in the early decades of the twentieth century.

With the world

completely divided into economic spheres of influence, Lenin wrote that
the only recourse left to the capitalistic nations was to repartition
their

spheres

through

war.

Lenin's

anti-capitalistic

doctrine,

however, could not be translated into state policy— the new ocmmunist
nation was simply too weak.

The Soviet leader would have liked to

sever all relations with the West and infiltrate its bourgeois systems
with

cotrnrunistic

propaganda

and

party

leaders.

With

the

workers so war-weary, instigating a revolution would be easy.

world's
It soon

became evident, however, that Russia could not afford to abandon the
more affluent West.
There was no world-wide socialist revolution, and by 20 January
1918, Lenin knew he could not count on Europe to help out with the
consolidation of his own revolution in Russia. Addressing the party an
the question of a separate peace with Germany, Lenin wrote that "a
certain amount of tine, not less than several months at least, will be
necessary, during which the hands of the Socialist Government must be
absolutely free for the job of vanquishing the bourgeoisie in our own
country first..."
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In a speech delivered 14 May 1918, Lenin spoke of

the hostility of the capitalistic nations, which he was store would ccme
against the new Soviet state once they no longer had the war to occupy
their tine: "...our Socialist Republic remains, for the tine being, an
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oasis in the middle of a raging sea of imperialist rapacity."
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The world situation had not turned out the way Lenin and the
Bolsheviks had hoped; and there was nothing left to do but change
course, try to coexist, in a world correctly perceived as hostile by a
small band of revolutionaries who had wanted it that way.
time to "retreat," as Lenin called it.
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Now, it was

Lenin recognized what the

orthodox Marxists had said all along: Russia had not been ready for a
socialist
agrarian

revolution— the
population

too

industrial
large.

base

This

had

been

realization

too

small,

marked

for

the
the

Bolsheviks a grave and unpleasant departure in foreign relations, and
the beginning of the concept of "socialism in one country."
Lenin's post-1917 policy in foreign relations is based on this
recognition.

He

judiciously

advocated

cooperating

capitalistic nations simply because he needed them.

with

the

Practicality was

one of Lenin's virutes, as well as a willingness to do whatever was
necessary to save his revolution.
expediency.

Lenin's foreign policy became one of

In December 1920 he wrote:

While we stand alone and the capitalist world is
strong, our foreign policy consists on the one hand, in our
having to utilise disagreements (to vanquish all the
imperialist powers would, of course, be a most pleasant
thing, but for a fairly long time we shall not be in a
position to do so. . . On the other hand, our existence
depends on the preserj^p of radical differences between the
imperialist powers...

Lenin was most concerned with aligning Russia with Western nations in
order to keep them from coming against the Soviet state, beginning with
Germany, which had already been ostracized by the West as a result of
World war I. Lenin admitted the "concessions" to the capitalists were
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degrading to a nation so proud of its socialist revolution, the one
event which had set it apart frcm the West. Yet it was, at the time,
the only way.

"It is our task," Lenin wrote, "to secure for Russia the

necessary machinery and funds for the restoration of the economy; when
we have obtained that, we shall stand so firmly on our a m feet that no
44

capitalist enemies can overawe us."

Stalin continued in this mindset— setting out to make Russia so
strong no nation, capitalistic or otherwise, could consume it.

It is

interesting, and very important to remember, how clearly these terms
were presented as rapproachment was negotiated between the West and the
Soviets in the years following the revolution.

As Adam Ulam pointed

out, Russia entered into the community of nations on her own terms— as
the

world-wide

destruction

of

center

for

capitalism.

social
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As

revolution,

the

Western

dedicated

nations

to

began

the

formal

recognition of the Soviet Union, beginning with England in 1922, and as
trade opened up, there was never any pretense on the part of Russia as
to just what its ambitions entailed.
Ulam wrote that the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk marked the end of the
age

of

innocence

for

the

young

Bolsheviks:

"They

went

into

the

negotiations as world revolutionaries; they emerged as men solicitious
mainly about their own state and pcwer."
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To the present day the

Soviet state's insistence that the U.S.S.R. is a peaoeful nation is
based on the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk and the Bolsheviks' futile attempts
in

late

assertion

1917 to negotiate a
is

quite

right;

peace with

but

revolution which motivated the

it

was

Soviet

the belligerents.
the

failure

of

state to adopt a

47

the

Their
world

policy of

22
co-existence with the bourgeois enemy.
officially

stated

foreign

policy

of

This is not denied by the

the

Soviet

Union.

Nikolai

V.

Sivachev, co-author of the Moscow publication, Russia and the United
States, explained how Lenin's foreign policy put forth the notion that
the

Soviet

Union

must

peacefully

coexist,

as

revolution

nations might not happen for quite seine time.
foreign policy ever since," wrote Sivachev.
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in

other

"This has been our

Other nations have not

wanted to co-exist with Russia, maintains Sivachev, because they think
the Soviet Union is stirring up world revolution and sedition within
their political parties.
The fundamental problem in foreign policy for the
Soviet nation has been to consolidate the victory of
Socialism, but our chief foreign policy goal has nothing to
do with stirring up "world revolution"...
Revolution
results in the contradictions of cap^t^lism and is not
something introduced frcm the outside.

This

is a

strange

statement,

indeed,

caning

fran a

country whose

revolution was not borne fran the "inner contradictions of capitalism"
at all.
The Russian Revolution was borne frcm a desire to modernize, to
transform

a

backward

and

corrupt

nation— but

in

a

different frcm the West and peculiar to Russia alone.

way

that

was

The insistence

that Russia be different was because Russia was different, not a part
of Western Europe in the ideological sense.

The nationalistic pride in

the Russian tradition, the Russian ego of which Lenin was

such an

example, saw no reason to adopt Western institutions or doctrines for a
nation which felt it had its own contribution to make to the m o d e m
world.

Ironically,

the

system

Russia

finally

did

adopt

to

help
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catapult it into the m o d e m world came frcm the West. Yet Marxism was
the antipathy of the Western

society which

revolutionaries had grown to abhor.

the

triumphant Russian

For this reason it was acceptable

to embrace Marxism. The acceptance of Marx demonstrates so well the
'leitmotif' of Russian history, the resentment of the West eclisped by
a dependency on it.
The Russian Revolution occurred when the tides of history were
changing;

indeed,

the revolution happened in part because of these

tumultuous times.

Part of what was changing so drastically was Europe.

World War I had destroyed the European empires, both physically and
ideologically.

NO longer would Europe be the vanguard of the world,

the center of ocnmerce, the determiner of global politics.

Something

new was afoot, stirring in the imagination of humanity.
Lenin had issued a challenge to the Western world which would not
go unheeded.

In the eyes of Woodrow Wilson,

the very backbone of

America stood on the chopping block: capitalism and the free enterprise
system.

He felt compelled to

address

Lenin's denouncement of

the

Western world with his own utopia, and both Wilson and Lenin purported
to

be

the

bearers

Europeanism"— with

its

of

a

spheres

new
of

order

superior

influence

and

to

secret

"old-world
diplcmacy.

Lenin and Wilson, Russia and America, were beginning to fulfill the
prophecy made by Toqueville so long ago.

Unfortunately their spiritual

ideas were in conflict, carpeting for the loyalties of the world.

The American Tradition: "We have it
in our power to begin the world over again."
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According to the thesis of Robert Dalleck, author of The American
Style of Foreign Policy, Wilson's acceptance of Lenin's challenge was
very much in keeping with an established American attitude toward the
world and the role America was to play in foreign affairs.
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Dalleck

saw America's participation in foreign affairs before 1945 as erratic,
an extension of domestic policy and emotions brought about by the need
for reform and a firm assurance that democracy will always be a part of
American life.

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, written in 1918 to

guide the world into peace without power politics, were the conscience
of America speaking; but they had little to d o .with the reality of
world politics or the situation in which the world found itself in
1917.
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When discussing the American tradition, however, one must be very
careful to make a distinction between the opinion of the American
people as a collective body and the attitude of the foreign policy
makers themselves.

Unlike a despotic Russian or Soviet

leader,

an

American president has to take public sentiment into account while
still making decisions in the best national interest.

While it may be

true that the Fourteen Points had little to do with the reality of the
world situation in 1917, Wilson's decision to enter World War I, when
it was finally made, was based on very hard-core realism.

In spite of

a pretense to fight the war for universalist goals, the reality of the
situation shewed Germany about to upset the balance of European power,
thereby threatening United States

interests and security.

Wilson knew

this; and he knew he had to restore Europe to a balance favorable to
America's economic and political goals.
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No doubt he believed in the

25
League of Nations: it was the best political system capable of assuring
America's continued growth and pcwer in a precarious world.
A
myths.

careful

study of American

foreign policy will

expose many

Isolationism, for one, has never really existed as an official

foreign policy, although the American people may have perceived it as
such throughout the years.
European affairs,

America has tried to remain independent of

and to do so was sound advice offered by George

Washington in his Farewell Address.
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Our independence,

though, was

only possible as long as Europe remained politically balanced and free
frcm domination frcm any one force.

An aggressor nation threatened the

freedcm of the seas as well as ocmnerce and economic prosperity for
all, putting America's national interests at risk.
would never be tolerated, nor was it.

Such a situation

Ultimately, the United States

pursued a policy of involvement with Europe whenever the circumstances
threatened world stability.
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It did, however, often have a difficult

time convincing the American public that such a threat was detrimental
to United States' interests, both political and economic.
According to Felix Gilbert, author of To the Farewell Address:
Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy, the reason for such difficulty
lies in America's early history.

Like Russia, the United States also

has a past that has nurtured its outlook of the world.

Frcm its

inception, there has been a contradiction inherent in this outlook,
largely based on the two main reasons why Europeans moved to the North
American continent in the first place.
to

seek

financial

reward

and

gain;
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One reason was materialistic,

the

other

was

spiritual,

to

establish a more perfect society than the warring Europe that was left
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behind.

The two motives were contentious, as were the policies needed

to attain such goals.

Financial gain necessarily required trade and

relations with the Continent;

creating a

different

kind

of world,

however, called for close scrutiny of the Old World and separation frcm
it.
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These two goals, the one material and the other spiritual, are an

integral part of the American personality.

Over the years they have

resulted in foreign policy problems which the United States has never
totally solved.
The problems exist mainly because America's policy makers have
never been able to separate the two goals, or to honestly prioritize
one over the other.

Instead,

they have pursued economic goals,

or

goals of national self-interest,- under the guise of pursuing a better
world for mankind.

Often, the two were thought to be the same.

Thcmas

Paine thought so.

"We have it in our power to begin the world over

again," he wrote in Carmon Sense, the pamphlet most historians agree is
exclusively

responsible

independence

frcm

for

Britain.

The

convincing
new

the

world

he

colonies

to

envisioned,

seek

though,

included free ports to serve the ocmmercial interests of all nations.
America was to take the lead in establishing these free ports.
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The

insular position of the North American continent was ideal for such a
revolutionary concept.

Renunciation of all foreign political alliances

was necessary in order to establish such free and unbiased trade.

Yet

in 1776, protection by Britain's maritime fleet was needed to protect
the open seas, something Paine did not seem to consider.
Europe's

balance

of

power

became

a

threat

to

A threat to

Britain's

maritime

power— and a threat to the open seas meant a threat to America's vision

27
of a new, more spiritual world.
As America's enonorny grew and prospered, it is easy to see why the
two

goals

became

so

entangled.

Alexander

Hamilton

wrote

George

Washington's Farewell Address. It called for a continuance of all trade
relations, and an avoidance of alliances
contention:
alliances.

commercial

interests
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— but the two were often in

were

threatened

by

political

This policy was further complicated when Washington imposed

a moral obligation upon this country to be an example to the rest of
the world of justice, enlightenment and virtue.

The "exaltation"

of

America's station was penned from the beginning, and this superiority
has stuck:
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations.
Cultivate peace and harmony...It will be worthy of a free,
enlightened and at no distant period of a great nation to
give mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a
people
always
guided
by
an
exalted
justice
and
benevolence.

James Monroe recognized the impracticality of attempting to follow
a

foreign

policy

which

discouraging political

encouraged

alliances.

The

international
Monroe

trade

Doctrine,

while

written 24

years after Washington's address, made it clear the United States would
not

condone

or

support

any

interference

frcm European

pcwers to

colonize "any portion of this hemisphere."^ While the doctrine was
defensive and lacked military support at the time, it was characterized
as "the best guardian of a nation with a great continental expansion
before it..."
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by scholar George

Dangerfield. He

also

claimed it

committed the m i ted States to be a leader in world politics, premising
to stand by any country in this hemisphere seeking independence.

Such

28
a

doctrine

would

assure

the

supremacy of America in its

economic,

1sphere

American people disliked the term.

political

and

ideological

of influence', even though the

Britain’s maritime hegemony, by the

way, is what made the Monroe Doctrine possible, another reason why the
United States would have to involve itself in European affairs if the
situation
future,

called

for

it.
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By

1823

Europe's

future was

regardless of any implied policy that the U.S.

America's
should not

become entangled in political relationships.
The Spanish-American war tested the Monroe Doctrine. The American
people went to war to achieve Cuban independence from the Spanish
'brutes';

they

independence,

equated

and

the

the
war

situation
had

a

with

romantic

their
impact

own
on

quest
the

for

nation.

Acquiring the Philippines, however, was not part of the original war
aims for which Americans perceived the war was being fought, nor was
the blatant aquisition of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. A debate within the
Senate broke out as a result of America's new imperialistic course in
foreign affairs.

The main tenet of the debate used by pro-imperialists

promulgated

theory

the

of

the

white

man's

burden,

giving

full

responsibility to the civilized, Christian world to educate the rest of
the world's heathen peoples.
destined

to

become a

officially stated.

part

These shades of Social Darwinism were
of America's

foreign policy as

They would show up in Wilson's war aims, Truman's

Doctrine, and John P. Kennedy's inaugural address.
While

the

it was

debate

ensued,

the

question
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of

overseas

economic

expansion was being egged an by the Industrial Revolution. America's
'other

side',

the

quest

for

financial

gain,

was

exposed

by

the

29
Spanish-American War.

Worried that the

United

States economy would

stagnate if it was not expanded, industrialists used the debate over
imperialism to develop a policy of open economic trade, one of Thomas
Paine's principles.

Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Notes of

1899 and 1900 proposed that all nations have an equal opportunity for
trade with China. Nervous that China's apparent weakness would be taken
advantage of by Russia,

Japan and France,

which were beginning to

establish spheres of influence throughout the area, the United States
sought an open trade market for all nations regarding China.
Businessmen greeted the new expansionist policy positively.

And

ideological purists like William Jennings Bryan were also pleased.

Not

only did it mean more for the economy, but America was doing its part
to preserve and foster the independence of others, as stated it should
in the Monroe Doctrine.
The Open Door Notes embodied the ideology of what Brook Adams
65
called "America's economic supremacy,"
while establishing for America
conditions to extend the "American system throughout the world without
the

embarrassment

William

Appleman

and

inefficiency

Williams

manifestation of America's

of

concludes

traditional

the

"desire to

Open

Door

colonialism."
Policy

reform the world

was
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a

in its own

67
image."
What had apparently happened was an odd fusion of ideology
and economic imperialism, the same two goals which had been present
since the founding of the nation.

While very concerned about Russia's

and Japan's influence in China, our cwn influence in the Philippines
and Hawaii was justified by a so-called need to protect that part of
the world until democracy could flourish.

America's now easy access to
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Chinese ports was assured by its occupation of territories in these
parts of the world.

Rather than call a spade a spade, United States

policy chose to claim it was making the world safe for democracy.
Williams claims the definition of that nebulous phrase meant "the world
was to be made safe for democracy a 11 'americaine, with all that implied
economically, politically and socially."
The world could not be made safe for democracy "a'l'americaine,"
however, if the Bolsheviks were making their cwn proclamation to be the
bulwark of an even purer democracy an the other side of the world.
According to A m o

J. Mayer, author of Political Origins of the New

Diplomacy, both Lenin and Wilson were "champion revolutionists of the
new

age,"
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one

which wanted

diplomacy and balance of

pcwer

to

do

away with

politics.

Each

the

old,

European

leader's policy to

attain such a goal was not without its irony, hcwever.
Wilson wanted a dissolution of autocratic pcwer throughout Europe
and the world, and the establishment of democracy in its place.

But

the Bolshevik solution to despotism "would render her economy useless
to mankind."
sword

of

opposition

70

This paradox in American foreign policy, the two-edged

capitalism
to

the

and

democracy,

became

Bolsheviks. Soviet

pcwer

apparent with
was

not

Wilson's

conducive

to

American economic and political growth and the attainment of power,
regardless of its stated ideology to uphold democracy and do away with
the exploitation of the working class.

This is why,

according to

Williams, the birth of America's policy to contain the Soviet Union
actually began in 1918 with the "decision to promote tendencies which
must

eventually

find

their

outlet

in

either

the

breakup

or

the

31
mellowing of Soviet pcwer."

Gabriel and Joyce Kolko believe this

71

same paradox is the context for undestanding the post-World War II
situation

as

well.

According

to

the

Kolkos,

a

Soviet-American

ideological rivalry was not the issue in the years 1945 through 1947
when policy was formed.

What had happened was America's failure to

reform the world economically,
aims.
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If

the

above

thesis

one of the United States' major war
is

plausible,

Stalin's

occupation

Eastern Europe and the Balkans was not acceptable to

of

such a goal,

anymore than Lenin's Russia had been with its shocking denouncement of
capitalism.
Whether or not America made its foreign policy decisions in the
interests of economic growth and power or in the interests of securing
liberty and justice for all people, is probably not disoemable.

If

the United States perceived it was saving the world for democracy's
sake,

all

other motives

would

simply

fade

away.

The

Bolsheviks,

however, were convinced of America's imperialistic motives, not their
esoteric ones, and this conviction led to a policy which tolerated the
United

States

interests.

only

to

the

point

needed

to

gain

Soviet

national

Yet the Bolsheviks, and later the Communists, were just as

determined to secure their cwn interests as were the Americans, even if
it meant compromising the socialistic principles of Marx. They proved
this point in the 1920's and 30's when Stalin pursued a policy of
rapprochement with
America.

the

bourgeois,

capitalistic

states,

England

The alliance Stalin forged with Hitler, a known enemy,

1939, also proved this point.

and
in

Stalin made this pragmatic neve to buy

time and gain access to Russia's western border which had been lost as
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a result of World War I. The paradox inherent in both nations' foreign
policy was this willingness to sacrifice democracy, either socialistic
or capitalistic, on the altar of self-interests,
those

interests

entailed.

The

Soviets,

regardless of what

hcwever,

did

so

without

pretext; Washington, on the other hand, could not.
The American people never fully understood this.
the years of the Grand Alliance,

Except during

the image they had of the Soviet

Union, regardless of its validity or falsity, was threatening to their
perceived mission of the United States: establishing a new and better
world order.

United States foreign policy makers were concerned with

both of America's missions, democractic and economic.

The democratic

mission endeavored to establish a world unlike any other; economically,
the world should be as free, giving America every opportunity to grew
and propser.
Washington,
suitable

As put forth by founding fathers Thomas Paine and George
as well as

paradigm

James Monroe,

for the

rest

of

the American way

the world

foreign policy became based on this role.
sought to

establish

new world

orders.

to

provided a

follow.

American

Both Wilson and Roosevelt
The

American

people

fully

supported these pursuits— they were an integral part of tradition.

The Reality of the Events

In the world of pcwer politics,

however, motives which

foreign policy pale beside actions and their ensuing results.
debate what Stalin's motives were

for wanting

shape

One can

to establish Soviet

hegemony in Poland and Eastern Europe; and the true impetus for issuing
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the Truman Doctrine is still being debated.

George Kerman's assessment

of the driving force behind Soviet foreign policy is fascinating, but
one will never be able to do more than speculate over the impact it had
an Washington's
following
insisted

the
on

policy-making as

it

began

to unfold

war.

Washington

discussed

the

securing

friendly

governments

in

in

reasons
the

the years
why

Stalin

states

he

had

liberated at the end of the war, but the bottom issue was that he was
there, a perceived threat to the balance of power in that region of the
world.

It is when the reaction Moscow had to the Truman Doctrine is

evaluated that the reality of the

situation becomes apparent.

The

world became divided, precarious; the two allies became enemies; and
World war II,

like its predecessor,

had failed to create a stable

environment for future generations.
The foreign policy traditions of Russia and the United States had
considerable bearing on the formulation of policy, as did the attitudes
each nation had regarding the other throughout the history prior to the
outbreak

of

determined

World

the

War

II.

eventual

The

events

outcome:

in

of

the

situation,

1941 Russia

and

hcwever,

America were

allies, joined in a common cause, pledged to rid the world of evil and
ensure a lasting peace once the enemy had been destroyed; by 1944 the
alliance

had

fragmented;

and

in

1949

the

North

Atlantic

Treaty

Organization had been formed to the exclusion of the Western allies'
onoe-friend-tumed-foe, Russia. It was between the years 1944 and 1947
that America's containment policy gradually developed; but John Gaddis,
author of several books on containment, believes there was containment
of Russia before Truman ever elucidated his doctrine,

before George
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Kerman sent his long telegram, before the war even ended.
According to Gaddis, containing the Russians had been on Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's mind as early as 1941— as well as on the mind of W.
Averell Harriman,

United

States

ambassador

Roosevelt had not forgotten recent

in Moscow since

relations with

tenuous, and he was not fond of ccmnunism.

1943.

Russia had

73

been

Yet like Churchill, he knew

the necessity of forging an alliance with "the devil";
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and frcm the

first Roosevelt exhibited a stubbomess to follow the only policy he
believed possible to assure a postwar peace with Stalin and Moscow.
Roosevelt gambled he could convince Stalin of the West's sincerity and
friendship,

thereby

assuring

Stalin's

participation

in

the

United

Nations, ending once and for all the traditional European concept of a
balance of power keeping the peace.

If Stalin confidently believed he

could rely an the United Nations to keep the peace, Roosevelt felt
certain he would abandon the urgently-felt need to expand Russia's
borders.

Although Roosevelt prepared for the loss of the Baltic states

and portions of Eastern Europe to Stalin, he hoped such a situation
could

be

averted.

Roosevelt

actually

wanted

to

'change'

Stalin,

convince him that a concept of collective security would keep peace far
better than a system of buffer states.
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Roosevelt took for granted

that Stalin's driving motive behind his war aims was fear— of future
invasions as well as a hostile capitalistic world.
assumed

too

much.

In

spite

of

pleadings

76

frcm

Roosevelt may have
his

advisors

and

Churchill, Roosevelt refused to discuss the territorial war aims Stalin
had put forth very early in the war, even before the united States had
entered.
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But Stalin made no secret of what he expected to gain from the
war,

77

and Britain was prepared to give him what he demanded in order

to safeguard the alliance and the continuance of a maximum war effort
fran the Red Army.
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Churchill and Stalin privately discussed postwar

territorial gains, Churchill being just as eager as Stalin to assume
hegemony in certain parts of the world.
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Roosevelt, hcwever, could not publicly and officially acquiesce to
territorial aggrandizement of

any kind

because

it

so violated the

Atlantic Charter, to which Moscow supposedly subscribed.
hcwever,

the Russian

carefully
open-ended.

made

Soviet

ambassador

to

acceptance

England
of

the

during
charter

80

the

Ivan Maisky,
war

years,

conditional

and

Furthermore, Roosevelt felt certain he could not present

to the American people a Europe which had been carved up into innocuous
spheres of influence.
Throughout the war years, America insisted an pushing democratic
principles upon its allies.

Keeping true to its traditions in foreign

policy, nebulous goals had to be a part of the Grand Alliance's war
aims, not goals to reestablish the European balance of pcwer.

Although

Moscow agreed to such aims only equivocally, the American people soon
came to equate Stalin with "Uncle Joe," believing a new Soviet Russia
was their partner in saving the world fran totalitarian evil.
misperception was not Stalin's doing,
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This

nor did he perpetuate such a

myth.
It is understandable, hcwever, why Roosevelt felt compelled to
give this impression to the American people,
easily convinced.

and why they were so

It would prove far easier to forge a lasting peace
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with Stalin after the war if the public held a positive view of its
Russian ally.

Because of the paradox so inherent in the American

tradition, the peculiar tendency to believe wars are fought for the
purpose of liberty and democracy instead of the more practical reasons
of national self-interests, American policy makers have often had to
hide the truth frcm the public.

The vagueness of such abstract motives

is much easier to defend to the American people than power politics.
Following World War II Americans finally had to admit to the necessity
of becoming involved in European affairs, but the European concepts of
'balance of pcwer' and 'spheres of influence' have traditionally been
abhored by a large majority of Americans. As Hans J. Morgenthau put it,
if the United States could no longer shut itself off from a world
infected with pcwer politics, it had to decontaminate the world frcm
that infection in order to make it safe to enter.
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Perhaps this is why

such a paradox exists in the American tradition of foreign policy.
Remembering their ancestors who had fled the Continent's imperialistic
wars of
fought
hcwever,

conquests, Americans wanted nothing to do with wars being
for

territorial

did not

gains

sacrifice

or

national

self-interests.

Stalin,

twenty million Russians for democracy's

sake— he wanted concrete spoils of war.
Franklin Roosevelt's war

strategy failed:

Stalin had not been

convinced to abandon a buffer zone on Russia's western border.

Worse,

Stalin had moved into Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The situation
Roosevelt hoped to avert had ccrne to pass, a situation for which the
American people and the foreign policy makers were totally unprepared.
Rather than admit that it was a mistake not to reach a practical
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agreement

regarding

Stalin's

post-war

territorial

aims

sooner,

Washington chose instead to accuse Mosccw of breaking its pledge to
establish America's

concept of

democracy

in

the post-war world,

pledge that had been made in equivocal, obscure language.

a

Because of

the American tradition, United States policy makers could not honestly
admit they wanted to restore the European balance of pcwer in order to
secure vital interests in a strategic part of the world.

It had to

became a matter of restoring democracy, a cause to which the American
people— and Congress— could rally.
For a large despotic state that has never kncwn Western liberalism
or republicanism,

concepts of

were nominal at best.
by natural borders,

self-determination and free elections

With a history of invasion in a land unprotected
securing national interests had been a part of

Russian foreign policy since the Moskovite princes first consolidated
their

pcwer

in

the

dark

northern

forests

surrounding

present-day

Moscow. With a tradition quite unlike the United States, which settled
a vast, relatively unpopulated continent founded on the principles of
the

Enlightenment,

supremacy
therefore,

of
it

Russia has

various
learned

European
a

had

to

contend with

nations

tradition

of

throughout
conventional

the

pcwer

the

centuries;

European

and

power

politics.
The Russian tradition in foreign policy,
tradition,

sought to secure

its national

and later the Soviet

interests.

Regardless of

Marxist-Leninist ideology, these interests always came first.

Unlike

Washington, which often felt it necessary to mask its state interests
behind lofty ideals, Mosccw offered no apologies for its amibitions
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during World War II. Stalin laid his war aims clearly on the bargaining
table, and he expected to be compensated for his nation's war efforts.
Over the centuries Russia came to fear and resent the West, and
this xenophobia helped to determine its foreign policy.

At the same

time it always realized its need for the West's technology in order to
compete

in

the

European world

of

power

and politics.

It

is not

surprising that, years later, this enigma would be present, haunting
the

proceedings

at

'self-determination'

Yalta
and

and

Potsdam.

Equivocal

terms

like

'democracy' are open to interpretation; and

when it came to settling the aims of World War II, their importance and
meaning were altogether different in the democratic West than in the
dictatorial

Soviet

Union.

Still,

in

the

Russian

tradition,

Stalin

realized his need for America's powerful economic assistance in the
post-war world,

providing American policy makers with a

never used.

Instead,

the

augmentation

and

need

the

post-war
for

lever they

settlement ended in territorial

containment

instead

of

a

mutual

consideration for the differences and degrees inherent in individual
societies and civilization as a whole.
To those of us who must ask why, the answer lies in the traditions
of each nations1 foreign policy— the quest for power.
containment

originated

in

the debris

left

behind

The policy of

frcm Roosevelt's

failed war strategy and the inability to formulate a policy to deal
with Stalin's demands for territorial security.
created

by four

years

of

war

began

to

As the power vacuum

fill up with Red

troops,

Washington realized it would not be able to control Stalin or the
post-war world the way Roosevelt had

envisioned— or

the

way

they
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perceived

Roosevelt1s

strategy began then.

vision

would

unfold.

Hie

quest

for

new
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Chapter Two— The Crucial Years: 1941-1945

The historical traditions of Soviet and American foreign policy
stayed

on

Alliance.

a collision
In the

historianshave

destined for

course

wisdom

concluded

of

throughout
hindsight,

how

divorce once the

the

both

of

Eastern

'marriage de

the
and

Grand
Western

convenience'

destruction of Hitler's

assured.1 Russian tradition dictated
through territorial acquisition.

the years

serving national

was

legions was

self-interests

Stalin made it clear early in the war

that he wanted those interests secured.

Americans, on the other hand,

claimed their ambitions lay with what Herbert Feis called "the power of
principle," the principle being that of national self-determination.

2

The incompatibility of American principles with Stalin's war aims
became a well-kept secret throughout the war.

Franklin Roosevelt was

well aware of the conflict; the American people were not.

Furthermore,

only seme of FDR's colleagues were aware of Stalin's war diplomacy;
others,

like Harry Truman, remained tragically ignorant of what had

transpired between the coalition during the war years.
The negotiations,

however,

Roosevelt pursued a war

had to be clear to those present.

strategy

involving

risks.

By putting off

Stalin's demands for early settlement of the post-war "organisation for
peace,"-by offering him a European front in 1942, Roosevelt hoped to
buy the time needed to convince Stalin that his new world order was an
efficient, peace-keeping mechanism for all, even the Soviets. Economic
sanctions necessary for reconstruction would be offered in the interim,
convincing Stalin not only of America's trustworthiness, but also of
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its sincere desire for an economically strong Russia to take its place
in the world ccmmunity of nations.

Using these tactics,

Roosevelt

hoped ultimately to prove the inefficiency of spheres of influence to
either world peace or international trade.

Woodrow Wilson had failed

to convince Europe of this in 1918; like Wilson, though, Roosevelt had
confidence in his own ability to influence and change.
There are revisionists who argue that America's
nations"

included

only

those

countries

which

"carmunity of

supported

Western,

liberal-style democracy and capitalistic enterprise, the two being part
of the same package.
not.

3

It is not clear if Roosevelt felt this way or

Clearly, his vision for the post-war world included capitalism

and democratic liberalism, but he also philosophically believed that
Russia, like other totalitarian states, would lose its despotic nature
if allowed to participate in the world on an equal basis without fear
of

reprisal.

More an

internationalist

than

even Wilson,

Roosevelt

became determined not to repeat the mistake of ostracizing the Soviet
Union frcm the West. He realized full well any peace without Russia was
only pseudo-peace.
political

If America was truly to realize its economic and

aspirations,

the

Soviet

Union

could

not

be

an

enemy,

competing for the same raw materials, threatening world stability.

If

international law was to be America's pathway to an Open Door in trade
and world-wide democracy,

the Soviet Union would have to became a

cooperating nation eventually.
Not

all

of

Roosevelt's

advisors

shared

his

vision.

Truman,

ignorant of what FDR tried to accomplish, was not going to allow the
Russsians to freely participate in the

"ccnmunity"

under their own
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terms.

4

It is also possible that Truman, even if he had understood

Roosevelt's,

intentions,

would not have

adhered

to them.

Stalin's

insistence that he acquire hegemony in the Balkans and a sphere of
influence in Iran started
death.

to

greatly disturb Roosevelt

before his

Truman could not allow Stalin to succeed in these quests, any

more than Roosevelt could or would have.
The truth is, FDR's war strategy was never tried.

It is quite

possible it could have succeeded if given a proper chance.

Instead,

Stalin continued to pursue his war aims throughout the negotiations
while Roosevelt's were never practiced.

Stalin received what he asked

for by default alone; Roosevelt never offered the Soviet statesman the
incentives needed to convince him it was in his own best interests to
follow,

or

at

least

consider,

FDR's

peace

plan.

The

concrete

proposals, the bulwark of Roosevelt's strategy, never came: the second
front materialized two years after it had been premised, and FDR never
offered a

substantial post-war

offers of a loan after his death.

loan.

FDR's

successors avoided all

Roosevelt chose to procrastinate for

reasons not fully known, opting instead to lead Stalin to believe he
could

have

what

he

wanted.

Historian

Lloyd

C.

Gardner

wrote:

"Searching for an answer to this phase of the strategy of postponement
5

is a frustrating task."
Authorities like Norman A. Graebner and Herbert Feis, who believe
Russia would never have accepted a world based on the principle of
self-determination,6 do not account for Roosevelt's failed strategy.
There is no way to knew the difference the second front would have made
if promptly delivered.

All evidence points to an enormous difference,
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in attitudes alone.

In history, however, there are no ifs.

Graebner

criticized Roosevelt's strategy: assuming Russia would accept a world
order utilizing the principle of national self-determination "expected
7

too much denial of that country's historic problems and ambitions";
and, one might add, of its tradition in foreign policy.

Likewise, to

expect the United States to aquiesce while Stalin divided up Europe
denied the American tradition.
As the events unfolded in the years beginning with 1941, it is
important to remember both Stalin and Roosevelt pursued policies very
much in keeping with the traditions
foreign

relationships.

bargaining table

from

Stalin's
the

inherent in each nation's own

war

beginning,

aims,

clearly

laid

simply

followed

a

on

the

policy

of

conventional balance-of-power, making sure Moscow would not be excluded
frcm the post-war world by Western nations which had
tolerance

in

the

past

for

Russian

power.

Roosevelt

shown
had

little
a

more

difficult rcw to hoe, trying as he did to appease both the American
people and the Soviet dictator so he could create a new world order.
Both Moscow and Washington knew of America's and Russia's emerging
superpower status; the post-war world would have to be shared.
were equally aware of

the distrust

and

apprehension

underneath the semblance of coalition and alliance.

Both

lying dormant

The difference in

these traditions cannot be denied; their failure to converge at seme
point and become compatible, however, was not inevitable.

'Long
Motherland!"
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To the vast relief of Winston Churchill, Adolph Hitler marched
east on 22 June 1941, invading the Soviet Union, thereby giving Britain
one lone ally in all of Europe. Churchill alluded to Stalin as the
devil in Parliament, and Stalin as well felt he had little choice of
allies.

8

Engaging Germany in a two front war, however, would be the

only salvation for Europe as well as Russia. So East and West came
together to fight the center; hew the center would be divided upon its
defeat was a natural problem, a dilemma facing all the victors at the
war's end.
Stalin began thinking of such problems as early as 1939 when he
signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. If that seems premature, it
is wise to remember America as well considered the post-war world
before

it

even

entered

the

fighting!

In

August

1941,

with

the

formation of the Atlantic Charter, a vague dissertation proclaiming the
right

of

all

nations

to

determine

their

own

America's post-war interests had been initiated.

political

destiny,

Unfortunately,

the

Charter could do little more than suggest a way to peace; its obscure
wording,

quite

open

to

interpretation,

carried

no

enforcement

provisions.

Churchill admitted it could serve only as "a guiding
9
star," not a law. Each nation, remembering the chaos resulting frcm

the last war's peace-making process,

began looking out for its own

self-interests by formulating policies to oversee the post-World war II
world.

Stalin admitted it quite

policy accordingly.

openly and

Unfortunately his policy,

developed

his

foreign

laced as it was with

suspicion and precaution, afforded very few ocnprcmises.
The

suspicion,

bom

in the past,

was bound to

influence

the
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diplomacy of the Grand Alliance, brought together for the sole purpose
of stopping Hitler. To the Russian mind, the feelings of suspicion were
confirmed during Hitler's rise to power.
appealed to the League of Nations
Hitler.

The

extremes,

West

and

practiced

Hitler

the

marched

The Soviet Union futilely

for collective

foolish

closer

policy

east,

security to stop
of

toward

appeasement
Russia.

to

Through

several remarks made by people like Britain's Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin, the Western leaders made it known that war between fascism and
ccnntunism would delight then.

"If there is any fighting in Europe to

be done," Baldwin told Churchill in 1936,
Bolsheviks and Nazis doing it.
needing more time,
Hitler in

1939.

Frightened of the impending war,

Stalin entered

It was a

"I should like to see the

into

shrewd move,

a

non-aggression

pact with

giving Stalin the time he

needed, allowing him to regain access to a geopolitically significant
portion of the Russian expire lost after World War I. It also displayed
within Stalin a diplomatic talent that would cone to haunt the Grand
Alliance. In exchange for neutrality, the USSR received a free hand in
Poland and the Baltic States.

Russia took back Estonia,

Latvia and

Lithuania, and incorporated Bessarabia and northern Bukovina into the
empire.
The West thought the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression agreement, called
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to be one of the most cold-blooded acts in
history, the cause of World War II. The Soviets believed the West had
steered Hitler in their direction, wishing for their destruction as
they always had.

Distrust of the Allies dictated how Stalin would

formulate his war aims and policies.

Two main fears haunted Stalin as

51
he

entered

distrust.

into

alliance

with

the

West,

and

both

reflected

his

Stalin feared that a separate peace between Germany and the

Allies would leave him to fight Hitler alone.

He also feared the

Allies would remain inactive, forcing his Red Army to bear the brunt of

the war while Germany and Russia

"mutually exhaust themselves."^

Philip Mosley wrote how, in 1941, the Soviet leaders fully expected
Britain and the United States to sit idly by while Hitler ran over the
Soviet Union. The prompt support of financial aid Russia received fron
America, known as Lend-Lease, did not shake its fear of "capitalist

12
encirclement."
Stalin formulated three main war aims based on these fears, and
these goals became the backbone of his foreign policy during the war.

13

The first intended to prevent a separate peace at all costs, and this
meant keeping the coalition intact and friendly as long as Hitler's
armies rolled.

For

this reason as well as

to

strengthen his cwn

regime, Stalin defined World War II as the Great Patriotic War, fought
for the motherland.

It was as well a great war for the liberation of

"the people of Europe and America...for democratic liberties."

14

The tactic worked indubitably well, cementing the Russian people
together

in

totalitarian

this

cause,

methods.

laying

The

day

to

rest

Hitler

allied
attacked

fears

of

Russia,

Stalin's
Churchill

loyally declared, "This is no class war,""^ and Stalin's speeches began
to

reflect

this

mood.

In

1943

he

dissolved

the

Canintem,

his

"political contribution to the coherence of the Grand Alliance."1**
Stalin's second goal sought allied recognition of the territories
Russia acquired frcm the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the preservation
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of those territories for Russia following the war.
lands

annexed

in

1939

were

both

Stalin claimed the

ethnographically

and

culturally

Russian, remembering that the Versailles treaty had taken than frcm the
Soviet empire.
moved

Stalin furthermore wanted the eastern border of Poland

farther west,

along what was

known

as

the Curzon Line,

an

imaginary border proposed by Lord Curzon at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1918, allowing for the annexation of more Polish territory into
Russia. Poland was also to acquire territory from East Prussia, and the
Rhineland was to be separated frcm Prussia.

17

The third aim proved the most taxing, draining the allies of any
advantage they might have had at the conference table and becoming a
bitter point of contention for Stalin and the Soviet people: opening a
second

front

in Europe.

Stalin wanted

allied

troops

to

cross

the

English channel, caning into Europe frcm the West, drawing Hitler off
Russia's frontline.
this war alone.

The second front assured Russia it would not fight

It also guaranteed Stalin that his Allies would not

allcw the war to weaken Russia to the point where the West

could

manipulate it in the post-war world.
At the Eighteenth Party Congress Stalin caustically remarked that,
once

the

belligerents

were

weak

and

exhausted,

the

imperialistic

nations would "appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of
course, - 'in the interests of peace', and to dictate conditions to the
enfeebled belligerents...Cheap and easy!"
steps to prevent such domination.

18

Moscow took the necessary

Stalin, whose Red Army provided the

main source of manpower against Germany in the early years of the war,
and

sane will argue throughout the war,

19

would make certain that
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Russia was not cut out of the peace this time.
So Moscow remained on guard throughout the years of the Grand
Alliance for any signs that its allies were out to exhaust the Red Army
so they could reap the rewards of victory.
second front confirmed these suspicions.

The late delivery of the

"Britain and the USA dragged

the war out in order to weaken the USSR, " reads the official Soviet
account of the war years.

What follows is worth quoting in full;

In Britain and the USA seme of the leaders did not
think it necessary to conceal designs of this sort. They
wanted the USSR to fight Germany single-handed so that the
two countries would bleed themselves white. Plans of this
nature were cynically expounded by US Senator Harry S.
Truman, who later became President of the USA. "If we see
that Germany is winning," he said, "we ought to help Russia
and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that
way let them kill as many as possible. In Britain, similar
ideas were propounded by Ji^in Moore-Brabazon, then Minister
of Aircraft production, v

The front was delivered way past the point when it oould have convinced
Stalin that statements like the above were untrue.
The history of the second front is a curious one.
memoirs
others."

speak
21

of

the

front

as

the

"main

problem

Ivan Maisky’s
dominating

all

Stalin needed reassurance of his allies' trustworthiness; to

this Moscow's History of Soviet Foreign Policy readily admits;
First and foremost, Soviet diplomacy had to make sure
that the bourgeois states already fighting Germany and
Italy would becore reliable allies of the USSR. To this end
it was necessary to form and consolidate a coalition of
states fighting Nazi Germany 2^nd open a second front in
Europe as quickly as possible.

As early as 1941 Stalin began intimating to the Western allies as
well as to his own people the need for a second front.

On 18 July

1941, less than one month after Hitler's invasion, Churchill received
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(xmmunication frcm Stalin, asking for a second front.
It seems to me, furthermore, that the military
position of the Soviet Union, and by the same token that of
Great Britain, would improve substantially if a front were
established against Hitler in the West (Northern France)
and the North (the Arctic)...
Until understanding is
reached on these...points, not only will there be no
clarity in Anglo/Soviet relations, but- if we are to speak
frankly, there will be no mutual trust.

Churchill, however, continued to assure Stalin in the first five and a
half months of their alliance of the logistical impossibility for a
European front at this time.

25

Stalin's intimations grew insistent but

Churchill maintained that Moscow's unrelenting demands for a European
front reflected a "monotonous disregard for...physical facts."

26

The

following excerpt frcm a speech delivered by Stalin in 1941 on the
twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, however, clearly
illustrates his interpretation of the "physical facts":
One of the reasons for the setbacks of the Red army
consists in the absence of a second front in Europe...It is
a fact that there are no armies of Great Britain or the
United States an the European Continent at present which
are waging war against the German fascist troops...
The situation new is such that our country is waging
the w|^ of liberation alone without anyone's military
aid...

The first Anglo/Russian mutual war-time assistance pact signed on
12

July

1941

settlements.

lacked

any mention

of

a

second

front

or

post-war

Stalin wanted both, at the earliest possible date.

He

presented a draft of treaties to Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden

on

16 December

assistance
established

1941.

The

both

during

and

the

Soviet

vision

first

after
of

the
the

treaty
war.

provided
The

"post-war

for mutual

second

clearly

organisation

of

55
peace."
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The treaty called for:

.. .the restoration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and
Greece in their pre-war frontiers, and also the transfer to
Poland of East Prussia. The treaty furthermore recognised
the 1941 frontiers of the USSR (i.e. including in it
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia), and the right of Britain to have bases
necessary for her 2 ^ecurity in France, Belgium, Holland,
Denmark and Norway.

Eden felt the treaties could be negotiated, but he reserved the right
to make modifications.
surprised

even

Maisky

Stalin made a third request,
and

was

flatly

refused

by

however, which
Eden:

immediate

recognition by the British of Russia's 1939 territorial acquisitions.
Britain had gone to war to defend Poland, though; it would have been
unrealistic to expect Eden to give it away here.
The reason Eden gave for Britain's refusal surprised and angered
Stalin. Explaining that territorial changes were not to be decided on
during the course of the war, Eden told Stalin that "under the Atlantic
Charter we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of
the inhabitants."
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An incredulous Stalin replied:

Why does the restoration of our frontiers ocme into
conflict with the Atlantic Charter...I thought that the
Atlantic Charter was directed against those people who were
trying to establish world dominion. It new looks ^ s if the
Atlantic Charter was directed against the U.S.S.R.

The

British

demands.

cabinet

voiced

mixed

emotions

concerning

Soviet

Always more pragmatic than the quixotic Americans, many felt

Russia had earned the right to keep its 1939 borders.

The London Times

felt the boundaries "were in no way incompatible with the security of
Europe,
insure."

which
32

the

framework

of

the

Atlantic

charter

sought

to

Fearing for the Alliance, well aware of the enormous part
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Russia still had to play to defeat Hitler, Churchill relented.

On 7

March 1942 he wrote to Roosevelt, pleading Stalin's case to recognize
Soviet borders.
Roosevelt, with the support of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
held firm in his conviction not to grant any territorial changes.

Hull

was concerned with Polish-American pressure, which insisted on a free
Poland after the war.
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The President showed more

concern for the

principles and causes of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations,
his vision for post-war peace.
In May 1942 Stalin sent Molotov to London for final approval of
the draft treaties and recognition of the 1941 boundaries.
debate

continued

between

English

and

Americans

As sharp

regarding

the

recognition of Soviet borders, Roosevelt intervened with an offer of
his own.

He sent Stalin a letter on 12 April 1942 inviting Molotov to

Washington directly after his London visit to discuss "a very important
military proposal involving the utilisation of our armed forces in a
manner to relieve your critical Western front."
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It was an astute

diplomatic maneuver on FDR's part.
The evening of 24 May John Winant, US ambassador to Great Britain,
entered into a discussion with Molotov at a reception in London. He
expressed great interest in a second front,
extended

conversation

on

the

matter.

engaging Molotov in an

Molotov

signed

the

mutual

aid-assistanoe treaty with England two days later: there was no mention
of borders whatsoever.

The diversionary tactic of the second front had

worked.^
Molotov's visit to Washington confirmed the second front, with
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little

roan for

interpretation

or misunderstanding.

Molotov asked

point blank if the intention was to launch a European front sometime in
1942.

The following account cones straight frcm the State Department:
The President then put to General Marshall the query
whether developments were clear enough so that we could say
to Mr. Stalin that we are preparing a second front. "Yes,"
replied the General. The President then authorized Mr.
Molotov to inform Mr. Staling that we expect the formation
of a second front this year.

Churchill,

as usual,

showed much more

caution,

stating in an

"aide-memoire" that the feasibility of the plan would be more evident
as it unfolded.
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Each time Stalin accused the Allies of breaking their

premise, Churchill would recall the postcript he had handed to Molotov
in London an his return trip fran Washington that spring.
Harriman

as

well

reiterated

to

Stalin

that

no

premises

Averell
had

been

, ,
38
broken.
In Moscow's assessment, however, the premise had been made and the
date pronounced.

More like a sentence than a promise, the second front

stood at the threshold of relations between the Big Three. It had been
offered in place of the Anglo/Russian treaty, an understanding that
Stalin would keep quiet regarding the recognition of Soviet boundaries
in

exchange

deliverance

for
only

a

cross-channel

invasion.

That

its

confirmed Mosocw's worst misgivings

was

untimely
the

most

pronounced tragedy of the Grand Alliance.
Soviet accounts of the failure to produce the front "as premised"
reek with damning accusations.

Maisky's diary entry of 15 February

1942 accuses the British of allowing the opening of the second front
only if it looked like the Red Army would get to Berlin first.

Later,
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Maisky wrote how right he was in his earlier assumptions:
...even at that early period of the Great Patriotic
War I had no illusions as to the true inclinations and
calculations of the British government. What followed only
confirmed the accuracy of my assessment of the situation.
In particular, the Second Front in France opened only when
the British and the Americans found themselves faced with
the real 'threat' that the Soviet armed forces would get to
Berlin before they did.

It is quite possible, though, that the West's intentions were not
honorable.

Certainly Churchill had no qualms about sacrificing Russian

troops for British troops.

40

He argued stubbornly against the front,

fearing the channel would become a

"bloodbath,"

41

favoring a

safer

route for his troops through French Northwest Africa in conjunction
with an advance westward across the desert toward Tripoli.

42

American

war policy also aimed at giving up as few men as possible, and on this
fateful note Churchill managed to convince FDR of the unsoundness of a
43

cross-channel invasion in 1942.

Evidence proves, however, that Roosevelt premised the front in
good faith with every intention of delivering it in 1942.

Preparation

for the front, code-named SLEDGEHAMMER, began inmediatley after Molotov
left Washington in May 1942.
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At a London Conference on 20 July, where

the future of the front was ultimately decided, America's delegation
argued for Russia and the fate of the Red Army if American and British
ground -forces

failed

to

land

in

Europe

before

the

end

of

1942.

Roosevelt wrote the following in a memorandum to Hopkins, instructing
him on how to proceed with negotiations at the conference:
In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the
possiblity of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation
would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the
turning point which would
save
Russia
this
year.

59
SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason
calls for its accomplishment.
You should strongly urge
immediate all-out preparation for it, that it be pushed
with the utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or
not Russian collapse becones iirminent.
In the event
Russian collaspe becones probable SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not
merely advisable but imperative. The principal objective
of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air
Forces frcm the Russian front.

It is difficult to believe such conviction could have been swayed.

Yet

Churchill ostentatiously refused support for the front, and FDR agreed
with Marshall's and Hopkins' final assessment of the fateful situation:
".. .mere acquiescence on the part of the British was not sufficient for
carrying out plans of this magnitude."
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Regardless of Roosevelt's good intentions, they oould not be a
substitute for actions.

Moscow, well aware that the failure to put

SLEDGEHAMMER into operation lay with the British,

47

directed its anger

toward both Allies. Stalin spoke to his people about the absence of a
second front on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution,
1942:
Our Allies
cannot fail to realize that since France
has been put out
of action, the absence ofa second front
against Fascist Germany may
end badly
for all the
freedom-loving
countries,
including
the
Allies
themselves.

To the Soviet nation the front became all-important, an instrument of
accountability

needed

to

solidify

the

coalition.

The

failure

to

provide a European front early in the war greatly hindered the chances
for a successful post-war peace settlement between the Big Three. What
is

most

curious

cognizance
observation

of

about

the

the delicate

made

by

whole

affair

situation.

Ambassador Winant

is

Hull's
in

Washington's
memoirs

December

obvious

recorded

an

1941:"'Russia,'

60
Winant reported, ' was suspicious that the British and ourselves aimed
at excluding her frcm the peace and postwar settlement...'"
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Stalin's demands for territorial acquisition had posed too great a
hazard to Roosevelt's concept of the future post-war world.
of self-determination,

embodied in the Atlantic Charter,

The ideal
became the

crusading spirit of World War II; the United Nations symbolized hope
for the American people and the West in general.

Both FDR and Cordell

Hull felt great relief when Stalin relented and signed the Anglo treaty
with no mention of borders or territories.^0 Failure to deliver the
front

in

1942,

however,

gave Moscow

ample

reason to distrust

its

Allies; and neither the Atlantic Charter nor the United Nations offered
anything to meet the immediate needs

or interests of the Kremlin.

Stalin was not about to compromise his war aims to allies he suspected
for a

dream he did not

share.

Robert Sherwood,

dismissed the issue of the second front.
Front will

probably

continue

for as

writing in

1948,

"The debate about the Second

long as any. of the immediate

participants in it shall live, and after that all that will matter is
that it actually happened precisely when it did and new world history
was made."
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Sherwood's prediction that the late delivery of the second

front would be forgotten in the more monumental history to follow could
not have been more wrong.

Roosevelt's War Aims: "We leave here, friends in fact, in
spirit and in purpose."
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The Atlantic Charter, signed by Britain and America on 14 August
1941,

secured in words Thanas Paine's vision for America:

political

sovereignty

for

all

nations,

capitalistic freedom "to traverse the high
hindrance."

endowing

complete

thorn

with

a

seas and oceans without

The Charter embodied the tradition of the Open Door and

the necessary political freedom needed to pursue such a policy.

The

fourth point of the Charter called on the signatories "to further the
enjoyment by all states,

great or

small,

victor or vanquished,

of

access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the
world which are needed for their economic prosperity."
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Clearly regarded by Roosevelt as a principle rather than a binding
53

law,

the Charter offered little guidance

in solving the pressing

conflicts which faced the coalition throughout the war years.

"It is

not a code of law frcm which detailed answers to every question can be
distilled by painstaking analysis of its words and phrases," Cordell
Hull

said

in

a

radio

adress

delievered

9 April

1944.

"What

is

fundamental," he concluded, "are the objectives of the Charter and the
determination to achieve them."
Unfortunately,

neither
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Stalin

nor

Churchill

shared

FDR's

dedication and enthusiasm to the rhetorical principles of the Atlantic
Charter. The nebulous document was America's dream, and both statesmen
at

one

point

ideals.
choose

or

another

clarified

their

acceptance

of

its

lofty

Its main objective, calling for the "respect of all peoples to
the

England's

form

imperial

of

government

possessions

raider

which

obsolete.

An

they

live,"

embarrassed

rendered
Churchill

explained to the House of Carmens that the Charter applied only to
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those nations "new under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing
any alteration in their territorial boundaries....So that is quite a
separate

problem

frcm

the

progressive

evolution

of

self-governing

institutions in the regions, and people which owe their allegiance to
the British Crown."
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The Soviets as well voiced skepticism of the Charter's ability to
provide concrete guidelines in the post-war world.

Ivan Maisky signed

the Charter in London on 24 September 1941, yet he qualified the degree
to which the Soviets would adhere to its precepts:
Considering that the practical application of these
principles
will
necessarily
adapt
itself
to
the
circumstances,
needs,
and
historic
peculiarities
of
particular countries, the Soviet government can state that
a consistent application of these principles will secure
the most energetic support on the flart of the government
and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

That the "circumstances, needs and peculiarities" of certain countries,
especially

Poland

in

its

differently by the Allies

relationship
than

to

by Moscow

Russia,

was

interpreted

should have

cone as no

surprise to the West, yet it did time and time again.

According to

historian Walter LaFeber, Moscow's qualifying acceptance
clearly indicated that the Soviets had no intention of
allowing the history of 1919-1939 to repeat itself; if they
could gather the requisite power, Eastern Europe and
particularly Poland, across which German armies had invaded
Russia twice in less than twenty-five years, would come
under de facto Soviet control.

Regardless of its inability to appease Stalin's territorial war
aims,

Roosevelt's

universal court of

war

diplomacy

still

focused

on

establishing

a

justice based on the principles of the Atlantic

Charter; his vision included China, America, Russia and Great Britain
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policing the world.

Only those nations with power had the ability to

check aggressors and influence smaller countries.

The President hoped

the peace-keeping organization would provide a viable substitute to
Stalin's

security

demands.

Roosevelt

wanted

to

believe

America's

political and economic institutions would be an acceptable alternative
to the present world order based on spheres of influence and power
politics, yet there was no evidence at the time that the world was
ready for, or even wanting of, such an order.
William Appleman Williams

saw real

continuity between Woodrow

Wilson's attempt to turn the Progressive reform movement into a viable
program for the entire world and Roosevelt's attempt to change the New
Deal into a

new world order.

In order to sustain American

style

democracy and prosperity, Williams maintained, it is always necessary
to expand markets.

"For these traditional reasons the United States

declined...even to discuss the Soviet Union's bid to settle postwar
boundaries."
to

settle
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The Soviet Union certainly viewed Washington's refusal

post-war European territories

as

evidence

that

American

policy-makers "planned to use the war as a means of spreading their
influence to as many countries as possible...
postwar world ruled by themselves."
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They wanted to see the

The refusal to discuss Moscow's

war aims, followed by the August 1942 revelation that the second front
would not ocme after all,

reinforced Russia's traditional fears of

foreign and capitalistic encroachment.^
The President did place a proportionate amount of emphasis on
Antierica's economic needs, and what those needs would be after the war.
The American tradition, though, does not really separate democracy frcm
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capitalism; nor did Roosevelt. Secretary Hull, as chairperson, stated
this tradition to the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in
1942, hoping perhaps to make such rhetoric official policy.
Liberty is more than a matter of political rights,
indispensible as these rights are. In our own country we
have learned frcm bitter experiences that to be truly free,
men must have, as well, economic freedom and economic
security— the assurance for all alike of ai^opportunity to
work as free men in the company of free men.

Such an atmosphere excluded the Soviet Union, and Hull felt explicitly
the post-war world held no room for a socialistic economic system.
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Roosevelt did not feel quite as strongly as Hull on this point.
He certainly wanted to change the Soviet system, and he had a sincere
desire to have the rest of the world partake of an "opportunity to work
as free men.”

But while it may be true that the Open Door best suited

American interests, Roosevelt and Hull sincerely believed such a world
was

best

suited to all.

Even

Britain's

system did

not properly

conform, as evidenced in the following poignant conversation between
Churchill and Roosevelt, which took place just prior to the signing of
the Atlantic Charter. The dialogue was recorded by Roosevelt's son,
Elliott, and Roosevelt began the conversation.
"Of course, he remarked, with a sly sort of
assurance, "of
course,
after
the
war,
one
of
the
preconditions of any lasting peace will have to be the
greatest possible freedom of trade...
Churchill's neck reddened and he crouched foward.
"Mr. President, England does not propose for a mcment to
lose its favored position among the British Dominions. The
trade that has made England great shall continue...
"The peace, said Father firmly, "cannot include any
continued despotism.
The structure of the peace demands
and will get equality of peoples.
Equality involves the
utmost freedom of competitive trade. Will anyone suggest
that Germany's attempt to dominate trade ixv^central Europe
was not a major contributing factor to war?"
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Roosevelt cannot be faulted for trying to convince Stalin that
such a universal trade system would be beneficial to all nations, even
the outcast Soviet Union. Stalin would have been difficult to persuade
even

in

the best

of

circumstances,

already present when the
delivery of

the second

coalition

given
formed.

the

element

Perhaps

front would have been a

of mistrust

a more

strong,

timely

convincing

factor.
As Stalin's nation continued to be hainnered and beseiged by German
forces, however, the need for post-war reconstruction entered Soviet
thinking.
borders

Moscow's war aims became even more important, for expanded
meant

greater

resources.

Unfortunately,

Moscow's

concern to address the issues net only with frustration.

growing
Stalin's

demands for border recognition were put off to the peace conference at
the war's end, giving Roosevelt time to push his plans, hoping all the
while that Stalin's war aims would dissolve into a new found enthusiasm
for the world peace-keeping orgainization.

With his Allies unwilling

to discuss war spoils at all, either in monetary or territorial terms,
Stalin's only choice was to accept the new American world order or
pursue the goals he believed offered real security.

As the war raged

on and Stalin continued to stand firm in his initial demands,
relationship of the Big Three deteriorated.

the

Stalin's unwillingness to

let a world court provide for his nation's security became more obvious
with the passing of each carmunique between the Big Three.

The Grand Alliance; One in Fact...Three in Purpose
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By November 1943, Stalin was in a superior position.

The victory

at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43, featuring the valiant Red Army,
had determined the Germans would eventually be defeated.

In contrast,

the Allied armies were "mired in Italy in a theater of war which could
not

compare

Qnbarrassed

in
and

Churchill had
deserved.

scope

or

feeling

the

casualties
somewhat

to

the

guilty,

huge Russian
neither

front."

Roosevelt

stamina to deny Stalin the requests he
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nor

felt he

At this point in the war the West needed the Red Army, which

was busy rolling back German troops from "the dangerous opening of the
/re

German front between Stalingrad and the Caspian Sea."

By the time of

the first official meeting of the coalition, held in Teheran from 27
November to 1 December 1943,

Stalin

felt confident:

the

conference

would be overshadowed by the broken premise of the second front.

When

Churchill wrote to Stalin in July 1942 announcing there would be no
cross channel invasion, Stalin replied with candor:
As to... opening a second front in Europe, I fear the
matter is taking an improper turn.
In view of the
situation of the Soviet-German front,
I state more
emphatically that the Soviet Government cannot tc^erate the
second front in Europe being postponed till 1943.

Yet Stalin would have to tolerate it, for the front would not be opened
in 1943, either.
The

main

topic

at

Teheran

involved

the

necessary

considerations needed for opening the second front.

military

Churchill, still

opposed to a cross channel invasion, feared more for his land army than
anything else, knowing that a crushing defeat at Normandy would only
facilitate Hitler. Roosevelt had allowed Churchill to convince him of
this for almost two years, but at Teheran he firmly agreed with Stalin:
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"Operation Overlord" would oonmence the following May,
was thrilled.
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1944.

Stalin

It became clear to all that the front would become a

reality, thanks to Roosevelt's insistence.
Roosevelt and Stalin had a rapport that did not include Churchill,
and

it

is

possible the

issue

of

establishing this understanding.

the

front

Roosevelt,

had

much

to

do with

always willing to meet

Stalin more than halfway, felt with conviction that he would have to be
the more conciliatory of the two if his peacemaking organization was

to triumph.

He knew post-war peace could not be kept without Moscow's

cooperation.

Nowhere

is this

conviction more

evident than

in the

discussions held at Teheran regarding Poland. Poland's fate was decided
at Teheran:

Stalin would have a free and open hand in Poland, and

Eastern Europe as well.
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Sane historians believe the Polish problem to be the nemesis of
the coalition,

lurking in every discussion and ocmpranise.

Others

believe the same to be true of Germany, which the Soviet Union expected
to pay dearly for the destruction of its hone land.

The thrust of the

Polish problem cane frcm the Polish government-in-exile, which Britain
had harbored since Hitler's 1939 invasion.

The invasion of Poland

ended the West's policy of appeasement, sending Britain and France into
war against Germany. Churchill, constantly under pressure to secure a
Poland free of Soviet influence, found himself in a difficult mediating
position between Moscow and the London Poles. Stalin correctly surmised
the hostility of the govemment-in-exile, and he tenaciously refused to
accept an "unfriendly" government on his border.
Roosevelt cared only that the Polish government be representative
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of

the people;

this would please his home

crowd.

Roosevelt hoped

public opinion and gestures of good will would ultimately convince
Stalin to allow self-determination in the buffer

states.

In 1943,

though, Roosevelt held no illusions regarding Stalin's feelings about
spheres

of

influence.

A

personal

ccxrmunique

from

U.S.

Soviet

Ambassador Averell Harriman to FDR written in October 1943 during the
Moscow

Conference

demonstrates

post-war ambitions.

Roosevelt's

awareness

of

Stalin's

Three difficulties stood out in Harriman's mind:

1) the Soviet Union's firm stand on the position taken for recognition
of their 1939 border; 2) their intention to be very tough on Germany;
and

3)

the

Polish

situation.

Harriman

also

called

attention

to

Washington's reluctance to discuss Stalin's post-war aims, and hew that
approach had so far misled the Soviets:
Although Soviet territorial questions were never
raised...it can only be inferred that the Soviet Government
expects to stand firmly on the position they have already
taken in regard to their 1941 borders. I believe they have
the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the
British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue
may have given then the impressi^ that we would not raise
serious objections in the future.

This, however, is exactly the impression Roosevelt wished to convey.
Roosevelt and his advisors agreed there was little anyone could do
short of war

to prevent Stalin

from taking back the territory he

believed rightfully belonged to him.

Roosevelt was not about to go to

war for the self-determination of Eastern Europe, regardless of what
the Atlantic Charter had to say.^ This might create a dilemma for the
American

people,

but

cooperation

with

the

Soviet

Union

for

the

remainder of the war and in the post-war world dominated Roosevelt's
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thinking at this time.
Eden

in March

1943

A discussion the President had with Anthony

revealed

as much.

Harry Hopkins

recorded

the

conversation :
The President said that, after all, the big powers
would have to decide what Poland should have and that he,
the President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference
and bargain with Poland or other small states; as far as
Poland is concerned, the important thing is to set i^-jup in
a way that will help maintain the peace of the world.

The President's attitude became evident in a secret conversation
Roosevelt held with Stalin on 1 December. At the meeting, Roosevelt
explained

to

Stalin

the

importance

of

public

opinion

in American

politics :
He added that there were in the United States frcm six
to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a
practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said
he personally agreed with the views of Marshall Stalin as
to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state...He
hoped, however, that the Marshall would understand that for
political reasons outlined above, he could not participate
in any decision here in Teheran or even next winter.

The

conversation

among

states

was

continued,
discussed.

and

the

question of

Roosevelt

explained

self-determination
to

Stalin,

very

patiently, as one would to a child, hew "he thought that world opinion
would want seme expression of the will of the people,
immediately
day..."
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after

their

re-occupaticn

by

Soviet

perhaps not

forces,

but

scroe

Stalin's reply was not child-like, but clever and accusatory:

The Marshall replied that the three Baltic republics
had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of
Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had
raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite
see why it was being raised now.
The President replied
that the truth of the matter was that the public neither
knew nor understood. Marshall Stalin answered that they
should be informed and sane propaganda work be done.
He
added that as to the expression of the will of the people,
there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in
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accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could
not agree to any form of international control.

This apparently satisfied the President, even in lieu of the character
of the Soviet constitution.

It is easy to understand why Stalin left

Teheran with the impression that the United States would not oppose any
territorial changes he wanted.

It is the

job of the historian to

interpret words, and although it can never be known exactly what Stalin
thought about this "peculiar conversation"
intentions,
definite

the

words themselves

policy.

On

such

are
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or of Roosevelt's exact

vague

words

the

and donot

future of

connote

a

Europe became

precariously decided.
Brief discussions concerning Germany also transpired at Teheran.
Stalin

wanted

hesitated.

complete

Remembering

dismemberment,
Versailles,

as

he

did
knew

Roosevelt.
the

Churchill

consequences

upsetting the status quo by totally debilitating a nation.

of

The three

discussed a few plans for carving up Germany and demilitarizing the
nation,

but

Germany's
problem.

settled nothing.

past

sins,related

Stalin,
this

adamant about retribution for

issue

directly

to

the Polish

The weaker was Germany, the less chance it would rise again.

Stalin made

it

clear at Teheran that he would conduct all

future

diplomacy toward one aim: Germany would never again pass through the
Polish corridor.

Teheran became Stalin's victory.

The only official documents to emerge frcm the conference were the
Declaration of Iran, the military agreement on the second front, to be
opened in May 1944,

and the Declaration of the Three Powers, whose

final words read: "We came here with hope and determination.
here, friends in fact,

in spirit and in purpose."
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We leave

Yet amidst the

71
salutations
division

and

of

praise,

purpose

the

among

testimonial

the

Big

Three

luncheons
had

and

dinners,

a

surfaced— Roosevelt,

interested in the promulgation and establishment of his peace-making
experiment; Churchill, still interested in reestablishing a semblance
of power in Europe, the only world order in which he felt safe; and
Stalin, dedicated to establishing a sphere of influence to protect his
borders, unable or unwilling to understand the abstract principles of
democracy which Roosevelt would soon impose upon him.
FDR addressed the nation soon after Teheran. His Fireside Chat of
24 December sowed the

seed of illusion that all was right within the

coalition.

Norman Graebner discussed the speech:

President

Historian
described

accurately

the imposing

military

"...the

situation,

especially in the Far East, but ignored, in his description of the
postwar world, the clear warnings of Soviet amibition in Eastern Europe
which Stalin had made no effort to hide.

In the utopianism of such

public

foundation

statements

Roosevelt

laid

disillusionment and conflict."
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the

for

eventual

During that fireside chat Roosevelt

told the American people:
We did discuss international relationships frcm the
point of view of big, broad objectives, rather then
details. But on the basis of what we did discuss, I can
say even today that I do not think any insoluble
differences will arise among Russia, Great Britain and the
United States....The doctrine that the strong shall
dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies — and we
reject it.

Roosevelt,

willing

to make

an

exception

in

the

case

of

Russia1s

relationship to Poland, failed to prepare the world for the eventuality
of a Polish government "friendly" to the Soviet Union.
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The nature of this relationship became well-known at the Yalta
Conference,

held fourteen months

later,

weather blessed the February conference;

February

4-11,

1945.

Mild

but Roosevelt's health was

ailing and he felt put upon to travel halfway around the world to meet
with his collaborators.

Stalin, however, would not venture very far

frcm his cwn well-protected sphere.

So for the sake of peace and to

quiet Churchill's clamorings for another peace conference to settle the
Polish

question

onoe-and-for-all,

Roosevelt

agreed

to

meet

the

Generalissimo more than half way.
By the beginning of February, the Red Army had moved two hundred
miles through central Poland, past the German frontiers,

into upper

Silesia. Soviet troops, less than fifty miles frcm Berlin, controlled
all of East Prussia with the exception of Komgsberg.
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In Hungary, the

Red Army moved toward Budapest. Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe had
begun, in spite of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Since

Teheran,

Stalin

had

begun

to

insist

on

the

Polish

territories annexed in 1939, and on a pro-Soviet Polish government.
Relations between the London Poles and Stalin had fallen beyond repair
by February 1945, so much so that Stalin could claim at Yalta that
these Poles not only exhibited hostility to his government and carried
out sabotage acts against the Soviet rear, but were conspiring with the
Germansr There was

little Churchill or Roosevelt could say against

these charges, short of calling Stalin a liar; such a charge would have
endangered the coalition far too much.
The incident Stalin offered as proof of the disloyalty of the
Polish govemment-in-exile began in 1941 when the government set about

73
forming an army.

Many of their top officers could not be located, and

no explanation could be offered as to its whereabouts.
1943

the

Nazi

radio

began

to

transmit

reports

On 13 April

that

the

Soviet

government had murdered the Polish officers in the Katyn forest.

The

Polish govemment-in-exile chose to take the German reports seriously
and

ordered

an investigation.

Churchill

saw

the

dangers

such

allegations would have to Soviet-Polish relations, but he was unable to
calm Stalin's furious redress.
London Poles

Stalin broke all relations with the

denouncing the incident as proof of a hostile government

under German influence.
The

significance

negotiations.

of

the incident

The Big Three

was

its

affect

upon

agreed wholeheartedly that any Polish

government must be composed of democratic, anti-fascist elements.

The

action

for

of

the

London

Poles

had

not

democracy or their hatred

for Germany,

plenary sessions at Yalta.

On

demonstrated

their

love

Stalin asserted during the

5 January Stalin

wrote to Roosevelt

concerning the matter:
I greatly regret that I have not been able to convince
you of the correctness of the Soviet Government's attitude
toward the Polish question.
I nevertheless hope that
events will convince you that the Polish National Committee
has always rendered and will continue to render to the
Allies...considerable assistance in the struggle against
Hitlerite Germany, whereas the emigre Government in London
assists
Germans by creating disorganization in this
struggle.

The severing of Polish-Soviet relations prompted Churchill to write to
Roosevelt an 8 January 1945: "At the present time I think the end of
this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last."
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The Big Three discussed Poland in detail at the third plenary
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session on 6 February. The President said he wished to see Lwow and the
rich oil deposits of that area go to Poland even though they were
within the already agreed upon Curzan line.

Roosevelt wished to appeal

to Stalin's magnanimity, still hoping Stalin would learn to bend to
Western public opinion.

Roosevelt pleaded rather than demanded:

"He

said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration
and

would

not

insist

on

it."
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Churchill

said

he

was

much more

interested in the "sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the
frontier line— he wanted to see the Poles have a heme where they could
organize their lives as they wished."
on about hew,

for Britain,

83

Churchill pleaded, going on and

the question was

almost cost them their life in the world."
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one of honor— "it had

Stalin, whose country had

suffered more than any other, who remembered with anger that neither
Great Britain nor the United States cared enough about the loss of
Soviet lives to open the second front before the war was practically
won, remained unconvinced by either plea.

He also desired a strong,

independent Poland, for it had been a weak Poland that had made it
possible for Germany to invade Russia not once, but twice.
hcwever,
death."
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For Russia,

"It is not only a question of honor...but one of life and
Stalin would not recognize the London Poles as a legitimate

government, and Churchill would not recognize the Warsaw,

or Lublin

Poles. Hie intense situation indicated the lack of progress that would
be made at Yalta regarding the Polish problem.
Churchill continued to press for a written solution to the problem
while Roosevelt made general statements that contributed little.
never wavered frcm his vow not to get directly involved.

He

Churchill
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insisted the Lublin government did not represent the Polish people and
Stalin assured
proof.

It had

him it

did.

Churchill,

of

course,

could

offer no

been impossible to get anyone into the country to

investigate up until this time, and now that the war had abated in the
area Stalin insisted that attempts to go in would be an insult to the
Polish people and the Provisional Government. Stalin said, after all,
the Lublin Government had stayed to fight Hitler and assist the Red
Army in liberation— it was to them that the Polish people had pledged
their loyalty and thanks.

The President felt free elections to be the

most important consideration, the only real question being who would
govern in the interim.

Stalin premised free elections, but insisted

the government be formed frcm the nucleus of the Lublin Poles who had
already proven their loyalty and adeptness to rule.

Churchill and

Roosevelt proved powerless under the barrage of Stalin's steady and
faultless

arguments.

Churchill

and

Roosevelt

finally agreed

to

a

"reorganization of the already acting Polish Provisional Government
with

other Polish

abroad."
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Stalin

democratic
made

it

leaders

quite

frcm within

clear,

however,

Poland
that

and

he

did

frcm
not

consider the Polish government-in-exile to be democratic or even close
to it.
To this day myths surrounding Yalta flourish.

Among the most

famous are that Stalin broke his premise to allow self-determination in
Eastern Europe and Roosevelt sold Poland 'dewn the river'.
none of this happened.

In reality

The most accurate comment concerning the truth

about Yalta comes frcm Admiral William Leahy, who was present at the
conference.

The final agreement on Poland, he said, "is so elastic
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that the Russians can stretch it all the way frcm Yalta to Washington
without technically breaking it."

Since the Red Army already occupied

Eastern Europe, however, Roosevelt wearily replied to Leahy,

"I know
87

Bill, I know...but it's the best I can do for Poland at this time."
Herbert

Feis

declared the

formula," destined to fail.
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Yalta

Declaration an

"ambiguous

George Kennan had this to say about the

Polish agreement:
The Yalta Declaration, with its references to the
reorganization of the existing PolishHTcmnunist regime "on
a broader democratic basis" and to the holding "of free and
uunfettered elections...on the basis of universal suffrage
and secret ballot," struck me as the shabbiest sort of
equivocation,
certainly not calculated to pull the wool
over thg^eyesof the Western
public but bound to have this
effect.

Unfortunately,
Polish

agreement

abstractideals

abounded

at

like the ones presented in

Yalta.

The

Declaration

on

the

Liberated

Europe, another undefined document, emerged from the conference.

Feis

called it "little more than another avcwal of devotion to ideals which
all three Allies had approved many times before...Its loose net of
phrases

allowed

Declaration,

easy

like

the

passage
Polish

to

any

document,

determined
makes

use

purpose."
of
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The

words

like

"democratic elements," phrases which Stalin defined much differently
than Churchill or Roosevelt.
Almost immediately following Yalta, as the Red Army continued its
march

through Eastern Europe

Western

world

Declaration

on

pointed

to

and began to

Moscow's

Liberated Europe,

an

actions

occupy the
as

intentional

a

region,

breach

reneging

of
of

the
the

these

highly cherished principles to which Stalin had pledged his support.
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But Stalin had made his policies clear to Churchill and FDR, and both
knew he had every intention of creating 'friendly" states in Eastern
Europe. According to Gaddis, the real failure had been not to honestly
prepare the American and British people for Stalin's intentions, and
not to inform the world that the Allies had no intention of opposing
Moscow if it meant

jeopardizing the Grand Alliance, world peace or

Roosevelt's United Nations.
Graebner maintains
following

Yalta

was

91

that what

very

occurred

logical,

diplomatic history of the war.

92

in the eighteen months

considering

the

military

and

In 1943 William C. Bullitt obstinately

argued for sending American troops into the Baltic states, liberating
the region before the Russians.
controlling
refused

93

The only way to prevent Moscow from

the region, he argued, was to get there first.

toadopt

this

tactic,

not

wanting

to

upset

Roosevelt
Stalin

and

determined to sacrifice as few American lives as possible.

Withholding

the

encouraging

second

front made the

situation especially ironic,

Russia to "eventually occupy the vast areas of Slavic Europe which has
comprised the historic territorial objectives of the Russian nation."
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The truth of the matter is that Eastern Europe, historically, has
never been a part of America's interests or affairs.

Graebner writes

how, for American officials, the Slavic states had always represented
political

corruption,

economic

instability

. .
95
insignificance.
Their significance to

and

strategic

the Kremlin and the Tsars,

however, has always been astronomical, and for the first time since
Napoleon Moscow had an opportunity to secure this buffer zone,
facto.
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Americans

mistakenly

assumed

that

Moscow's

de

. . .
tradition in

78
foreign relations could be supplanted by a new world order.

Roosevelt

ignored Stalin's quest for political security, convincing the American
people and the rest of the world that Stalin had indeed abandoned
Russia's traditional quest
happened,
war.

for a

sphere

of

influence.

This

never

and Stalin never hid his intentions frcm his partners in

Soviet foreign policy remained orthodox throughout the war.
Official Washington had simply premised too much.
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Leading the

American people to believe Stalin had magnanimously changed because of
the Grand Alliance and new adhered to the nebulous principles of the
Atlantic Charter and the Declaration for Liberated Europe left FDR's
successors little choice: abandon the Atlantic Charter and admit to
Roosevelt's

failed

war

startegy,

or

brand

Stalin

a

liar,

thus

sacrificing the Grand Alliance and laying the seeds for the Cold War.
The decision to take the latter route misled the world into believing
Stalin had indeed broken the pledges made to his Allies.
Yet the document which bound both Churchill and Roosevelt to deny
Stalin's territorial requests, The Atlantic Charter, the "guiding star"
of the coalition, was one whose principles were easily bent.
ideals

calmed

the

American

public,

steeped

as

they

were

in

tradition of fighting wars for democracy and liberty for all.

Such
the
Yet

Stalin had agreed to the Charter only with the qualification that the
principles would secure support under certain circumstances, depending
on the needs of the country.

In spite of Stalin's clear intentions, or

perhaps because of them, the agreements and communiques signed at the
conferences were too broad to be binding,

saying little in specific

terms about what would transpire in Poland and Eastern Europe, leaving
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Roosevelt's successors with no policy whatsoever in that part of the
world.

As the Red Army pushed Hitler's forces back, Eastern Europe and

Germany became a huge military vacuum into which
flowed.
war

Soviet

influence

Left up to a group of men unprepared to follow FDR's unproven

diplomacy,

America's

best

United

States

interests;

and

policy
this

makers

clearly

proceeded
excluded

a

to

act

in

socialistic

economic system dominating part of Germany and all of Eastern Europe
and the Balkans.
Seme contemporaries, like Walter Lippmann and Henry Wallace, spoke
out in favor of allowing the Soviet Union to have its traditional
sphere of influence.
sphere
China.

in
98

however

Lippmann argued that, after all, the U.S. had a

Central America,

and would

soon

have

one

in Japan and

For Lippmann, the matter was one of limitations.
strong,

has

universal

power

which

reaches

"No nation,

everywhere."
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Captain Thorneycroft, speaking to the British House of Cannons, viewed
the Polish conflict with despair, seeing in it the seeds for another
world war.
We could not ocsme back fron Yalta with a blue-print
for a new Utopia. The fundamental error into which my hon.
Friends have fallen is this. The rights of small nations
are not safeguarded by signing documents like the Atlantic
Charter and quarrelling with^^iyone who does not agree with
your interpretation of them.

Before the advent of containment came the United States1

'get

tough' policy with Russia— based on the democratic principles of the
Atlantic Charter which Stalin had alledgedly violated.101 Even before
the supposed violation took place, hewever, the Charter1s main design
eliminated the Soviet Union's political and economic system frcm the
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post-war world and unequivocally put forth a new world order.

Even

Britain's pre-war colonial domain had to be abolished according to the
precepts put forth in the document.
coaxing

Stalin

second front,

along,

Roosevelt had every intention of

offering him attractive

piecemeals

like

the

in order to gain his cooperation in a world totally

different frcm the one in which he was used to operating.

Roosevelt's

strategy remained unfulfilled, and the Soviets became unfairly linked
to the principles and vague words of a document which would, if given
time,

firmly

comers

entrench

of the earth.

Westem-style
This

democratic

Roosevelt's

capitalism

successors were

determined to do, with or without Moscow's cooperation.

in

all

bound and

Stalin, on the

other hand, had suspected such motives all along; he therefore took
precautions early in the war to assure that such a world would not cane
to pass.
The seeds of America's containment policy, sewed in the years of
the Grand Alliance, germinated soon after Roosevelt's death.

He had

left no legacy of foreign policy for dealing with the Soviets in either
Eastern Europe or the world.

Hoping the United Nations would prove

viable in the face of future dilemmas, there is even evidence that
Roosevelt hoped to hand the bomb over to the peace-keeping organization
and the world's four policemen.
the President's vision.
with

Stalin

and

the

102

Harry Truman, however, did not share

Left without a concrete policy for dealing
threat

of

Soviet

expansion

and

world-wide

socialism, he and his advisors had to devise a policy conducive to
their

goals

and

philosophies— the

tradition in foreign policy.

establishment

of

the

American
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Chapter Three— The Creators, 1945-1946

Dean Acheson,

assistant

secretary of

state in 1945,

later

to

become Truman's Secretary of State, entitled his memoirs Present at the
Creation. The 'creation' was that of an American foreign policy which
clearly accepted the responsibility of a world power in the post-war
world, and all the tenets such a duty entailed.
Every creation must have a creator, and in this case there were
several.

Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, James Byrnes, Averell Harriman,

James Forrestal, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg ocme to mind as seme of
the prime movers of this creation.
creators, played a different role.

George Kennan, also one of the
He served to confirm convictions

already held, to provide the justification for official policy when it
finally emerged.

Not everyone would agree with this assessment.

John

Lewis Gaddis, foremost authority on America's containment policy, would
not.'*' Gaddis, however, does agree that "although [Kennan*s] role was by
no means decisive in shaping Truman's approach to the world, his ideas,
more than those of anyone else, did provide the intellectual rationale
upon which that approach was based."
America's

tradition

in

2

foreign

affairs

idealistic and self-righteous, with an
power politics.
economy

had

Furthermore,

become

fused

the quest

with

had,

so

far,

been

intense dislike of European
for

democracy,

a

thriving and

adding

contradiction to the creation of a foreign policy.

an

stable

element

of

No doubt America

had endeavored to become an economic, and therefore a political world
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power.

By 1945 it had achieved the status it desired; unfortunately,

it had little or no experience in the new role.
Acheson's memoirs say as much.

The period of the creation of

America's foreign policy as a new world power is one which he called
obscure and ambiguous.

"Not only was the future clouded,
equally clouded."

3

a cannon

enough situation , but the

present was

Evidence

shows this to be the case.

Revisionists go to great lengths to prove

that Washington's creation of foreign policy in the years immediately
following the war became maligned by those who intentionally wanted to
sabotage Roosevelt's post-war plan for peace.

4

Such a view, hcwever, is

far too simplistic for the complicated situation with which Washington
and the Kremlin had to deal in the post-war years.
Elliot Roosevelt's memoirs discussed the difference between PDR's
administration and the new State Department under Harry Truman. The one
difference, he wrote, "is that when Franklin Roosevelt died, the force
for progress in the m o d e m world lost its most influential and most
persuasvie
implications

5
advocate."
of

it

As

are

peace-keeping organization

biased
accurate.
belonged

as

that
FDR's

almost

remark
devotion

exclusively

may
to

be,
a

the
world

to him.

An

integral part of his personality, the attitude he held toward Stalin
and the importance of the Russians in world affairs could have been
upheld by only a few other statesmen.
Daniel

Yergin,

author

of

Shattered

Peace, described

Roosevelt's attitude tcward the Russians as

the

Franklin

"Yalta Axicm."

The

axicm depended on finding a way to work with the Russians, even to the
point of agreeing to the vague documents negotiated at Teheran and
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Yalta. Preserving the coalition for the post-war world remained the
primary goal of FDR until his death.
much

the

personal

possession

of

Yet, "The Yalta axioms were very
Roosevelt

and

independent agents, whose only loyalty was to him.

a

few

powerful

Those axioms had no

institutional base in the government...Certainly, they were not popular
in the state department."

6

Even the United Nations, the one institution

which may have assured the survival of seme of Roosevelt's attitudes,
lacked any real power for keeping the peace.
For this reason, it is difficult to accuse Harry Truman, or anyone
else, of deliberately infiltrating Roosevelt's "Grand Design" with one
of his own.

In actuality the largest part of FDR's policy involved an

attitude,

certain mindset,

a

Truman the

least of them.

and very few people
Roosevelt

shared it,

certainly knew this,

Harry

but for

political reasons of expediency FDR felt Truman had to be his running
mate in the 1944 election.

The

following Roosevelt's death,

quickly became

impossible

task— trying

to

'creation'

implement

an

which

started in 1945,

saddled with an almost
"attitude"

with

no

institutional or legal basis, a dead man's dream with which few had
empathized.

Ultimately,

understood FDR'S vision.

it may be safe to

say that few had even

Furthermore, neither Truman nor the creators

knew what Stalin was going to do in 1945; Stalin himself did not know.
Each nation knew what it wanted to achieve in the way of national
interests;

the

difficulty or

feasibility of

realizing

those

goals

remained to be seen.
Thus the 'creators1 were not of the same frame of mind as Franklin
Roosevelt. When assessing their scramble to implement foreign policy in

89
1945,

it is prudent to remember this.

At

the time of Roosevelt's

death, there were few concrete agreements regarding the post-war world
and the territorial aquisitions

which

Left

of

only

with

the

ambiguity

Declaration on Liberated Europe,

Stalin

the

insisted upon having.

Atlantic

Charter

and

the

the creators of America's post-war

foreign policy had the freedom to determine policy and the success or
failure of the United Nations. Their attitudes determined the outcome,
resulting in the political containment of Russia which was colored with
the ideological fervor of the Cold War.
And what of the Kremlin? To what extent did Stalin bring upon
himself

the

American

decision

to

contain

Russia?

Issac

Deutscher

maintains that Stalin had no concrete plans, no designs, other than
what

he had put

Russia's

western

forth at Teheran
border,

and

especially

Yalta— "friendly

Poland,

and

states"

reparations

on

from

Germany and other Axis nations to help rebuild his war-torn economy.
According to Deutscher, Stalin did not premeditate putting his Eastern
European

zone under

exclusive

communist

control,

and

none

of

his

demands for reparations from Germany or any other country could be
7

described "as a stepping stone for revolution.”

of the war," Deutscher wrote of Stalin,

"...even at the close

"his intentions were still

extremely self-contradictory, to say the least."

8

If this was truly the case, and evidence shews it to be, the
creators

of

containment,

as

well

as

Stalin,

found

themselves

floundering at the war's end, searching for a policy which assured that
each of their nation's self-interests would be met.

In April 1945 the

new creators of American policy had little faith the United Nations
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could assure this condition.

Stalin of course never believed the UN

oould serve his country's security needs; but then Stalin had left
Yalta under the impression he would be allowed "friendly states" on his
western border.

The agreement he made with Churchill in June 1944

confirmed the Russian sphere of influence in the post-war world.

9

The

one factor which had held all the loose language and obscure ends
together,

FDR,

was gone.He had

ability to secure United
The

time

may

have

believed

States interests

ccrne when even

FDR

in

the

United Nation's

and modify Russian needs.
would

have

modified

his

expectations; that is something we cannot know.
One thing

is certain.

A definite change in attitude

can be

detected after FDR's death, rather than a change in any official policy
which may have belonged to the former President or the Generalissimo.
Although this change was not necessarily a result of the President's
passing,

the creators of American policy felt they oould no longer

trust FDR's methods, what little they understood of them; and Stalin,
perhaps remembering Truman's harsh words spoken as a senator in 1941,
waited to see if the tenuous agreements drawn up at Teheran and Yalta
would stand.
open-door

With America's tradition in foreign policy steeped in
trade,

it

is not surprising

that

Stalin's

socialistic sphere of influence would not be tolerated.

emerging

Likewise, the

Russian tradition believed in the necessity of "friendly governments"
in order to secure borders, making it almost certain the Kremlin would
view any attempt to establish liberal-based democratic governments an
its western border as unacceptable.
There is a big difference, hcwever, between an unacceptable policy
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and

cold war.

The

decision

to

contain

Russia,

although

formally

adopted in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine,

actually began two years

before,

from

a

gradual

process

resulting more

Realpolitik than anything else.

the

necessities

of

The attitudes of the creators became

manifested in the Truman Doctrine, an ideological statement designating
the virtuous United States as an ensign to the people, the protector of
all

nations

against

the

evil

and

totalitarian

Soviet

Union.

rhetoric, true to the American tradition in foreign policy,
U.S.

Such

justified

intervention into Greece and assured Congressional approval of

such an action.

Stalin also intimated to his people the belicose

nature of their past-ally, and the hopelessness of working together to
negotiate a post-war peace.^ What actually happened, however, was the
formulation of the belief, on both sides,

that future negotiations

would prove futile in obtaining the interests both nations insisted
upon having— a precept Roosevelt had refused to accept.

Truman; "...and the Russians can go to hell"

In the 1920's, after the State Department had decided to reject
the new Bolshevik state, it set up an "observation post" in the Baltic
port city of Riga.11 Having adopted a policy of nonrecognition, the
State

Department

simply hoped the

Bolsheviks

would

disappear.

As

DeWitt Clinton Poole, a State Department official at the time wrote,
there

was

world."

a

"breach

between

the

brought

a

Bolsheviks

and

the

rest

of

the

to

the

12

The

year

1933

renewal

of

expectations

92

relationship between Russia and America. William Bullitt, Roosevelt's
choice for the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,

eagerly

anticipated working with the Russians. George Kennan was also in Moscow
during the 1930's.

Called "Bullitt's bright boy," Kennan recalls in

his memoirs hew "Words would fail me if I were to try to convey in this
context

the

excitement,

the

enjoyment,

the

fascination...of

this

13

initial service in Moscow."

By 1935, however, the assassination of Sergei Kirov, a powerful
Carrnunist leader and the most plausible man to succeed Stalin,

had

taken place, marking the beginning of Stalin's purges and the end of
expectations

for

successful

negotiations

between

the

democratic

Americans and the dictatorial Russians. Bullitt's reports to Roosevelt
recoiled in bitterness and spoke of insurmountable difficulties, yet
much to the ambassador's chagrin Roosevelt refused to be convinced to
adept a "hard line."

Kennan wrote of those years:

...the terrible cloud of suspicion and violence, of
sinister, unidentifiable terror and
'sauve qui peut'
denunciations, began to gather over Russia, only to unleash
upon it seme months later the full horror of the purges,
and to continue to darken it, in one degree or another
until Stalin's death in 1953.
With this event the
atmosphere for the conduct of any sort of diplcjqptic work
in Moscow, by anyone, deteriorated drastically...

According to Daniel Yergin, the pessimism of those years continued
to exist in the State Department, only to resurface follcwing FDR's
death.

"If one had taken a snapshot of the career staff sometime

during those first couple of years of relations, it would have shewn
many of the men who were to became State Depatment experts on Soviet
and camnunist affairs in the mid and late 1940's."^ Yergin adds: "As
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U.S. leaders attempted, after World War II, to analyze Soviet policy
and

select

an

appropriate

American

course,

provided one end of the spectrum of the debate.

this

group's

position

Eventually its axioms

triumphed."^
Harry Truman seemed

to have been unduly influenced by this end of

the

"spectrum," although he had the benefit of advice frcm the other

end

as well.

There were those like Henry Wallace and Secretaryof War

Henry Stimson who warned

against adopting a 'get tough' policy toward

the Russians.
There is much debate concerning Truman's attitude toward FDR's
policy and his intentions to carry it out.

Evidence shows Truman did

have every intention of adhering to his predecessor's policies, but his
ignorance

of

self-esteem.

FDR's

war-time

diplomacy

saddled

him

with

a

lew

Understandably, Truman felt compelled to appear tough and

decisive to compensate for

such a

tremendous oversight.

Truman was characteristically prone to rashness as his
regarding Germany and the Russians proved.
Truman that he be in control,

so,

1941 remark

It was very important to

leading him to make hasty decisions

before all the details had been examined.
to knowing so little about

Even

current

He exhibited a sensitivity

foreign affairs,

and expressed

anxiety that Roosevelt had not taken the care to brief him on the most
important issues of the day.

17

Even though he had to rely on the advice

of those closest to the situation, he clearly indicated he would make
any changes he thought necessary.

Truman wrote in his memoirs:

I always fully supported the Roosevelt program, but I
knew that certain administrative weaknesses existed...
I
was well aware of this, and even on that first day I knew I
would eventually have to make changes, both in the Cabinet

and in administrative policy.
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18

Truman believed in FDR's program for peace, and probably believed he
carried it out the best he oould under the circumstances.

He never did

possess Roosevelt's patience and subtleness, however, and this became
obvious in his dealings with the Soviets.
One of the people Truman sought the advice of in those early
months was Averell Harriman, the United States ambassador to Russia
between 1943 and 1946.

William Appleman Williams described Harriman as

"one of the nany wealthy industrial
FDR."
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Although this is

true,

banking

it was

leaders who

Harriman's

supported

earlier business

dealings with the Soviets in 1925 which led him to believe, initially/
that Stalin and the Russians oould be reasonable partners in both war
and peace.

This convinction, in fact,

influenced FDR's decision to

appoint Harriman, whcm he felt would prove an excellent negotiator,
determined to find resolutions for even the most difficult problems.
Roosevelt was correct in this judgment.

Like FDR, Harriman at first

did not feel alarm at Stalin's intentions in Eastern Europe, content
that the dictator and the Kremlin "do not wish to foment revolution
along

their

borders

or

international stability."

to

20

cause

disorder

which

would

threaten

Historian Deborah Larson points out that

neither FDR nor Harriman had any patience for the London Poles, feeling
them to be aristocratic landowners

hostile to Stalin. Both statesmen

wanted to see a Polish government sympathetic to the Soviet Union and
willing to call on it for any future security problems.

21

Gaddis believes no one did more to shape Truman's views than
Harriman,

22
who began to advocate a quid pro quo treatment of Russia as
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early as September 1944, mostly in reaction to the Warsaw uprising of
July

1944.

uprising.

Harriman

became

deeply disillusioned

following

As underground Poles desperately tried to liberate their

capital before the Red Army arrived,

Stalin maliciously halted his

troops outside the city and let Warsaw be rampaged.
resulted

the

in the

destruction

factions within the capital.

of

most

of

the

This maneuver

anti-Soviet

political

Pleas from Churchill as well as Roosevelt

would not move Stalin. "Under these circumstances," Harriman wrote in a
telegram which he never sent,

"it is difficult for me to

see hew a

peaceful

or acceptable solution to the Polish problem can be found."

Shortly

after

the

uprising,

on 25

August,

Harriman

telegrammed

Roosevelt and Hull:
I
have
evidence
that (the
Russians)
have
misinterpreted our generous attitude as a sign of weakness,
and acceptance of their policies. Time has came when we
must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our
goodwill.
Unless we take issue with the present policy
there is every indication the Soviet Union will-become a
world bully wherever their interests are involved.

Roosevelt, however, would not heed Harriman's advice.

24

Discussing

Roosevelt's lack of discernment, the Ambassador wrote:
He has no conception of the determination of the
Russians to settle matters in which they consider that they
have a vital interest...The President still feels he can
persuade Stalin to alter his point of view on ma^y matters
that, I am satisfied, Stalin will never agree to.

It is not surprising, then, that Harriman warned Truman during
their first meeting on 20 April 1945 of a

"barbarian invasion of

Europe." The Ambassador called for a reconsideration of present U.S.
policy and "the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet government
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was likely to act in accordance with the principles to Which the rest
of the world held in international affairs."

26

Three days later Harry Truman called together a special conference
with his chief military and diplomatic advisors to get seme opinions on
the current status of the Polish situation.

Molotov was in Washington,

and Truman had already net with him once.
scheduled later that afternoon.

He had another meeting

Present at the advisory council were

Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Henry Stimson, Secretary of the
Navy James Forrestal, Admiral William Leahy, General George Marshall,
Admiral Ernest King, Ambassador Averell Harriman, General John Deane,
and

Charles

Bohlen.

This

landmark meeting

clearly

illustrated

the

difference between Truman's and Roosevelt's approach to the Russians.
Truman began by stating how, up until now, the "Yalta agreements
had so far been a one way street and that oould not continue.

He would

go ahead with the plans for San Francisco, and if the Russians did not
care

to

join,

they

oould

'go to hell."'

27

"It may well

be

that

Roosevelt would have resisted the acceptance of the Lublin Government
in Poland...," wrote revisionist D.F. Fleming, "but without telling the
Russians to go to hell."

28

Truman then moved around the roan, asking each one present to
state his opinion.

Stimson went first.

He favored "caution." In the

big military matters the Soviets had always kept their word, he said,
and had often gone even one better.

Concerning the border countries,

it was important to find out what Soviet intentions were.

Much of

Poland, after all, had been part of the Soviet Union prior to World War
I, and the Russians took the Polish question very serioulsy.

Later,
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Stimson would point out that aside fran the United States and Great
Britain, very few countries understood free elections.
Ambassador Harriman believed the real issue to be whether the
United States was to be a "party to a program of Soviet domination of
Poland."

29

Stimson interjected at this point that perhaps the Russians

were being a bit more realistic than the United States regarding their
own security.
reasoning.

Leahy then

spoke

up with

seme additional pragmatic

Directly following Yalta, the Admiral had been the one to

tell FDR that the Crimea declaration was "so elastic that the Russians
can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without technically
breaking it."
Yalta

with

30

He now repeated the concept, explaining how he had left

the

impression

that

the

Kremlin

had

permitting a free government to operate in Poland.
Yalta was susceptible of two interpretations."

31

no

intention

of

"In his opinion

In the same breath,

though, Leahy voiced the contradiction that the United States should
tell Russia it stood for a free, independent Poland.
Secretary Stettinius voiced his opinion that Stalin had broken the
Yalta agreement.

Forrestal agreed with this.

"He had felt for seme

tine...that the Soviets believed we would not object if they took over
all of Eastern Europe. Better to have a showdown new than later."
After hearing all the opinions,
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Truman dismissed the conclave,

keeping with him Stettinius, Harriman, Dunn and Bohlen to help work out
an agenda for the meeting scheduled later that afternoon.

When Molotov

entered the roan, the President came right to the point.

He told the

Russian the United States had made all the concessions it intended to
make regarding the Polish situation, that Stalin simply had not lived
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up to the Yalta agreement, and it was most doubtful if Congress would
appropriate

any money

for post-war economic

assistance

unless

the

Polish problem was solved in accordance with the decision reached at
the Crimea.
"I have never been talked to like that in my life,"
Molotov retaliated in protest.
"Carry out your agreements," ^ruman shot back, " and
you won't get talked to like that."

Even Harriman reacted with dismay at the President's rough language.
"The years of labor by Roosevelt and Hull.. .were cancelled out on April
23, 1945," Fleming wrote regarding the tongue-lashing Molotov received
at the hand of Truman.
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If the meeting between Truman and his advisors proved anything,
however, it was that Washington lacked any post-war policy for dealing
with the Russians.
course

to

The men present were uncertain of exactly what

follow.

They

only

knew

their

own

personal

feelings— regarding the present situation, the Russians themselves and
what

it

had

been

like

to

deal

with

criticized both Harriman and Deane

them

for

in

the

past.

their attempts

to

Stimson
convince

Truman to pursue a "tougher policy" at that April meeting, citing past
experiences as a reason for their attitude.
They
(Harriman and
Deane)
have been
suffering
personally frcm the Russians' behavior on minor matters for
a long time, and they have been urging firmness in dealing
on these smaller matter & we have been backing them up, but
now they were evidently influenced by their past bad
treatment & they it^ed for strong words by the President on
a strong position.

The "Riga Axiom" was triumphing.
Molotov left Washington angrily.

The peace conference of the Big
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Three loaned ahead, its date unknown; and still an agreement regarding
Poland had not been reached.

Truman decided to send Harry Hopkins to

Moscow to try to patch things up, to smooth over the rough spots he
himself had created.

Gaddis contends this attempt by Truman symbolized

his earnestness to carry out Roosevelt's program,
Russians

in

intention,
rhetoric."

the

best

'Rooseveltian'

fashion.

36

to work with the
This

was

regardless of his tone, which Gaddis called
37

Truman's

"belligerent

He purposely sent Hopkins to Moscow, knowing the secretary

of oomterce represented a close link between Stalin and Roosevelt.
Hopkins managed to negotiate a ocmprcmise for the Polish conflict,
and Truman felt the results had at least accomplished a return to
normality in negotiations between the two powers.

It was

Stalin's

suggestion to allow four representatives from the London Poles-in-exile
to be on the

current Polish

Provisional

Government.

Hopkins

Truman to accept the oarprcmise, and he did— with reservations.
did not

settle the

accomplished was
Russians..."
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to

Polish problem,"
break

the

Truman wrote.

deadlock

between

urged
"This

"All that was

ourselves

and

the

Hopkins managed to successfully negotiate the problem

because he assured Stalin, as had Roosevelt, that the United States
wanted to have "friendly countries all along the Soviet borders."
Truman,

also

like

Roosevelt,

felt

compelled

concession and hide it frcen the American public.

to

gloss

39

over

And
this

40

Gaddis maintains that the Polish camprcmise left the question of
German

war

reparations

the

major

issue

facing

Potsdam.

This

is

partially accurate, but Poland was still very much a part of the German
question.

Poland currently occupied a portion of Germany, west of the
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Neisse and Oder rivers, an area rich in food production.
the western

border of

Poland

to include

this

portion

believing it should be compensation for Polish sufferings.
he wanted a

larger,

"friendly"

Poland

Stalin wanted
of

Germany,

In reality,

on Russia's western

border.

Churchill, understandably, voiced the most concern about this.

Once

American troops pulled out of Europe, it would be left to Britain and
France to meet the needs of the German people.

With a large area of

their food source under Polish control, Germany would be difficult to
feed.

The rest of Western Europe as well would not have the benefit of

this area's food source.
At first, Roosevelt had agreed with Stalin's desire to see Germany
economically ruined after the war.
surrender,

The initial terms for unconditional

proposed in the Morgantheu Plan,

Germans to death.

would have starved the

More rational thinking prevailed as the war wore on,

however, and Washington came to realize that social and political chaos
would be the only result if the Germans were not fed and employed.
More important, it would be impossible to establish a democratic, and
therefore

capitalistic

government

in

such

an

economically

weak

atmosphere.
The question of war reparations frcm Germany opened up a real
pandora's box.

Even though Britain and America were not prepared to

restorer Germany to a high degree of prosperity, the Big Three, prior to
Potsdam, oould not came to terms on just how much Germany should pay
for its crime.

Truman had threatened Molotov, during that decisive

April confrontation, with Congress' reluctance to appropriate funds to
any nation that disregarded the American principles manifested in the
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Declaration on Liberated Europe or the Atlantic Charter.
Stalin in a dilenma.

This

left

If pro-Western governments on Russia's western

borders proved to be the only way he could get post-war aid for his
country, he would simply have to find other alternatives.

No doubt the

gravity of the economic situation facing the Big Three permeated the
Potsdam conference;

the fact that only America was

in an adequate

financial position to assure the survival of Russia and Europe put both
Stalin and Churchill on edge.
The truth is, the creators of American policy feared a post-war
depression.

They also feared the survival of democratic capitalism in

a

Europe

war-torn

socialistic left.
ruin of

Europe,

that

politically

tended

to

move

toward

the

A depression in America almost assured the economic
and

American

policy makers

socialism under such circumstances,

feared

the

triumph

of

waiter LeFeber, writing on the

Cold War, contends that American foreign policy grows directly from
domestic considerations, the most important of these being economic.
Discussing

the

Depression

Past

post-war
and

policy makers,

Depression

Future

he

wrote:

"The

led

officials

ghosts

to

a

of

second

assumption.":
The post-1929 quagmire had been prolonged and partly
caused by high tariff walls and regional trading blocs
which had dammed up the natural flow^jf trade...Free flew
of exports and imports was essential."

The new Secretary of State Janes Byrnes, wham Truman appointed to
replace Settinius in July 1945, agreed that "Our international policies
and our domestic policies are inseparable...a durable peace cannot be
built

on

warfare."

an
42

economic foundation of

On

21 August

exclusive

blocs...and

1945 Byrnes submitted a

economic

statement to the
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Senate Canmittee can Banking and Currency:
The United States is today a bastion of democracy and
private enterprise. In many countries throughout the world
our political and economic creed is in conflict with
ideologies which reject both of these principles.
To the
extent that we are able to manage our domestic affairs
successfully, we shall win converts to our creed in every
land.'

A more accurate definition of the American tradition in foreign policy
oould not be found anywhere.
Most of the creators shared this 'Universalist' view.

The ironic

exception was George Kennan, the man usually credited with formulating
the containment policy.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. maintains that post-war

policy boiled down to a debate between the universalists and the sphere
of influence supporters.
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Harriman, Byrnes, Acheson and Forrestal

were all universalists, upholding Open Door trade and the promulgation
of

Westem-style

democracy worldwide.

Capitalistic democracy,

they

believed, was the only insurance against the spread of socialism, a
system which threatened the kind of world conducive to America's free
enterprise

system.

Universalists

feared

spheres

of

influence

and

European pcwer politics because such policies closed off markets and
induced tariffs an exports and raw materials.

Furthermore,

if the

American Congress felt a sphere of influence approach was being used to
solve the world's post-war problems, rather than the United Nations,
Washington's

political

isolationism,

limiting

hemisphere.
affairs,

45

atmosphere
America

to

would

once

intervene

only

again
in

the

embrace
Western

Without American intervention into European and Asian

"closed

trade

areas

and

discriminatory

systems

would

flourish," and the dream of the Open Door policy would go dcwn in a sea
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of socialism and European labor parties.
this dream belonged

Schlesinger pointed out that

to Cordell Hull as well,

who managed to pull

Franklin Roosevelt back into its folds everytime he strayed from its
precepts.
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Letting Stalin have the war reparations frcm Germany that

he wanted threatened Europe's eoonany as well as its political systems,
the danger being that Stalin would succeed in establishing a sphere of
influence

in

Germany

and

other

assuring an economy based on
determination

to

receive

parts

of

Western

Europe,

socialism in those regions.

monetary

compensation

for

his

thereby
Stalin's

financially

war-ruined country, and the West's reluctance to give it to him, badly
strained the relationship of the Big Three.
Just hew much these economic fears influenced the origins
containment is not so clear.

of

Stalin wanted a sphere of influence in

both Eastern Europe and Manchuria; and although Roosevelt had given it
47
to him
this was unknown to Truman and viewed with alarm by Harriman.
On 14 May 1945 Harriman wrote to Forrestal that Russian conduct "would
be based upon the principles of power politics in its crudest and most
primitive form.

He said we must face our diplomatic decisions frcm

here on with the consciousness that half and maybe all of Europe might
be communist by the end of next winter..."
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Harriman wrote of a

conversation he had with Stalin in April 1945, when the dictator told
him

he

expected

capitalism.'"

communism

to

"flourish

in

the

'cesspools

of

Advocating a containment policy in 1945, Harriman wrote:

The CCmmtunist party and its advocates everywhere are
using
economic
difficulties
in
areas
under
our
responsibility to promote Soviet concepts and policies and
to undermine the influence of the Western allies. The only
hope of stopping Soviet penetration is the development of
sound economic conditions.

104

In the same month, Harriman recommended against giving the Soviet
Union

preferential

loan

treatment

over

Western

criticized the Treasury Department's study on a

Europe.

He

also

$10 billion dollar

credit requested by Russia. According to Harriman, the study overlooked
"the determination of the Soviet Government not only to reestablish its
capital investment destroyed by the war, but to embark an an ambitious
program of expanding her industrial machine."
of any industrial nation,

however,
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It is hard to conceive

not wanting to

reestablish its

industrial capacity in the years following a major world war.
Byrnes would 'misplace1 a Russian request for a $6 billion loan.

Later,
51

At the Potsdam conference, one of Truman's most important goals
advocated establishing international control of the Black Sea Straits.
Such a requisition ensured Western control of a very politically and
economically

strategic

area.

Although

his

proposal

called

for

"internationalwaterways," the paper specifically named only the Black
Sea straits to be under the jurisdiction of the Big Three powers.
Stalin would have none of it.
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He wanted to control the straits and

negotiate a treaty with Turkey allowing him to do so, much like Britain
had a treaty with Egypt for control of the Suez canal. Truman had a
difficult time understanding Stalin's reluctance to allow the straits
to be controlled by the United Nations Security Council. Calling his
proposal a “war-preventative measure," Truman wrote:
The persistent way in which Stalin blocked one of
the...measures I had proposed shewed hew his mind worked
and
what
he
was
after.
I
had
proposed
the
internationalization of all the principle waterways.
Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control
of the Black Sea Strait$jgand the Danube. The Russians were
planning world conquest.
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The chance that this strategic area would fall exclusively under
Soviet domination alarmed Washington.

It was clear by the simmer of

1945 that Poland would be under communism's thumb; and the Rumanian
government as well had a Soviet-inspired premier in ocmnand, put there
by

the

Rumanian

Roosevelt,

by

King

at

the way,

the

Kemlin's

remained

insistence

complacent

over

in
this

March

1945.

development,

feeling Rumania to be an improper place to test the Declaration on
54

Liberated Europe.

Truman and Byrnes, however, did not share this view.

Negotiations

had broken down during the final meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam
concerning
Britain

the

and

recognition

the

United

of

several

States.

Eastern

The

European

president

asked

reorganization of the satellite governments along the
lines as had been agreed upon at Yalta.
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states

by

for

the

"democratic"

Stalin replied that the

governments in those countries were more democratic than the one in
Italy,

which had been

believe this.

recognized.

Churchill

and

Truman would

not

Certain words irked Stalin, words like "responsible" and

"democratic"— "If

a

government

is

not

fascist,

a

government

is

democratic," Stalin hotly told his cammrades.56 Truman told Stalin he
had no way of knowing whether the governments were democratic or not.
No one was allowed in, and the reports coming frcm within the countries
were

disheartening.

"An

iron

fence

had

come

down

around

them,"

Churchill blatantly told Stalin. "All fairy tales," Stalin retaliated.
Nonetheless,

Truman would not

recognize

the

satellites until their

governments had been reorganized according to the Yalta agreements.
Churchill agreed and that was the way it stood.

As a result, Russia
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stood little chance of receiving any kind of economic assistance from
the U.S.
Following

Potsdam

and

Stalin's

refusal

to

allow

democratic

elections in his sphere or the internationalization of the Black Sea
straits, Truman's fear of Soviet expansion intensified.

On 13 October

1945, Truman wrote to Byrnes:
My position on the Dardanelles has never changed. I
think it is a waterway link with the Black Sea, the Rhine
and the Danube...I am of the opinion if seme means isn't
found to prevent it, Russia will undoubtedly take steps ^ y
direct action to obtain control of the Black Sea Straits.

Furthermore, the Soviets were beginning to show signs of their
ambitions in Iran. In 1941, both British and Soviet troops entered Iran
and divided it into a northern and southern sphere to keep the Germans
out.

Plans for evacuation had been negotiated at Yalta, and it was

agreed all parties should pull out nine months after V-E Day. That was
not until March 1946.

New, however, the U.S. ambassador in Iran warned

Vfeshington that Soviet troops were

intervening in Iranian affairs,

attempting to incite Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Armenians to unite with
their ethnic brethem along the Russian southern border.
Truman,
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like Roosevelt, had paid lip service to the concept of

"friendly" governments along Russia's western border.

At Yalta, then

later at Potsdam, the American government would insist it only desired
friendly

governments;

self-determined
population.
Roosevelt

governments

The
and

negotiations.

yet

two

Hopkins

in

the

same

representative

concepts
oould

were
not

breath
of

all

incompatible,
face

at

the

it

called

elements

for

of

the

something

which

time

their

of

At the end of 1945, however, Truman had to face it;
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Stalin had a sphere of influence which Washington oould not allow to
grow any larger.

He had acquired this sphere with American approval,

all because of the word

"friendly," which Roosevelt,

Truman had tacitly agreed to.

Churchill and

The only way to publicly admonish the

Soviets was to claim that they had broken the Yalta Declaration on
Liberated Europe. In the minds of the creators, Russia was carving out
a sphere of influence which Washington simply did not want it to have.
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Stalin: "...and the United States...would have to accept
world-wide interests whether it liked it or not..."

The

May

1945

meeting

between

Hopkins

and

Stalin

showed

the

Generalissimo to be patient and conciliatory toward what he considered
stubborn and infantile behavior.
Department

to

accept

the

The refusal of Truman and the State

Polish

Provisional

Government,

a

body

"friendly" to the Soviet Union, could only be interpreted as hostile by
the Russian dictator.
Harriman

saw the harm in using such equivocal

language.

The

following carment, made just after Yalta, shows this:
I believe at the time that Stalin meant to keep his
word, at least within his cwn interpretation of 'free
elections', although I had always expected we would have
trouble over those words. He did not, in my judgqa^nt, sign
the declaration with the intention of breaking it.

According to Harriman, Stalin was confident at the time of the
Yalta conference that most of Eastern Europe would vote caxmunist, and
free

elections

would

prove

"friendly"

after

all.

George

Kennan,

present at the Moscow embassy along with Harriman, could not agree.
Harriman recalls hew
Kennan argued that instead of trying to negotiate
issues that were not negotiable, the rational course was to
divide Europe frankly into two spheres of influence and
accept no responsiblity for whatever the Russians did in
their sphere, becauseghhe United States and Britain were
too weak to affect it.

A more accurate assessment would be that the United States chose not to
affect it, opting instead to let the Red Army liberate Eastern Europe
rather

than

sacrifice

its

cwn

armed

forces

to

get

there

first.
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Harriman, rejecting the concept of spheres of influence,
the

principles

of the

Charter and

the

insisted on

Declaration even

though he

admitted the wording of the documents to be "trouble."
Stalin admonished the creators of America's foreign policy during
Hopkins' Moscow visit, telling the statesman, in essence, that America
needed to grew up and accept the fact it could not have its cwn way in
all

parts

of

the

world.

Other

powers'

interests

needed

to

be

considered, Stalin told Hopkins, and the recognition of this fact is
all part of being a superpower.
He said that whether the United States wished it or
not it was a world pcwer and would have to accept
world-wide interests...In fact the United StateSgJhad more
reason to be a world power that any other state...

The fact that Stalin recognized the power of his ally and the
weakness of his cwn state is well-documented.

Truman's memoirs recount

how
Stalin agreed with America's 'open door' policy and
went out of his way to indicate that the United States was
the only pcwer with the resources to aid China economically
after the war. He observed that Russia would have all it
could do to provide for the ^ t e m a l economy of the Soviet
Union for many years to came.

In

April

1945,

Stalin admitted

to

Milovan Djilas,

a

Yugoslavian

ocrrrnunist, that it would be ten to fifteen years before the Russians
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would recover.
In the same breath Stalin added, "...and then we'll
have another go at it."
consumption

of

The remark, made at a dinner party after the

several

bottles

of

vodka,

sounded

like

Stalin

anticipated another war; there is no telling frcm this statement if he
intended to start it.
Whether

or

not

the

Soviet

Union

was

on

the

offensive,
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contemplating, even wanting, world deamination, preoccupied the minds of
the State Department. Russia's perceived desire to forcefully subjugate

the world to totalitarianism and communism had become, by the end of
1945, integral to Washington's 'get tough' attitude toward the Kremlin.
Certainly, if Stalin was not on the offensive, the get tough policy the
creators advocated would not be quite as necessary.

the

weakness

of

Washington's

argument

that

Evidence points to

Stalin

wanted

world

conquest, as well as to the Soviet ability to wage such action.

The

very term "world conquest" is meaningless, anyway, unless defined in
more precise language.

Certainly Stalin would have liked the widest

possible base to support the Soviet Union, to consolidate his cwn power

and help rebuild the economy to its pre-war level of production.

The

dictator, however, had to be keenly aware of what he could practically
accomplish and what was simply beyond his grasp.
the

State

Department

overestimate

Soviet

backward...Mr.
the

Soviet

Apparently,

in

April

strength.

1945
"The

how

Harriman himself told

important

country

is

it

still

was

not

to

fantastically

Harriman said he was therefore not much worried about

Union

taking

Harriman

the

neglected

offensive

in

to

this

convey

the

near

future."

observation

to
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the

President.
By the time Stalin and Hopkins met in May 1945, the Georgian felt
convinced

United

States

policy

makers

no

longer

attitude which had guided Roosevelt during the war.

shared

the

same

The Generalissimo

told Hopkins hew the Kremlin felt:

It was their impression that the American attitude
towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it
became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was
as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were

Ill

no longer needed.65

Stalin cited examples confirming his impression, one being the Polish
question.

At Yalta, Stalin said, the decision had been made that the

existing Provisional Government was to be reconstructed, and "anyone
with cannon sense could see that this meant that the present government
was to form the basis of the new."
He said no other understanding of the Yalta agreement
was possible.
Despite the fact that they were a simple
people the Russians should not be regarded as fools, which
was a mistake the West frequently made, nor were they blind
and c^uld quite well see what was going on before their
eyes.

Another example Stalin offered as proof concerned the manner in
which Lend Lease aid had been abruptly cut off.

Truman had mistakenly

signed a paper terminating the final period of Lend Lease. Not only
were all ships prevented frcm departing, but those ships already sent
out were turned back, making Stalin furious.

In spite of a reversal of

the order and Truman's apology, Stalin called the manner in which the
incident had occurred, "brutal."
The incident took place in early May one month after Truman had
lashed out at Molotov, warning him that economic sanctions could not be
appropriated unless the Yalta agreement,
adhered to.

as he interpreted it, was

In lieu of this incident, it is not surprising Stalin

regarded the abrupt termination of lend-lease as economic diplomacy of
the basest kind.
If the refusal to continue Lend Lease was designed as
pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up, then
it was a fundamental mistake.
He said...that if the
Russians were approached frankly on a friendly basis much
oould be done but that reprisal^ in any form would bring
about the exact opposite effect.
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The Soviet Union never was offered any reconstructive aid in the
post-war period.

After the final protocol for Lend Lease ran out, the

Soviets were on their own.

Philip Mosley, author of The Kremlin and

World Politics, believes the witholding of loans or grants to Russia at
the war's end greatly affected the ability of the coalition to remain
intact in the post-war years.

Mosley wrote: "To make the cooperation

stick, much more should have been done to assure [Stalin] of assistance
in rebuilding the Soviet economy; as it turned out, Stalin and the
Soviet people soon felt that their vast sacrifices were forgotten by
less war-damaged Allies as socn as the fighting was over."
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Stalin

thought so as well, as his conversation with Hopkins proved.
Historian Norman Graebner

agrees with Mosley.

The

absence

of

reconstructive aid, and the refusal to discuss it to any degree, simply
gave

the

Soviets

too

few

alternatives.

Faced

with

American

intransigence, the Kremlin's only recourse was to create a sphere of
influence

in Eastern

Europe,

Manchuria

or

anywhere

it

oould

find

insurance for the survival of its war-torn nation.^
Whether or not Stalin had a legitimate ccmplaint is difficult to
assess.

Roosevelt had gone out of his way to give the Soviets maximum

lend-lease during the war with no quid pro quo attached, even to the

point of waiving the requirement of

recording expenditures.

Other

nations had to account for every penny, but FDR did not want to offend
• 70
Stalm.
of course, Roosevelt too had refused to discuss a post-war
loan with

the Soviets,

Furthermore,

although he

he left all negotiations

peace conference.

intimated there would

be

one.

for reparations to the final

At Yalta, he did settle on a figure of $20 billion
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to be the

"base

figure"

upon which

negotiations

should proceed.71

Stalin took the figure literally, and became quite upset when Truman
and Churchill refused to set any definite figure for reparations to be
extracted frcm Germany. Mosley contends Roosevelt refused to negotiate
a post-war settlement because of the American public, which wanted very
limited involvement in European affairs at the war’s end.
that

American

involvement

in

European

affairs

72

included

Any sign
post-war

economic and military aid threatened American entrance into the United
Nations. Roosevelt did not want another repeat of 1919, when Congress
had refused to join the League of Nations, so he proceeded with extreme
caution— even to the point of misleading the public of Stalin's true
ambitions and expectations for the post-war world.
Unfortunately the United Nations, the one institution upon which
Roosevelt had founded his policy, disappointed Stalin even before the
Potsdam conference had cormenoed.
in

San Francisco in April

1945.

The United Nations Conference opened
The

fact

that Argentina,

a

Nazi

sympathizer during the war, had received an invitation to join, and
Poland was still being excluded frcm the organization, upset Stalin.
Stalin told Hopkins in May that this action raised the question of the
value of agreements between the three major pcwers if their decisions
oould be overturned by the votes of such countries as Honduras and
Puerto Rico.
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Gaddis sympathized with the Soviet point of view regarding the
admittance of Argentina.
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Even Harriman criticized the UN descision to

seat the Argentines. The Yalta agreement stated that only those nations
who had declared war on Germany by 1 March should be allowed entrance
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to the UN. Argentina clearly did not apply.
Gaddis cites several journal and newspaper articles written at the
time,

all

of

the

opinion

that

the

United

States

anti-Soviet bloc of South American countries.

New

Republic

Department
office."

75

and

denounced
"called

an
for

"anti-Soviet
Truman

to

forming an

Thomas Reynolds of the

bloc"

remove

was

within

these

the

officials

State
frcm

The most influential member of the American delegation to

the UN was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Secretary of State Settinius and he backed each
other on most decisions made at the UN conference.
admit Argentina, and Vandenberg welcomed his support.

Settinius voted to
76

Vandenberg viewed the conference more as a contest between the two
superpowers than a workable peace organization.

"The net of all this

battle," he wrote in his memoirs, "is that Molotov won only at those
points where he had a committment frcm the dead hands of F.D.R.
Otherwise, he would have wan nothing.
On 26 April 1945,

He lost every other battle."

while the conference was

in session,
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Vandenberg

recorded the following in his diary:
It was the concensus of Delegation opinion that we
must "stand by our guns" at whatever point we are sure of
votes enough to win....I continue to believe that this is
the point at which we line up our votes...and win anq^end
this appeasement of the Reds now before it is too late.
Harriman had a meeting with the delegates the day the conference
opened, "making everyone understand that the Soviets were not going to
79

live up to their post-war agreements."

Harriman's comment started a

debate within the public sector which had been steadily building since
Yalta. Were the Russians reneging on past promises, and were they going
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to prove detrimental to the establishment of Roosevelt's Grand Design
for world peace— the United Nations?
Most people mistakenly assume the main tenet responsible for the
failure of the United Nations to produce a secure post-war world is the
power of the veto— and blame the Soviets for their insistence on this.
Yet America insisted on it as well, and in fact would have it no other
way.

Hull's memoirs recall hew "we were no less resolute than the

Russians in adhering to this principle."
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The real inadequacy of the United Nations proved to be the lack of
confidence both Washington and the Kremlin had in its ability to solve

world problems to their liking.
twenty-five

nations,

participation

in

all

World War II involved more than

demanding their

world-wide

decisions.

right
"Snail

to

sovereignty

nations

had

and
been

responsible for seme of the world's troubles," Stalin told Hopkins that
spring in Moscow. "He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow
the Soviet Union's
America's

interests to

insistence

reasoning.

on

be

admitting

affected by
Argentina

such

countries."

confirmed
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Stalin's

Henry Stimson called the conference situation "'unreal',

with the delegates

'babbling on as if there were no...great issues

pending.'"
The San Francisco Conference as well as Potsdam convinced Stalin
he would not have the kind of cooperation he envisaged having with FDR.
Whether or not Roosevelt led Stalin to believe he could do whatever
proved necessary to maintain friendly states on his western border was,
by

the

end

of

1945,

a

moot

point.

Washington

insisted

on

self-determination in Eastern Europe; Stalin insisted America leave his
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sphere of influence alone.
He

had,

after all,

stayed out of Greece when

British troops

marched in to repress the resistance forces attempting to overthrew the
monarchist party on 12 February 1945.

As part of a bargain he had made

with Churchill in June 1944, Stalin agreed to let England retain its
sphere of influence in Greece, Yugoslavia and Hungary in exchange for a
Russian sphere in Rumania and Bulgaria. The official agreement called
for a ninety per cent Russian predominance in Rumania, a ninety per
cent

British

predominance

in

Greece,

and

a

fifty-fifty

split

in

Yugoslavia. The Russians were to have a 75-25 predominance in Bulgaria.
Officially,

Roosevelt acquiesced in this arrangement as

long as it

could be cancelled after the war, therefore dealing only with armistice
and liberation procedures.

However, FDR unofficially accepted Russian

dominance in Eastern Europe as fact by October 1944.
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Issac Deutscher agrees with Feis' assesment in his article, "Myths
of the Cold War." Churchill and FDR had to yield Eastern Europe to
Stalin in what Deutscher calls a "grotesque gentleman's agreement."
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The necessity of the war-time alliance dictated that Stalin be given
his sphere of influence.

"After the war, they had second thoughts;

after the war, they wanted it back.
Deutscher wrote.

That was the idea of containment,"

What Deutscher left out of his analysis, however, was

Truman's unawareness of Roosevelt's ambiguous agreement to a Russian
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
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Harriman as

well never became aware of Roosevelt's true attitude regarding the
Churchill-Stalin
objected

to

agreement

Roosevelt's

of

October

complacency

1944.

85

regarding

The

Ambassador

Eastern

only

Europe,

a
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situation he futilely tried to change.
Harriman's memoirs

reflect

an

ignorance

that would eventually

infect all of Washington following FDR's death:
I don't understand now, and I do not believe I
understood
at
the tine,
just
what
Churchill
was
accomplishing by these percentages. I know that he wanted
a free hand in Greece, with the support of the United
States...Churchill certainly knew that President Roosevelt
insisted on keeping a free hand and wanted any decisions
deferred until
the three could meet together.
The
interesting thing is that when they did ggset at Yalta, the
question of percentages was never raised.

By Yalta, however,
Stalin's mind,

the issue had already been settled, at least in

and Roosevelt was

not

about to

jeopardize the

San

Francisco Conference with a public debate regarding Russia's sphere of
influence.

He had been prepared to let it go since 1943, and by 1945

it was gone: the Red Army occupied most of Eastern Europe, which it had
liberated.

Truman and the creators had to deal with this occupation,

whereas Roosevelt did not.
According to Deutscher and Horowitz, Stalin upheld his end of the
1944 bargain.

He yielded Western Europe to the capitalists, saving it

from communism, sitting still while British troops moved into Greece in
July 1945, crushing the leftist rebel forces of the National Liberation
Front

(EAM). Furthermore, Stalin supported the Chinese Nationalists,

led by Chaing Kai-shek

and in Yugoslavia he did all he could to

prevent Tito's communist revolution.
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Stalin did not pursue the above policies out of respect for his
allies.

Such

a

notion

national interests.
believed it would.

carried

meaning

only

if

it

suited

Soviet

In this case it did, or at least the dictator
Stalin wanted the establishment of friendly buffer

118

states on his western border, as well as an influence in the strategic
areas which
power.

had

always

been

instrumental

to

Russian

security and

Roosevelt had done his best to accommodate Russia's security

requirements
Unfortunately,

to
he

"lay

a

basis

did not

live

for

long-

long

enough

term
to

cooperation."

carry
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through

his

lengths throughout

the

conciliatory policy.
Stalin,

who had already gone to great

1930's to consolidate his power, was not about to yield what he had
gained through a long and costly war.

Strictly a sphere of influence

person, he understood nothing about Westem-style democracy, believing
it to be a farce.

Because he only understood power, the creators of

American foreign policy mistakenly believed they could deal with Stalin
if they exhibited a power which matched his own.

But Stalin reacted

furiously to Truman's tongue lashing of Molotov, the first real action
of

the

new administration's

change

in

attitude.

Stalin

redressed

Truman by reminding him that the Russians had accepted Britain's right
to

establish

ideologically

compatible

governments

in

Belgium

Greece, because these countries were vital to British security.

and
Why

were the Americans giving the Soviets such a hard time in Poland?
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Stalin also resented Washington's objections to the Groza regime in
Rumania— he and Churchill had agreed to Soviet hegemony there as well.
"Truman had unintentionally reversed FDR's policy of conceding a sphere
of

influence

prerogatives
wrote.
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in
based

Poland,
on

and

geography

refused
and

to

accept

proximity,"

special

Soviet

historian

Larson

Stalin, no doubt, would have agreed with her.

By the end of 1945, both Washington and the Kremlin were c o n v i n c e d
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negoitations
wanted.

between

them would

fail

to

yield what

the

other

one

In early February 1946, Stalin delivered his famous speech to

an election oaimittee in Mosccw. He blamed capitalism for World War II,
much as Lenin had blamed the Western world for World War I. He called
for strenuous five-year plans to step up production, intimating that
such plans were necessary to ward off future capitalistic forces, just
as the five-year plans of the 1930's had saved the Mother Country frcm
Hitler. He extolled the virtues of carmtunism and the Soviet system,
maintaining that the Red Army's strength during World War II had proved
their worth.
Washington dubbed the speech a declaration of war.
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It came at a

time when Washington had publicly voiced concern over Stalin's recent
moves in Iran. Gaddis maintains the discovery of a spy-ring in Canada
just before the speech also influenced its impact.
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On 28 February, in

response to Stalin's speech and the other disturbing incidents, Byrnes
called for an about-face in American policy, declaring that the U.S.
should end the appeasement of Russia once-and-for-all.

He also called

upon America to take its rightful place as the preserver of the world's
status quo against force and tyranny— Soviet force and tyranny to be
sure.

"If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not

only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the
peace of the world."
delivered

a

93

Senator Vandenberg,

speech before

the

Senate

just the day before, had

strongly attacking America's

current foreign policy and calling for the end of appeasement.
The change in American policy, however, had already taken place.
In Stalin's mind,

it took place the day Molotov received Truman's
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scolding.
change

And although Washington may have been unaware of it, their

in

policy

began

ten

months

before

whenHarriman

began

influencing Truman to adopt a quid pro quo approach to Soviet ambitions
in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. He

had tried in vain to convince

Roosevelt to adopt the same approach.

Byrnes'speech on

officially voiced Washington's decision to

recognize

expansion, coupled with tyranny, in Soviet policy.
9

February

voiced

his

official

recognition

28 February

the quest for

Stalin's speech of

of

the

change

in

Washington's policy, and his own avowal to combat it.
It was at precisely this time that George Kennan, holed up in the
Moscow embassy, fuming over America's policy toward the Soviet Union,
received a request frcm the State Department asking for a detailed
explanation of why the Soviets behave as they do.

Kennan recalled the

request in his memoirs, emphasizing the importance of timing in his
answer, simply called "The Long Telegram."
It was one of those moments when official Washington,
whose states of receptivity or the opposite are determined
by subjective emotional currents as intricately imbedded in
the subconcious as those of the most complicated of Sigmund
Freud's erstwhile patients, was ready to recieve a given
message.

Kennan later questioned the capability of a State Department prone to
such emotionalism.

"Increasingly, with the years, my answer would tend

to be in the negative."
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Kennan: "Never— neither then [1933] nor at a later
date— did I consider the Soviet Union a fit ally for this country."

The author
favored

a

of Washington's

"particularlist"

international

affairs,

containment policy/

approach

not

a

to

George Kennan,

settling

"universalist"

conflicts

approach.

in
The

particularlist approach considers that "the thirst for power is still
dominant among so many peoples that it cannot be assauged or controlled
by anything but counter-force."
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Kennan sensed a deep foreboding about

Roosevelt's policy to entice Russia into the United Nations by offering
it concessions.

"An international organization for preservation of the

peace and security," Kennan recorded in his memoirs, "cannot take the
place of a well-conceived and realistic foreign policy."
The more we ignore politics in our absorption with the
erection of a legalistic system for the preservation of the
status quo, the sooner and the more violently that system
will be
broken to pieces under the realities of
international life.

Particularism did not reject the idea of working with other nations to
preserve the peace, but it did recognize "a real ccnmunity of interest
and

outlook,

governments

which
and

is

not

to
upon

be

found

the

only among

abstract

limited

formalism

of

groups

of

universal

international law..." ^
It might be safe to say that Kennan belonged more to a past age
than to the one in which he lived, to the time when a handful of
European diplomats determined whether or not to wage war and what would
be the fate of peace.

Kennan had a great deal of respect for men like

Prince von Mettemich, Viscount Castlereagh and Otto von Bismark, the
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accomplished
empires.

plenipotentiaries

of

Europe's

great

nineteenth-century

Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, these men managed

to keep Europe out of a world war for over 80 years.
these

leaders because of

their

recognition

of

one

Kennan admired
of

the world's

foremost realities— the quest for national self interests among great
nations— and

their

determination

to

deal

pragmatically

with

that

reality.
The diplomats of the 1800's avoided war by keeping a balance of
power among their nations; war waged by any one against the others
would prove to be self-defeating.
power

was

and

would

continue

to

Kennan believed the
be

the

only

glue

"balance of
binding

any

international structure." 9%he ambitions of sovereign states could not
be contained by any international peace organization, Kennan argued.

Stalin, after all, laid no value on peace per se. He
was interested in a world where the interests of his own
personal power would prosper. If "peace" would cause them
to prosper better than "war," he would be for peace...if
the day were to ocme when violence...would serve his
purposes better than Deace, no international organization
would restrain him...' ^

For

this

reason,

Kennan

disliked Roosevelt's

diplomacy and made no secret of the fact.

second-front

Kennan returned to Moscow in

1944, after a seven-year absence, to find Washington engaged in what he
considered

a

deplorable

policy— trying to

convince

Stalin

participate in America's peace-making endeavor.
I found this persuasion to be unwise and regretable
because it helped to feed the impression...that it was we
who were anxious for their collaboration and friendship, we
who wanted something from them, we who, for seme reason,
could not face the
problems of the postwar era without
dangling before our public opinion at least the facade of
Big Three collaboration.

to
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Frustrated,

Kennan

nonKkxrmunist

found

Poles

to

himself
invite

working

to

the

on

the

problem of

dicussions

to

which

formulate

a

coalition government, never doubting all the while that it was a "lost
cause."
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Kennan's own feelings on the subject were ignored by the State

Department. Upon his return to Russia, he made the Garment "that none
of these

reflections

had merit,

superiors in Washington."

at

that tine,

in the eyes of my
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The above observation is true of Kennan's entire career prior to
1946, when Washington finally read The Long Telegram. A pensive and
sensitive

man,

Kennan

remained

obscure

in

the

State

Department

throughout the 1920's and 30's. Kennan pointed out in his memoirs that
the Foreign Service had been established in 1924, just two years before
he entered.

He decided to enter into the Foreign Service, as he tells

it,

"I did not know what else to do."

because
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He left Princeton

University in 1924 as "obscurely as I had entered it" and considered
himself, at that time,
weaknesses

and

"an ordinary youth, assailed by very ordinary

passions."

10*1

He

thoroughly

enjoyed

the

study

of

international relations in college, however, and had flourished at it.
Even so, he did not want to pursue the field academically, believing it
would throw him into an

"occupational rut."

He chose the Foreign

Service instead, a career decision he never regretted.
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His decision to serve in Russia, however, was a bit more pragmatic
and a

little romantic,

historian.
Russians,

He
but

knew
that

both

America
they

characteristics
presently

would

be

had

of
no

this

statesman

relations

forthcoming.

with

Furthermore,

and
the
he

remembered with fondness his grandfather's cousin and his namesake,
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George Kennan, who devoted his life to the study of Russia, especially
the penal system which sent so many of Russia's revolutionaries into
exile.

Calling it "a family tradition," Kennan embraced the study of

Russia, its language, its people, and its foreign policy tradition.
Kennan felt a certain affinity for the Russians and their late
entrance into the Industrial Revolution. Raised in a pioneering farm
family frcm the South, Kennan admits that the eighteenth century lasted
fifty years longer for him— just as it did in Russia. His father found
the new twentieth century that was dawning a bit

"disturbing...and

incomprehensible."
It is, I suppose, to this shallowness of grounding in
the nineteenth century, and this inherited partiality for
the eighteenth, that I must attribute the discomfort I
experience in my cwn status as a contemporary of the
twentieth.

Kennan also felt uncomfortable with the Russian Revolution, which
so clearly pitted socialism against capitalism.
own

agrarian background

provided

him with

He confessed that his

little

reality of capitalism's expolited and expoliter.

exposure

to

the

He admitted there

must be seme truth to Marx's theory, that the class struggle had to be
a "real phenomenon," but he "retained the privilege of viewing it as
the product of a tragic 'misunderstanding'

(to use Chekov's charitable

term) in the early development of industrial society, not as a dramatic
encounter between demons and angels."
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One gets the feeling that Kennan belongs, in part, to the Lost
Generation, the Fitzgeralds and Jungs and Hemingways who had such a
difficult time dealing with the global effects of World War I. In the
introduction of The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, Kennan wrote:
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I was a young and rather lonely young man, living in
Germany and the Baltic states, consuming...seme of the
great German and other war literature of the Weimar period:
Remarque, Hemingway, Bulgakov, and others.
The initial
effect of this confrontation through the printed page with
a reality— namely the holocaust of 1914-1918— which lay
scarcely in a decade past was to force me to ponder the
immense and, .^pparent injustice the recent war had
represented.

Kennan went to Russia in 1931, to Riga. In 1934, after Roosevelt
and Litvinov had made the agreements for formal recognition of the
Soviet Union, Kennan went to Moscow as part of the official American
embassy.

There, he would be a witness to the Kirov assassination and

Stalin's

purges,

becoming

part

of

the

disillusioned

delegation

stationed in the Soviet capital at that time.
Regardless of the purges, however, Kennan had not been pleased
with the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements,

accusing FDR of using weak

language

in

during

the

negotiations

and

the

subsequent

treaty,

"verbiage that had failed to be effective in protecting the interests
of other countries dealing with the Soviet Union." This would be the
beginning of Kennan's displeasure with the way Washington dealt with
the Kremlin.
This episode has remained in my mind as the first of
many lessons I was destined to receive...on one of the most
consistent
and
incurable
traits
of
American
statesmanship— namely, its neurotic self-consciousness and
introversion, the tendency to make statements and take
actions with
regard not
to
their
effect
on
the
international scene...but rather to their effect an those
echelons of American opinion, congressional opinion first
and foremost...'1‘

In addition to FDR, Kennan accused John Hay of doing this in the Open
Door

Notes,

Doctrine."1^

as

well

as

Harry

Truman

"when

he

gave

the

Truman
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Kennan remained in Moscow until 1938, then he went to various
places in Europe until 1944, when he was called back to Moscow in
Averell Harriman's absence.
when

the Treasury

He had been in Moscow only a short time

Department

wrote

to

the

embassy,

explanation of why the Soviets behave as they do.

requesting

an

According to Kennan,

what prompted the request was Stalin's refusal to join the World Bank
and Monetary Fund.

The query excited Kennan, who had longed for a

chance to tell what he knew, what all his years of study and experience
had taught him about the Russians.
wrote.

"They had asked for it," Kennan

"New, by God, they would have it."

113

Kennan's main thesis of The Long Telegram, written 22 February
1946, would be repeated one year later in the controversial "Sources of
Soviet Conduct."
behavior.
internal

It discussed the intricacies of Russian diplomatic

Kennan
workings

believed
of

the

the

behavior

to

be

Soviet totalitarian

influenced

system.

by

the

Because

the

regime had to maintain absolute power, it was imperative to invent a
hostile world environment from which the people had to be protected.
This would allow the maximum amount of control.

Not only would the

population be willing to succumb to tyrannical police methods

"for

their own protection" frcm outside malevolent forces, but the Soviet
Union could erect an "Iron Fence" to keep the people walled off from
outside

influences

attempting

to

cause

dislocation.

Propaganda

denouncing the capitalistic world as imperialistic and war-bound helped
to maintain the illusion of the necessity of the Iron Fence. For these
reasons, Kennan theorized, negotiations with the Kremlin would always
prove futile.

The Politburo had to maintain an adversarial position
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vis-a-vis the Western world and especially the United States, or its
main

reason

for

assuming

absolute

power

over

its

people

would

disintegrate.

Kennan

looked to Russia's history for an explanation of

its

inability to deal with the Western world, and the Russian Revolution
itself, whose outcome Kennan had such trouble accepting.
It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had
smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western
Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in
Russia. Only in this land which had never kncwn a friendly
neighbor or indeed any tolerant equlibrium of separate
powers, could a doctrine thrive which viewed eoancmic
conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. 114

The

State

fascinating.

Department

found

Kennan's

and

message

Forrestal distributed copies to hundreds of naval and

army officers, making it "required reading."
copy,

telegraphic

of course

Byrnes

read

it.
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Acheson was given a

Clark Clifford

prepared his

September 1946 report on United States-Soviet relations based upon its
contents, a report which the President read.

Schlesinger wrote that

"much of American policy during those years can best be understood
within

the

policy

assumptions

outlined

in

the

paper "

° Clifford

directly quoted Kennan's telegram in several places of his report.
In

the

debilitating.

telegram,

Kennan's

attitude

toward

Russia

was

He waited a long time for the opportunity to write the

dispatch for the State Department. Now, the statesman felt a surge of
relief at his chance to reveal the motives behind Soviet policy; and to
put to rest once and for all the notion that the Kremlin would respond
reasonably to negotiations.

Although Kennan was well aware of national

interests and the part they played in determining policy, he seemed to
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forget that America had ambitions, too.

Perhaps everyone in Washington

did, conveniently.
Kennan warned that Russia would try to influence Turkey and Iran,
and that it desired access to the Persian Gulf. The telegram's most
important contribution, however, that the Soviet Onion would be willing
to consort with the ocmmunity of nations if it was offered "large-scale
long

term

credits"

seems

to

have

been

overlooked

by

Washington,

especially Byrnes. If Russia is not offered aid, Kennan wrote, "it is
possible that Soviet foreign trade would
Soviet's

own

principle

of

security
general

sphere...and
economic

a

be

cold

restricted

shoulder

collaboration

largely to

turned

to

the

among nations." ^ T h i s

fact, that collaboration was even possible, is contradicted by Kennan
toward the end of the telegram:
In summary, we have here a political force committed
fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary
that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be
secure. 118

The purpose of this paper is not to determine the accuracy of
Kennan's analysis.
overall

Certainly there is a great deal of truth in the

assessment— any

totalitarian

maintaining control over its people.

regime

must

have

ways

of

Whether or not Kennan figured out

Stalin's main method of control is hardly the point.

Washington's

inability to negotiate a lasting peace settlement with Stalin could now
be justified with Kennan*s analysis— the Soviets were simply impossible
to deal with, and always would be.

No external offering, regardless of

its efficacy, would move the Russians.
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Washington could not admit to such allegations in the late months
of 1945 and the beginning of 1946; public opinion still placed faith in
the Russians,

America's

ally.

The

time

would

cone

when

Kennan's

analysis would be converted into policy, but for new Truman continued
to negotiate with

Stalin, hoping all the while he would not have to

abandon FDR's Grand Design. James Byrnes continued to press for a peace
settlement in the Eastern European satellites, but the September Peace
Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London, proved
to be a fiasco.

The American Secretary of State met privately with

Molotov, before the British foreign minister arrived, hoping that such
preferential

treatment would

convince

the Kremlin

that

the

United

States was not forming an Anglo-American bloc against the coimunist
state.
Regardless of the efforts to negotiate, hcwever, relations between
the two remained

cool.

Byrnes

insisted the

Rumanian andBulgarian

governments be reorganized according to the Polish precedent, allowing
elements from other political factions to participate in a coalition
government.

Molotov insisted that Poland was different, that Bulgaria

and Rumania were just as democratic as Italy, whom the United States
and Britain had recognized with no hesitation.
allow any

factions

with

Western

interests

into

Molotov refused to
the

Bulgarian

and

Rumanian governments, wishing these areas to remain explicitly under
Soviet influence:
If the United States had been invaded by Mexico and
the Mexicans had occupied a part of the United States as
the
Soviets had suffered at the hands of Rumania,
the
American government would not tolerate a hostile government
in Mexico. 11y
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The failure to arrive at a peace settlement in September prompted
Byrnes to try one more tine,

in December. He called for the Peace

Conference to be held in Moscow, hoping the Soviets would prove more
yielding in their hcire court.

Byrnes managed to negotiate a settlement

allowing for U.S. and British recognition of Bulgaria and Rumania, but
the

terms

were

so

disagreeable

secretary's demise.

to

Truman

that

they

led

to

the

This time Bymes did business directly with Stalin

instead of Molotov, whan he considered stubborn and dishonest.

Stalin

agreed almost immediately to allow a few other political factions to
enter the Rumanian government.

Furthermore,

he would

"advise"

the

1PCI
Bulgarian government to broaden its political base. ' u
Truman angrily
reasons,

the

criticized

least of

the December

them being

conference

Soviet dominance

Bulgaria. He was furious with Bymes,

for several

in Rumania

and

mainly for political reasons.

The Secretary of State had been, of late, failing to issue satisfactory
briefings back to the President. Truman learned about the Stalin/Byrnes
negotiations from the press; and even after B ym e s issued his report to
Washington,
account.

there had been

just as many details

in

the newspaper

Truman disliked his Secretary of State's nonchalant attitude,

the failure to keep him well-abreast of all proceedings.
thinking

about

a

new

secretary,

his

first

choice

He began

being

General

the

December

Marshall.
The main
settlement

reason

went

for

deeper

Truman's

than

an

disagreement with

insubordinate

employee

and

Soviet

hegemony in Rumania and Bulgaria. This is obvious from the angry letter
the

President

wrote

to

Bymes

immediately

following

the

incident.
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Truman saw the threat of a chain reaction,
theory',

not unlike the

in current Soviet policy if allowed to continue.

'dcmino
In the

letter, Truman voiced the most concern over the current situation in
Iran. Truman canpared the Kremlin's program in Iran to its takeover in
Estonia,

Latvia and Lithuania. New, it was clearif the Soviet Union

was not

stopped itwould invade Turkey and take

straits to the Mediterranean.

over the Black Sea

121

Truman thought Rumania and Bulgaria should be the stopping point
for Soviet expansion, a symbol to the Russians that America would not
tolerate any more "incidents" that resembled expansion.
think we

should play

"I do not

compromise any longer," Trumanwrote to Bymes.
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We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria
until they comply with our requirements; we should let our
position in Iran be known in no uncertain terms and we
should continue to insist on the internationalization of
the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea
Straits and we should maintain complete control of Japan
and the Pacific.

Truman was not finished yet, however.

"We should rehabilitate China

and create a strong central government there.

We should do the same

for Korea....I'm tired of babying the Soviets." The letter was written
5 January 1946.
Obviously Truman felt Turkey and Iran to be of more strategic
importance to the United States than Eastern Europe.

Like Roosevelt

before him, President Truman never considered going to war over the
fate of

Poland or any other state which held so little strategic

interest

to

Yugoslavia

the
and

United

States.

Bulgaria,

The

provided

Balkans, hcwever,
a

close

channel

particularly
into

the

Mediterranean and the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. ^^Truman
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refused to recognize these states unless their governments were formed
according to the principle
brushed

aside

the

problems

of
of

self-determination.
self-determination

Even
and

so,

Truman

recognition,

referring them to the Council of Ministers, to meet at a later date.
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A more urgent concern at Potsdam was internationalizing the Black Sea
Straits; nonrecognition of the Balkans was simply a method of staying
Soviet hegemony in the region.
Iran,

too,

caused

concern.

Strategically it held

gateway to the Persian Gulf, the means to transport the oil.

oil

and

a

President

Roosevelt began thinking of this critical area and its importance to
the waging of m o d e m

industrial war early in the war.

He placed

General Patrick Hurley in Iran and other Mid-Eastern countries in 1943
as his

"personal representative," to

study the region for possible

economic and political infiltration of the American way.
Hurley issued his Iranian "report" to Roosevelt on 23 December
1943.

It outlined the economic and political shape of the country,

making recommendations on hew best to influence the nation to became a
Western, liberal democratic state.
toward Iran,

therefore,

"The policy of the United States

is to assist in the creation in Iran of a

government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of
free enterprise..."

the report began.

By this program... of self-help Iran can achieve for
herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice,
freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of
speech, freedom frcm want, equality of opportunity, and to
a degree freedom frcm fear.

And, one could also add, freedom to trade oil with the United States.
Hurley recommended that the American government assist the Iranians
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"concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant
125

for a[n oil] concession."

Roosevelt found the letter "very interesting."

1 7R

"I was rather

thrilled," he wrote to Secretary of State Stettinius, "with the idea of
of using Iran as an example of what we
-American policy.

could do by an unselfish

We could not take on a more difficult nation than

Iran. I would like, however, to have a try at it."
program outlined

in his

building of free nations."

report as

a

simple

Hurley defined the

plan

"to promote the

1 27

The report also discussed the imperialism

of Great Britain and the socialism of the Soviet Union, both obstacles
which must be
was

to

overcome if the plan to turn Iran into a "free

work.

Hurley had

faith

in

the ability

diplomacy" to take care of these little problems.
As

the

nation"

of FDR's

"world

1

Soviet Union began to encroach upon Turkey and

Iran,

throughout 1945 and into 1946, Truman's foreign policy was bound to
change; those areas dictated it, whereas Eastern Europe did not.

His

anger that Russian troops were still moving into Iran in late 1945, as
the deadline for Soviet
the letter he

troop withdrawl drew closer, was manifested in

sent to Bymes.

Turkey to negotiate bilateral

At the same time, Stalin was
control

of

the Dardanelles,

pushing
ignoring

completely Truman's proposal for the "internationalization" of those
waterways.
As

Stalin

correctly

reasoned,

internationalization meant

that

Russia would lose sovereign control over the straits, a goal of every
Russian Tsar since Peter the Great. The Soviet dictator did not want to
share control, and Truman was not about to hand the straits over to
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him; their geopolitical position made them too important.

Making that

part of the world a United States sphere seemed the only recourse, and
the creators of America's foreign policy had started thinking in these
terms by early 1946.
Edwin Wilson,

A report frcm the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey,

to Bymes,

dated 11 March,

stated that "Soviet troop

movement in Iran toward the Turkish frontier would indicate that USSR
may shortly be in position to strike at Turkey if and when this should
appear advisable frcm viewpoint Soviet interests."
Soviet objectives as the

installation of

a

The report cited

friendly government

in

Turkey so it could secure control of the straits and "putting an end to
Western influence in Turkey." ^^En early 1946, Byrnes' memoirs also
anticipated Soviet domination of Greece and Turkey:
Greece is apparently their first objective. They are
likely to seek next the usual infiltration methods, control
of the Italian government. This would be because of the
military effect it would have on Greece and Trukey. I do
1 is to dominate, in one

The Soviet Union, though, eventually backed down in both Turkey
and Iran. Troop build-up in Iran continued until March 1946
Department report on the status of northwestern Iran, issued 23 January
1946, had this to say:
Although oil has not been mentioned during the current
dispute, seme observers believe the Iranian government1s
refusal to grant broad concessions in northern Iran to the
USSR in 1944 is the cause of the present difficulty.^ 32

By 6 April an agreement had been reached between the Iranian government
and

the

Soviets,

the

main

tenet

being

"An

agreement

Irano-Soviet Oil Ccmpany" to be submitted within seven months.

for
133

joint
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Russia was not the only country wanting Iranian oil.
to Roosevelt's experiment

to

make

Iran

a

"free

In addition

nation,"

American

businessmen were in carmunication with the State Department for control
of Iranian oil fields.

A dispatch dated 4 August 1944, sent fran the

Charge in Iran to the Secretary of State, urged "upon the Department
utmost necessity of prevailing upon
Tehran without delay...that American

ccmpanies to get their men
companies

send

to

representatives

fran highest executive level to canplete presentation of bids, if an
American firm is to get

concession... .to gain this rich prize for

American interests will require quick action..." ^ ^
The Russian delegation, also on its way to bargain for the oil,
did not arrive in Teheran until 21 September.
as the bid was accepted 1 September.
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It apparently lost out,

The proposed Irano-Soviet Oil

Company, negotiated two years later, did not succeed either.
The Shah of Iran did not want the Soviet Union involved in Iranian
oil concessions, or in any other facet of his nation.

On 5 March 1946,

the Iranian government officially asked the United States to assist it
in obtaining the "unconditional evacuation of Iran by Soviet forces."

1

Turkey as well wanted the Soviet Union to quit its harrassment for a
bilateral treaty to control the straits.

1 37

On 7 June 1945 the Soviet

Union officially announced to Turkey that it wanted a base on the
straits.

Turkey realized it would need help frcm more than just the

British, who were overextended in the area and
Turkish objective,

therefore,

"tiring fast... .The

became one of securing peacetime U.S.

military and diplomatic support for Turkish territorial integrity and
the maintenance of the status quo in the straits."
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The United States complied with that policy.
Forrestal

asked Bym e s

what

he

thought of

a

On 28 February 1946,
"task

Mediterranean as a sign of support for the region.
idea.

force"

in the

By m es liked the

He sent the USS Missouri to Turkey as a "shew of flag."

More

ships were sent in the course of the year, and Forrestal announced that
the American government would maintain a permanent naval presence in
the Mediterranean. ^ % y the end of 1946, Soviet pressure on Turkey had
abated.

With the Soviets retreating in both Iran and Turkey, it would

seem reasonable to expect Washington to soften its attitude toward
Moscow. The Greek

civil war,

however,

going on at the

same time,

revealed a new dimension to the contest for hegemony in that region of
the world.
World War II brought real trouble to Greece, unleashing the forces
which sent the old order crumbling and gave rise to a broadly-based
leftist resistance movement. ^^Starvation and unemployment were rampant
in the country by 1944, and the left-wing liberals would no longer
trust their fate to a monarchy.

Great Britain had always kept the

status quo in the Mediterrenean intact, shouldering the responsibility
for Greece's defense and liberation during the war.

England harbored

the Greek king, George II, during the war, well aware of the opposition
growing against him within his own country.
Britain's

job became more difficult with the formation of the

National Liberation Front in September 1941, known as EAM. Although
organized by the Greek Communist Party, the EAM was
predominantly a non-Camrnmist organization, with a
membership by 1944 of perhaps 1 1/2 million people (out of
Greece's 7 1/2 million) and armed forces (ELAS) of about
50,000
guerilla
fighters.
Thousands
of
republican
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officers, large numbers of women and peasants, virtually
the entire labour movement, and a surprising array of
clergymen and intellectuals took up the resistance cause.

After

the

liberation

of

Greece

in

1944,

Churchill

restoration of the Greek king, George II, to the throne.
and war-torn population, under the guidance of EAM
against this.
Papandreou.

favored

The starving

leaders,

fought

Churchill installed a coalition government under George
Although

it

contained

seven

communist

ministers,

primarily consisted of political factions to the right and center.
people rebelled in December
countryside.

Greece's

1944,

communist

Yugoslavia, offered support.

with EAM forces
neighbors,

it
The

controlling the

Bulgaria,

Albania

and

Moscow stayed away from the conflict, as

Stalin premised Churchill it would.

Churchill himself praised Stalin

for upholding his end of the June 1944 sphere of influence agreement.
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There is doubt as to hew much influence the Soviets ever had over the
EAM, even in 1947, at the time of America's intervention.
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The bloody civil war in Greece would continue until 1949.

The

dilemma for American policy makers was whcm to support— the right-wing
conservative

politicians,

clearly not

left-wing resistance movement.

the people's

choice,

or

the

It was impossible to support the EAM,

which would threw the strategic Mediterranean into the hands of the
communistic Balkans, too close to Moscow's influence.

On the other

hand, the ideals of the National Charter promulgated self-determination
and free elections.
possible

Roosevelt had

favored an election as

soon as

144
, but the election continued to be postponed at Churchill's

insistence.

After FDR's death,

reports

frcm Lincoln MacVeagh,

the

American ambassador in Greece, to Secretary Stettinius confirmed the
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need for an election but feared the result would be a government too
far to the left.
American

145

officials

tried

to

push

for

a moderate

government.

Britain had maintained troops in Greece since its 1944 invasion, hoping
to quiet the region enough to hold negotiations between the EAM and the
British

inposed

government.

Negotiations

brought

about

several

agreements, but neither side could suppress its hostility and anger.
Reports

coming

from

the

EAM

coalition

government

repressing

the resistance movement's freedom of speech and

supporting

terrorist

raids

flush

thorughout

well-known EAM leaders.
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monarchist right winning.

spoke

the

of

the

countryside,

trying to

out

In March 1946 elections were held, with the
Only 49% of the population registered to

vote, however, and the left boycotted the elections.
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Seven months

later King George's restoration to the throne sent the nation into
bloody civil war again as leftist factions rose up in protest against
what they considered an oppressive unjust regime.
On the eve of the March elections,
the

Kermlin1s

Kennan sent a dispatch to

Washington

relating

account

of

the coming

elections.

Quoting from the Moscow publication,Red Fleet:

Greek

It is plain to all honest and impartial observers that
elections new being prepared are an attempt to provoke
Monarchist-Fascist coup d' etat under mask of "legality"
and thereby deceive world public opinion.
As Eleutheria
stated, Greek people will hardly accept authority imposed
upon it without resistance. 148

Theydid not.

Because of the right-wingelectoral victory, the nation

continued to be convulsed by civil war.

The only thing keeping

the

monarchist government afloat was Britain's assistance, and that could
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not go on much longer.

As early as fall, 1945 London asked Washington

for assistance in raintaining Greek independence against "what Western
officials believed was a Soviet instigated threat."

Throughout 1946,

in spite of protests caning from the left, exposing the repression of
King

George's

regime,

Washington

knew

it

had

to

support

the

undemocratic right or face the alternative: a communistic government in
Greece,
Balkan

bordering
states.

on

The

the Mediterannean
Greek

government

and

the

already

asked

the

United

oomrunized
States

for

assistance, knowing their only salvation lay in continued support from
the Anglo-American bloc.

When the British officially pulled out on 21

February 1947, America readily stepped in.
The decision to intervene in Greece, assuring the continuance of a
right-wing regime counter to the will of the people and the downfall of
the leftist resistance movement, was the beginning of America's policy
to support the government most likely to enhance the interests of the
United

States.

The

creators

of

this

policy

implications of supporting an unjust regime.

did

not

like

the

On 3 January 1947, after

the Greek monarchist government had already asked for U.S.

economic

assistance, Byrnes expressed the need for the government to change, to
become more representative of the people.
Although
US
recognizes
importance
of
Greek
independence and territorial integrity, our views on
desirable character and policies of Greek Govt have not
changed...all loyal political jparties should unite to form
most
broadly
based
govt
possible
dedicated
to
moderation...now is the time to subordinate unessential
differences and cooperate in policies that will remove, as
far as possible, legitimate criticism of Greek Govt and
causes of internal dissension. 1 50

But MacVeagh assured the Secretary in the summer of

1946 that "No
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'terrorism' can possibly exist in a country under Anglo-Saxon hegemony
which can be equated with
Communism wherever it goes."

that which accompanies Russian-supported
151

The State Department had to believe such

equivocations to justify its own polices.
This

is

where

George

Kennan's

role

as a

creator

becomes

so

instrumental, for Kennan's Long Telegram provided such justicfication.
Kennan himself admitted the timing of the telegram was perfect.
months earlier,"

Kennan reasoned,

"Six

"this message probably would have

been received in the Department of State with raised eyebrows and lips
pursed in disapproval." ^^Gaddis wrote the following regarding the role
Kennan played:
To insist that Kennan's thinking either shaped or
reflected
that
of
the
administration would
be
to
oversimplify, for in fact it did both.
Kennan himself
acknowledges having played a decisive role in certain
areas...But Kennan's overall strategic concept...did not
emerge
fully formed in
1947;
it was
as much
a
rationalization for (and at times, a critique of) what the
administration did during the next three years as it was an
impetus to those actions. 153

The

State

Department

needed

to

ideologically assess

diplomatic behavior and relate it to its own.
comnunistic-oriented

regime

in

control would not be sound policy.
and

the

balance

of

power.

an

area

the

Kremlin's

Losing Greece to a

already

under

communistic

It was a question of power politics

"Containment,"

wrote

Gaddis,

"is
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another way of restoring a balance of power in the world."

just

Britain ,

unable to maintain its traditional role in the Near East, had to be
replaced by America. Churchill knew it, and set the stage for such a
takeover on 9 March 1946, with his famous speech delivered in Fulton
Missouri. Be called for an Anglo-American alliance, now that an "iron

141

curtain" had been drawn all around Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 18^
Anticipating the future,

knowing full well

his nation

faced

grave

economic danger, Churchill used ideological fervor to turn the conflict
of power politics into a clash between good and evil.

He painted a

grim picture for his idealistic American audience.
So did Kennan, although it was clearly not his intention.
however, exactly what Washington had wanted to hear.
long

Telegram

circulated

throughout

Washington,

It was,

After the famous
Forrestal

brought

Kennan heme to head the newly established National War College in
Washington,
the

"dedicated to the study of political-military affairs at

highest

level."
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His

success

in

that

position

attracted

the

attention of Secretary of State Marshall. He appointed him director to
the

newly

formed Policy Planning Staff

in May

1947,

organized to

formulate and develop "...longterm programs for the achievement of U.S.
foreign policy objectives."

1R7

It was actually Forrestal's request that prompted Kennan to write
the famous
known.

"X Article,"

as

"The Sources of

Soviet Conduct"

became

The Secretary of the Navy was so taken by Kennan's viewpoints

on Russia that he sent him a paper on Marxism and Soviet power, asking
for Kennan's Garments.

Kennan replied that he would rather write his

own views on the subject and Forrestal readily agreed.

Forrestal liked

the paper Kennan wrote so much that he gave it to the Secretary to
read. 158
Early in January 1947, Kennan spoke on the subject of Soviet
objectives to the Council of Foreign Relations, using the paper he had
written for Forrestal as a guideline for his lecture.

The editor of

142

the

council's magazine,

Hamilton Armstrong,

was present.

Kennan to sufcmit in writing the topic of the presentation.

He asked
The result

was "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," signed with an anonymous "X." The
article appeared

at the end of June inthe

July issue of Foreign

Affairs. As it coincided with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall

Plan, and as it penned the

word "containment," it

correctly assumed the status as rationale forWashington's supposedly
newly-formed policy.
Kennan,

in

159

the

article,

explained that

the Kremlin

must

be

contained because "there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere
assumption of a connunity of aims between the Soviet Union and powers
which are regarded as capitalists."^ Its ultimate goal was to "make
sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the
basin of world power."

It had all the time in the world, because it

believed in "the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of
its destruction...."

Kennan cited the hostility between capitalism and

socialism as an inherent part of the Soviet tradition which could not
be modified.
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"In these circumstances," Kennan wrote in the article,

"it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and
vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies."

162

Kennan called for containing the Soviet Union at a "series of
constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to
1C O

the shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet policy...."

He did not, however,

consider all points on the globe to be of the sane importance.

This

was the 'particularlist' in Kennan. The United States needed to restore
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the balance of power, not try to make the world over in its image. 164
Those areas which held the key to natural resources, raw materials and
industrial capability were instrumental to U.S. security.

Of course,

Greece and Turkey applied and Kennan approved of the policy of sending
aid to those areas.

He did not apporve of the reasons Truman told the

American piblic it had to be done.

"The internal organization of other

states

of

was

not

a

proper

matter

concern

for

American

foreign

policy." ^ 5
For the creators of American foreign policy, hcwever, it would not
do to publicly create a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and
the Near East, an area vital to the Persian Gulf and the rich oil
passing through it.

Roosevelt recognized the growing importance of

this area, and began making early plans to create a sphere there by
developing a "free nation" in the truest sense of America's superior
values

and

institutions.

No

doubt

he

believed

in

his

own

value

judements, as did MacVeagh when he wrote that no sphere under American
hegemony could be as harsh as one under the Soviets, regardless of
oppressive, right-wing tactics.

Truman knew at Potsdam how vital the

area was— he wanted to 'internationalize' the straits for this reason.
Stalin wanted the area too, and would not cooperate in allowing
American interests to cut him off fron it.
his

weakened

circumstance,

nation,

hcwever,

it seems poor

and

He knew the limitations of

backed

down.

judgment on Washington's

Given

this

part to have

created a Soviet monster and use it for an excuse to send economic aid
to Greece in order to prevent a left-wing communist party from gaining
control.

Throughout 1944 and most of 1945, Stalin contentedly let the
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British roll troops through Greece, stabilizing the country under its
sphere.

He

did

sphere— Poland

this

and

in

Eastern

order

to

Europe;

keep
and

the

West

specifically

out

of

his

Rumania

and

Bulgaria, the areas which he and Churchill had agreed would be under
Russian dominance.
It soon became obvious to Stalin, though, that Truman and the
creators of America's foreign policy had little respect for the deals
which he, Churchill, and Roosevelt had made.

There is no guarantee

that Stalin would have stepped trying to gain influence in Iran and the
Balkans even if Truman had cooperated by recognizing the nations in the
Soviet sphere.

Perhaps a large loan would have helped to convince

Stalin that Washington desired an economically healthy and productive
post-war Russia. In truth, neither Washington nor London wanted this in
the post-war world; the power of the Bear was too great.
Roosevelt would have ocme up against the same problem.

Cordell

Hull's memoirs note a change in Stalin's behavior in the fall of 1944,
right after Stalin and Churchill negotiated their little deal.

Hull

wrote that "we were beginning to get indications that the Russians were
about

to

drive

hard

bargains

Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania..."

in
1

their

armistice

agreements

with

Even though Roosevelt approved the

agreement, he made it conditional for three months only; then it would
have to be discussed.
later date.

Roosevelt postponed many discussions until a

Although he died before the later date arrived, he would

have had to deal with the problems eventually.

No one,

Roosevelt

included, knew what Stalin was going to do in the years following the
war.

Within the State Department, opposition was also growing against
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Roosevelt's methods, particularly frcm Averell Harriman. FDR, had he
lived, would have had to deal with those objections as well.
Most evidence points to the "Yalta Axiom," more than anything
else, making the difference.

Even after Hull noted the

change in

Stalin's behavior, he advocated treating the Soviets with friendship.
He

totally

sympathized

antagonistic
Roosevelt
effort.

and

used

with

hostile

this

Russia's

West,

their

approach— it was

history,

their

xenophobia
his

and

contribution

fear

of
. .

the

suspicions.
to

the

167

war

Yet he knew the power politics of the world were about to

undergo a great change, with America and Russia sharing the lead and
Western Europe going down.

He

sought to control the ambitions of

Russia by convincing it to cooperate in ruling the world instead of
seeking to do it unilaterally.

His efforts are to be ccnmended, but

they fell short of what was needed at the tine.
The

creators

of

America's

foreign

policy

did

not

inherit

Roosevelt's disposition toward Russia. They chose instead the "Riga
Axicm," feeling it would get far better results in "taming the bear"
and establishing a post-war world molded in the American tradition of
foreign policy— Open Door, lew tariffs and nations wishing to cooperate
with such a system.
of their policy.

In retrospect it is easy to ascertain the failure

It is not so easy to determine if Roosevelt's 'axiom'

would have done a better job once the Soviets starting making their
demands known.
George

Kennan wrote

in his memoirs

that

"Never— neither then

[1933] not at any later date— did I consider the Soviet Union a fit
ally...for this oountry." ^^This attitude showed in the Long Telegram

'
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and in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," penning the word 'containment',
officially making

it part of

U.S.

policy.

Yet

Truman knew,

like

Roosevelt before him, that the post-war world had to freely supply, in
the political sense, the raw materials and resources needed to keep
America great.

It came down to a matter of methods and attitudes only

because Roosevelt failed to publicly address the issues when he was
alive.

The

Soviet Union was

never

a

fit ally

for

the

goals

of

America's creators of foreign policy— Roosevelt simply hoped it would
be someday, and that he and his "Grand Design" would be instrumental in
bringing such a transformation about.

The Grand Design, hcwever, the

united Nations, was not a viable organization for solving the problems
caused by power politics in the post-war world, leaving the Kremlin and
Washington face to face in cold war combat, each wanting what the other
did not want it to have.
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Chapter Four— Conclusion: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine."

On 27 February 1947, Dean Acheson delivered a persuasive speech to
a select group of Congressional leaders,1 hoping to convince them to
support the President's forthcoming request for military and economic
aid to Greece and Turkey. The meeting, by invitation only, came just
seven days after Britain had issued two papers to Washington, formally
announcing England's troop withdrawal fron Greece in six weeks and the
end of all economic aid in the area.

Britain asked America to step

into the newly-created power vacuum,

taking

its place and thereby

assuring the continuation of Anglo-American interests.

2

Acheson, the under secretary of state at the time, did remarkably
well convincing those present of the urgency of the situation.
President's

request,

he

and

the

new

Secretary

of

State,

At the
General

Marshall, had been busy drawing up the necessary paperwork to give to
Congress
before.
crisis."

ever

since

the

British made

their

announcement

one

week

Acheson threw himself into the task, which he considered "his
3

General Marshall started to explain the situation to his

colleagues during the Congressional meeting,

but his commentary was

going "very badly," alarming the Congressmen to the possiblility of
seme useless and expensive American
simply to pull

intervention abroad,

"British chestnuts out of the fire."

4

undertaken

It was up to

Acheson to take over the meeting and, in his own words, "scare hell of
out 'em."^ He did this.
Acheson described the pressures Moscow had been putting on Turkey
in the last year in order to obtain access to the Straits. He also
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emphasized the amount of Soviet propaganda which had been filtering
into the oonnunist forces in Greece. The move against Iran, Acheson
said, "for the time being had failed."

Acheson painted a picture of

limitless Soviet expansion if the U.S. allowed Greece to fall to the
communists, the so-called 'domino theory.'

"If they controlled Greece,

Turkey would sooner or later succumb, with or without war, and then
Iran...Fran there the possibilities of penetration of South Asia and
Africa were limitless."*’
Acheson

told

the

Congressional

leaders

that the

issue

was

freedom— America's and the world's— versus Soviet totalitarianism.
Only two great powers remained in the world, Acheson
continued, the United States and the Soviet Union. Not
since Rcme and Carthage had there been such a polarization
of power on this earth. Moreover the two great powers were
divided by an unbridgeable ideological chasm.
For us,
democracy and individual liberty wspre basic; for them,
dictatorship and absolute conformity.

Senator Vandenburg,
gravity.

present

at the

meeting,

spoke first

and

with

"Mr. President," he solemnly told the entire roam, "if you

will say that to Congress and the country, I will support you and I
believe that most of its members will do the same."
to be

sure Congress

Acheson had described.
Schlesinger,

understood

the

situation

8

Vandenberg wanted

in the

global

terms

"It was Vandenberg's 'condition'," wrote Arthur

"that made it possible,

even necessary,

to launch the

global policy that broke through the remaining barriers of American
9

isolationism."
A

few weeks later, on 12 March

1947,

Truman madehis formal

request for funds to Congress. The statement became known as the Truman
Doctrine. More than just a request for funds, his discourse announced
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to the American people a new threat to their security, and hence the
need for a new policy governing the relationship between America and
the

rest

of

the

world.

Without

this

threat,

Washington

feared

Americans might have difficulty grasping the severity of the situation,
insisting instead that intervention into European affairs had nothing
to do with the security of their hemisphere.

So Truman told the people

of all nations that
At the present moment in world history nearly every
nation must choose between two alternative ways of life.
The choice is not always a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the
majority, and is distinguished by free institutions,
representative government, free elections, guarantees of
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and
freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of the
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.
It relies
upon terror and oppression, a controlled pres^Q fixed
elections, and the suppression of personal freedom.

Both Acheson and Truman ignored the reality of the situation in Greece
when they turned the internal struggle of that country into a necessary
crusade against the evil forces of Soviet oomtunism.

The decision to

contain Moscow's sphere of influence where it presently stood in 1947
was

based on

sound

pragmatic

thinking,

an

acknowledgement

of

the

strategic importance of Greece and Turkey to the national interests of
America— the need for economic and natural resources which could not be
provided by the United States alone.

Furthermore, Washington had been

concerned with the region for years; its interest in the area was not
new, nor was the threat U.S. policy makers now emphasized to Congress.
It was only when Britain could no longer maintain the status quo in
Greece that the situation became urgent.
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The tradition in American foreign policy had been,

since the

nation's beginning, to shroud its ambitions in democratic rhetoric and
the task of promoting freedom and justice for all.
offered no exception,

The Truman Doctrine

and it is quite likely that the

creators of

America's post-war foreign policy believed in the illusion, promoted
over the years, that nothing mattered quite so much as aiding other
nations to adopt America's ways, means and institutions.
of course, was the backbone institution.

Capitalism,

Creating "friendly" states

assured its survival, but Washington could not separate its ambition
that America be a rich and powerful nation from the Kremlin's ambition
that the U.S.S.R. be the same.

The failure to do so resulted in cold

war, an arms race which could still erupt into a global catastrophe,
and a containment policy which has extracted from the American people
exhorbitant costs— in both human lives and revenue.
in America's best interests to allow

the civil war to continue in

Greece, inviting Moscow's eventual participation?
what

was

the

ideological

point
battle

of

turning

between

Would it have been

Of course not.

the power struggle there
the

American

way

and

into

But
an

Soviet

totalitarianism?
A

study in the tradition of America's foreign policy

foreshadows
address,

this

the

outcome.

ethnocentric

Ever

since

concept

clearly

George Washington's farewell

that

America

must

shoulder

the

responsibility to provide an example of democracy and justice to the
world denied the possibility than

any motivethe United States might

have was not wholesome and pure.

Its people came to believe in both

the creed and their nation's motives.

As a result, the creed's very
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existence has forced America, over the years, to strive for justice and
equity.

Even

tenaciousness
citizens,
bom

of

though

its

its

efforts,

is ocmnendable.

failures

have

usually

by

The concepts of

been
a

pronounced,

handful

the

of determined

justice and sovereignty,

out of the Age of Enlightenment, have set a standard for human

conduct the world over.
adhere to this morality.

All nations are expected, to sane extent, to
Human beings as well as governments have

created their own systems of chastisement for those who ignore such
ethics.

The credit goes more

immortal

words that all men are created equal,

States as a nation.

to Thcmas Jefferson,

who penned the

than to the United

It was an idea whose time had ocme, and someone

had to say it.
It is not surprising that America, forged on this idea, has had to
struggle

with it ever since.Domestically and internationally,

the

United States has continued in its self-inposed policy to be unique and
above reproach, feeling strongly that there never has been any other
reasonable method of government
democratic republic.

than

that

of

its Constitution

and

Regardless of the shortcomings, it was the best

the world had to offer— so far.

From time to tine, the argument would

crop up that Americans should first establish their morality at home
before trying to push it abroad.
became

obvious,

hcwever,

and

Once the need for foreign markets

intervention

into

foreign

affairs

a

necessity for assuring those markets, the American tradition was too
firmly entrenched; the American people would not approve Washington's
intervention for any other reason than to save the dcwn-trodden fran
the evil of corrupt governments.
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If that sounds too sinplistic for the realities of this world, its
political systems and power struggles to date, it is.

Moreover, it was

when Woodrow Wilson went to war to end all wars? and it was when
Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, the "guiding star"
of the

coalition,

the

"expression of

fundamental objectives toward

which we and our Allies are directing our policies.
The tradition of America's

foreign

relations,

hcwever,

cannot

serve as a good excuse for the eventual disintegration of World War
II's Grand Alliance, the failure of Roosevelt's Grand Design, and the
emergence
aware

of

ofWashington's
the

containment

shortcomings

of

policy.

Roosevelt was

self-determination

and

the

Charter, principles he used to satisfy the American people.

quite

Atlantic

Throughout

the war years he had to walk a tightrope, appeasing Stalin's war aims
while allowing the American people to believe he did not have any.

The

pressure must have been tremendous; and there are those who argue that
Roosevelt
people.

did
For

interference

the best he
this

of

reason,

public

George

opinion

chore

Kennan
into

for

a

has

foreign

always

resented

affairs,

fewknowledgeable

the

believing

diplomacy

to

be

determine

the

best way tonegotiate asettlement without the fear of

offending voters.

a

could given the mindset of the American

people

who

12

Roosevelt did have this fear,
situation bore out.

as his handling of

the

Polish

He knew he would never go to war over Poland, yet

the concerns of Polish-American voters did not allow him the freedom to
publicly negotiate a Polish settlement with Stalin. After Roosevelt's
death, the creators in Washington used Poland as an example of Moscow's

can
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breach with the Atlantic Charter, a reneging which never took place.
Roosevelt's initial agreement with Stalin, which took place at Teheran
in 1943, assured Poland's existence as a state "friendly" to the Soviet
Union in the post-war world.

Yet Roosevelt made this agreement in

secret, resorting to the use of innuendos and obscure language.11 No
doubt Stalin recognized the agreement as tenuous, at best.

Even so,

Roosevelt had accepted Stalin's definition of 'friendly', knowing full
well he intended to establish hegemony in Poland, one way or another.
Nowhere is the use of vague wording and meaningless rhetoric more
pronounced

than

Liberated

Europe.

in

the

Issac

Atlantic

Charter

Deutscher wrote

and

that

The
the

Declaration
"pledges

of

on
the

allies, had, anyhow, been so vague and contained so many loopholes that
by

reference

to the

text

each

side

could

justify its

conduct."

Several historians agreed with him, George Kennan among them.

15

14

It is

hard to believe Churchill or Roosevelt were naive enough to think
Stalin's concept of social democracy would ever change to Westem-style
liberal democracy,
conferences when

yet this is the impression they conveyed at the
the Big Three met.

Stalin had made it clear at

Teheran that he equated democratic parties with parties

that were

friendly, that would cooperate, with the Soviet regime.

The West's

disregard

naivete

ignorance.

for

Stalin's war

aims

cannot

be

excused

by

or

It is certain the West knew of Stalin's war aims and the

problems they posed to America's concept of the post-war world.16 It is
not as clear if Roosevelt realized the problems the obscure language of
the Atlantic Charter would eventually cause.
Poland was the one issue where definition and clarity was needed,
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the one issue which damaged the coherence of the coalition more than
any other.

It set the precedent for future negotiations between the

Big

The

Three.

unsettling

of

issues

with

meaningless agreements became the norm.

ambiguous

language

and

In spite of Stalin's clear

intentions, or because of them, the agreements and cartnuniques signed
at the conferences became too broad to be binding,

saying little in

specific terms about what would be done in Poland and Eastern Europe at
the war's end.
Stalin was determined to return his borders to the configuration
of 1941, to create a protective barrier along western Russia. This was
but one of his war aims.

He made his intentions clear early in the war

when he sent Molotov to London and Washington to push for recognition
of the 1941 border.

Molotov was refused recognition and premised a

second front by his Western partners instead.

The front was never

delivered when first pledged, and thus became the first broken premise
of the coalition, a fact Stalin never forgot.
The

document

which

bound

both

Churchill

and

Roosevelt

to

officially deny Stalin's territorial requests was The Atlantic Charter,
whose principles were so easily bent.

Such ideals may have calmed the

American public, but Stalin agreed to the charter conditionally, with
the qualification that the principles would secure support only under
certain
country.

circumstances,
17

depending

on

the

needs

of

the

specific

Roosevelt chose to publicly ignore these important words.

The interpretation of the Polish agreements hinged on the words
"democratic" and

"anti-fascist," two words which,

in Stalin's eyes,

were not manifested by the London Poles or any other existing Polish
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party

except

his

cwn

puppet

party.

The

West

proceeded to follow a policy of contradiction,
that Poland's government should
include unfriendly elements.

be

knew

this,

yet

it

agreeing with Stalin

friendly but

insisting

that

it

America's ambitions of an open door in

Europe and the rest of the post-war world conflicted profoundly with
Stalin's war aims,

yet

instead of

confronting the

conflict

openly

Roosevelt chose to stall for time, putting off discussions until a
final peace conference which he would never attend.

18

Simultaneously,

he was misleading the public with tales of the coalition's new-found
oneness and unity.
One possible explanation for such a debacle is the tremendous
pressure Roosevelt felt to balance public expectations with reality.
Another is Roosevelt's dream of a United Nations, a vision in which he
obviously placed too much

confidence,

deep-seated and ocrrplex problems.

hoping

that

it would

solve

Russia1s quest for secure borders

and spheres of influence in the Balkans, Iran and Asia was part of its
tradition in foreign relations long before Stalin ever made it the
basis for his foreign policy.

It was rooted in Bismarck's diplomacy,

European power politics and the balance of power.

It was also rooted

in the desire for power for its cwn sake, the nationalistic goal of the
modem, industrial world.
this.

Churchill, a product of Europe, understood

The American people did not.

Roosevelt may have, but

for

domestic political reasons he could not base policy on the existence of
such a world; it denied the American tradition.
Woodrcw Wilson had dreams of overcoming the archaic system of
balancing the power to preserve the peace, but he could not put these
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dreams

into

motion at

Paris

in

1918.

The

Treaty of

Versailles,

hammered out at the end of World War I, destroyed the status quo so
completely that Hitler gathered the support of the demoralized German
people,

rallying

Stalin,

to the

combining

anti-capitalistic

cry

a

that

fierce

principles

their

xenophobic

of

rise

again.

nationalism

with

Marxism-Leninism

politically, militarily and economically,
Western world.

nation would

was

determined,

to survive with a hostile

He would do what he could to assure such survival.

This determination became heightened by historical events as Hitler
rose to power— mainly the isolation and non-recognition of the Soviet
Union by the West, and the policy of appeasement.

This legacy of the

past was too strong to overcome with broad terms, and Stalin was not
about to depend cm Western institutions to secure his borders or to
prevent

Germany

assurance,

not

from rising
America's

still

a

third

time.

unfulfilled dream of

He wanted

Manifest

real

Destiny

to

remake the entire world over in its image.
Yet Roosevelt cannot be faulted for wanting a functional world
body.

The fault lies in letting this nominal agency, still in its

embryonic form, serve as a substitute for diplomacy and negotiations
over territorial disputes.
vague

language,

Stalin's demands were pushed aside with

giving Roosevelt

time

to pursue his Grand

Design,

hoping all the while that Stalin's war aims would dissolve into a
new-found

enthusiasm

for

a

world

peace-keeping

organization.

One

cannot help but think Roosevelt knew the failure of his reasoning as
the war's end drew closer, but the seeds of the future had been sown.
He could not go back to 1943, to Teheran, which had been the time for
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negotiations.

Then, Stalin had a desperate need for his Allies and

lend-lease,

and would have been willing to make concessions.

would

required

have

a

frank

admission

to

the

American

This

public

on

Roosevelt's part of the need to negotiate, an honest admission that
Stalin

harbored

aggrandizement.

the

handle

war

aims

of

territorial

Roosevelt obviously felt such an admission would not

have been tolerated.
to

traditional

More faith in the ability of the American people

reality could

insistence that they do.
difficult situation.

have

made

the

Procrastination

difference,

or

perhaps

an

only hindered an already

Theorizing what could have been, however, is not

a luxury historians can afford to engage in.
Problems beseiged the Grand Alliance, scme rooted in the past,
others arising as the war wore on.

The tragedy of the coalition was

not an unawareness of the problems, but a failure to confront them head
on by negotiating in concrete language about definitive borders.

That

each was suspicious of the other was realized by all; that each had
different war aims was known by all.
Churchill's war aims also

It is prudent to remember that

received Roosevelt's

disapproval.

It is

doubtful that Poland or Eastern Europe could have been saved from
Moscow, but it was certainly possible for the coalition to reach a more
equitable status, giving the United Nations a chance to fulfill its
true purpose.

As it turned out, past suspicions were confirmed and

past hostilities intensified, threatening national security as it never
had been before.

The coaltion surely had the power to overcame the

past and secure the future, at least more than it did.

Refusal to

address the issues gave FDR's successors cause to brand Stalin a liar,
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precipitating the policy of containment.
FDR's

successors

became

the

creators

policy as it was eventually penned.

of America's

containment

Roosevelt knew the Soviet Union

would have to be contained, but his Grand Design was far removed from
the ideological fervor of the Truman Doctrine which carmitted America's
resources anywhere that "free peoples" needed help to "maintain their
free

institutitons

and

their

national

integrity against aggressive

movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes."
1950 the National Security Council

(NSC)

drew up paper

19

In

#6 8 , which

declared that "the assault an free institutions is worldwide now, and
in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free
institutions

anywhere

is

America's

decision

perceived

as a struggle

a

defeat

to contain

everywhere."

Russia

into

a

20

NSC

global

68

locked

phenomenon,

between good andevilby the American people.

FDR's worst fears had become a reality:

all efforts to negotiate a

post-war peace settlement ceased, supplanted by a cold war.
George Kennan did not approve of the Truman Doctrine, which he
felt masked America's true motives in the same rhetoric as the Atlantic
Charter.

Kennan

wrote that

significance to decisions we

"We

liketo...attribute

have already found

a

universal

it necessary,

limited and parochial reasons, to take."
It was not enough for us, when circumstances forced us
into World War I...our war effort had to be clothed in the
form of an effort to make the world (nothing less) "safe
for democracy." It was not enough for us, in World War II,
that the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor...we did not
feel comfortable until we had wrapped our military efforts
in
the
wholly
universalistic— and
largely
meaningless— generalities
of
the
Atlantic
Charter.
Something of this same compulsion became apparent in the
postwar period in the tendency of many Americans to divide

for
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the world neatly into Communistic and "free world"
components, to avgjd recognition of specific differences
among countries...

Kennan complained that the "heart" of the Truman Doctrine, "to support
free peoples who are resisting subjugation," "placed our aid to Greece
in the
.

framework of
.

.

a

universal policy rather than in that of a

.

specific decision addressed to a specific set of cirsumstanoes."

22

It seems odd, then, that Kennan's article, "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct," provided the rationale for Washington's containment policy.
As Kennan himself remarked, however, it was more a matter of timing
than anything else.

Irregardless of anything Kennan had written or

would write in the future,

the decision to

monarchist regime in Greece,

support the right-wing

thereby assuring the

survival of

the

status quo in the region, was never in dispute.
Kennan admits that he did not make his objectives clear enough in
the article.
intention

The gap between ends and means became too large, and his

of

political

involvement.

"Soegregious

containment

soon

came

to

mean

military

were these errors," Kennan wrote in his

memoirs, "that I must confess to responsibility for the greatest and
most unfortunate of the misunderstandings

to which

they

led."

He

called the language of the "X Article" "careless and indiscriminate,"
and

the

recognition

of

the

article's

shortcomings

a

"painful

23
experience."
In spite of Kennan's realizations, one cannot help but wander why
the

wording

of

both

The

Lang

Telegram

and

the

"X

Article"

led

Washington so far away frcm Kennan's intentions and his particularlist
philosophy.

One answer must be

the American tradition in

foreign
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policy— the creators had to account for their

decision to intervene

in Greece in such a way that the American public— and Congress— would
support it.

Kennan's writings contained truths, yes; but the overall

tone reeked with the "Riga Axian." Kennan overlooked the fact that the
Soviet Union may have had sane legitimate reasons to suspect the West,
that the West was indeed guilty of seme inimical acts against it.
Kennan's explanation of the historical circumstances surrounding the
Kremlin's

hostility

tcward

the

West

ignored

both

the

West's

intervention into Russia's civil war of 1918-1920, and its refusal to
align with Russia against Hitler in the 1930's.

24

In the "X Article," Kennan attributed Soviet animosity to ideology
alone: "For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside was
hostile

and

that

it

was

their

duty

political forces beyond their border."

eventually

to

overthrow

the

Furthermore,

The real facts concerning it have been confused by the
existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet
philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of
great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in
Germany...which did indeed have aggressive designs against
the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the
stress laid in Moscow an the menace confronting Soviet
society frcm the world outside its borders is founded not
in the realities of foreign antagonism tut in the necessity
of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority
at hone.

The existence of

such an attitude,

present in Kennan's

"Long

Telegram" as well, made it all too easy for the creators of America's
post-war foreign policy to ignore the ambiguity of the agreements made
at Teheran and Yalta and insist the Soviets follow than unequivocally,
right dewn to the last obscure letter.

It gave the policy makers an

excuse to disregard the interests of the Kremlin, which were termed
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destructive and detrimental to the freedom of the world.

The tone of

Kennan's writings fit the mindset of Washington's creators, who were
tired of dealing with Moscow's intransigence and its refusal to adopt
America's version of the post-war world.

Regardless of whose political

system was the most desirable, Moscow's or Washington's, both were here
to stay.

Roosevelt's awareness of this was keen;

as a result,

he

viewed antagonism and hostility toward Russia as futile.
Unfortunately, Roosevelt's legacy to Truman did not include his
attitude toward Russia. FDR led America's creators to believe Moscow
would adopt his Grand Design in the post-war world.

When Stalin began

insisting that Poland, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans be instilled
with

'friendly' regimes, the creators insisted in turn on a stricter

observance of the Declaration of Liberated Europe and the Atlantic
Charter. Averell Harriman especially went out of his way to convince
Truman that Stalin had to be stopped— via the use of a
policy.

'get-tough'

This turned out to be a fundamental mistake, simply because

such demands were not negotiable with Stalin. Although it would have
been difficult, the creators had it in their power to correct this
error

by

admitting that

the

Yalta

agreement

was

Atlantic Charter nothing more than a "guiding star."

tenuous

and

the

Soviet expansion

could still have been contained, but minus the universal fanfare of
saving the entire world

fran the evils

of

Soviet totalitarianism.

Russia had already backed down in both Iran and Trukey by the end of
1946,

By treating Greece as an individual incident instead of a global

precedent, as Kennan advocated, Stalin would have realized Washington's
intolerance

toward

Soviet

expansion,

political,

ideological

or
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otherwise.

This would have kept negotiation channels open and the

United Nations may

have

proven

a

viable

instrument,

averting

the

ideological conflict of cold war and the concept of a struggle between
evil and good.
Kennan contributed to universal crusade, even though he deplored
the implications of such motives.

His writings, however, did nothing

to promulgate the notion that the Soviet Union should be dealt with as
any other nation seeking power directly in conflict with United States
interests; instead, he turned that country into a menace which could
only be dealt with using extraordinary measures, such as coming to the
aid of any nation whose freedom was threatened, whatever that means.
The EAM in Greece felt its freedom threatened by the Monarchist right,
which held power.

Conversely, the right's political sovereignty was in

danger of being destroyed by leftist rebel forces.
Moscow
prejudiced,
was

called

the

creators

of

Who was right?

America's

foreign

policy

"...according to the authoritative evidence of a man who

'present at the

creation',"

Sivachev wrote,

guided not by facts but by prejudices."

26

"...Washington was

During these years,

the

Soviet historian continued, the "totalitarian model" prevailed among
the thinkers in Washington,
Kennan and

other members

of

influencing waiter Bedell Smith,
the

State

Department.

Stalin

scathingly to the Truman Doctrine within twenty-four hours.

George
replied
He used

America's own opposition to the Doctrine to make his points:
waiter
Lippnann,
for
example,
frankly
points
out...that an American alliance with Turkey would give the
U.S.A. a strategic position, incomparably more advantageous
than any other, from which power could be wielded over the
Middle East.
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Stalin next quoted the New York Times, which proclaimed the advent of
"the age of American responsibility."
Yet what is this responsibility but a smokescreen for
expansion?.. .New that they want to take Greece and Turkey
under their control, they raise a din about "totalitarian
states."

Stalin raised a good point, but there was no double
involved.

standard

Each nation wanted to secure that part of the world for its

own interests.

Clearly, neither nation was mature or insightful enough

to lay aside its ambitions for the sake of peace.

In that respect,

Roosevelt's vision was not fit for the world as it then existed; it
still is not.

Kennan knew this.

Although left weak economically,

Russia emerged as an undisputed world power, as did the United States.
Toqueville's

prophecy

of

so

long

ago

had

cone

to

pass.

This

instantaneous two-power world was most unfortunate when viewed in terms
of America's and Russia's already existent ideologies and the realities
of the past.

Deutscher wrote that a struggle between socialism and

capitalism all too often misrepresented a conflict between democracy
and

ccrtirtunism.

28

His analysis

is well

taken.

It

is

important to

realize that Roosevelt's motives, like Truman's, Stalin's and all the
creators

of

containment,

can

be

questioned.

To

what

extent

are

governments, all governments, sincere, and to what extent do they use
their ideology as a mask to cover up quests for political and economic
power?

There is evidence to support either side of this question and

no clear answers emerge.
William Graham Sumner warned Americans, "If you want war, nourish
29
a doctrine."
Nourishing doctrines

has

been part

of

the American

172

tradition in foreign relations, and the Soviet Union has its doctrine
as well.

Both nations claim their doctrines speak of true democracy,

and both have tried to base their foreign policies on the supremacy of
their ideas, each accusing the other's
seeking world domination.

corrupt political

system of

Geopolitically, hcwever, both Russia and the

United States are rich in land, natural resources and manpower; this
reality was the basis of Toqueville's prophecy, and it had nothing to
do with republicanism or communism.

He foresaw a power struggle, and

astutely guessed it would encompass the globe.
of these

It was not in the name

ambitions, however, that the Grand Alliance broke down and

the containment policy formed.

Without the doctrines, waging a cold

war would have proven sanewhat more difficult.
In truth, neither the political system of the Soviet Union nor the
United States has yet proven to be superior to the other; neither has
achieved

world

peace,

an

end

to

starvation,

disease

or

economic

exploitation, or an abolition of racial and religious prejudice.

Of

course the American system has never, fortunately, produced a menace
like Stalin. Stalin had to be dealt with in the post-war years, but the
methods adopted by the creators of America1s containment policy did
little to change the nature of the dictator1s policies.
hoped to do this, but his strategy failed as well.
Roosevelt

were

relations—

too bound

by

the

traditions

in

Roosevelt

Both Stalin and

their

own

foreign

Stalin to acheive national interests by the use of orthodox

European pcwer politics; Roosevelt to secure his interests by promoting
a

universal

system based

capitalistic-democracy.

on America's

already existing

system of
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The seeds of America's containment policy were sewn in FDR's war
diplomacy, which refused to negotiate a territorial settlement with
Stalin in the post-war world.

This left Truman and his advisors with

nothing but the Atlantic Charter, the Yalta agreement, and their cwn
concept of the post-war world and Stalin's place in it.

The origins of

containment, hcwever, lay dormant throughout the war, and even before,
in the traditions of both Washington's and Moscow's foreign relations.
Both harbored

ambitions

which

excluded

the

other;

both wished

to

'contain' the other's ambitions in order to fully promote their cwn.
There could be no winners and no losers, only face-off after face-off.
This has happened throughout the years since World War II ended; and
many times the absurdity of the policy has been proven.

It is left to

the future to decide its outcome, and leaders of all nations will make
the final choices.
It is fitting to recall seme of Roosevelt's last words, spoken in
his

1945

State

of the Union Address,

the final time he addressed

Congress. The words foreshadowed the danger he knew was caning.

Sadly,

they also spoke to the failure of the Grand Alliance to acheive a
lasting

peace.

The

time

would

core

again,

Roosevelt

seemed

to

indicate, when the world would have to cane up with a better plan for
establishing the peace.
The nearer we came to vanquishing our enemies the more
we inevitably becane conscious of differences among the
victors.
We must not let those differences divide us and blind
us to our more important common and continuing interests in
winning the war and building the peaoe.
International cooperation on which enduring peace must
be based is not a one-way street.
Nations like individuals do not always think alike,
and international cooperation and progress are not helped
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by any Nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdan or
virtue....
Perfectionism,
no
less
than
isolationism
or
imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to
international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to
isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by
a direct attack against international cooperation but
against alleged inperfections of the peace.
In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred
international anarchy to international cooperation with
Nations which did not see and think exactly as we did....
We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow
the -jsame tragic road again— the road to a third world
war.
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